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Reining the Flux: The Meaning of Abstraction in T.E. Hulme's Aesthetics

Yoshio Nakamura

Tracing T.E. Hulme's chronological development of his aesthetics and philosophy, we come across a discrepancy in the writings around 1911-1912 when T.E. Hulme is distancing himself away from the theoretical attachment to Henri Bergson.¹

As is seen manifestly throughout his early and middle aesthetics, Hulme's concept of art is mostly formulated in accordance with the French philosopher's tenets. In "Bergson's Theory of Art" (composed *circa* 1911 or 1912), although admitting that "He [Bergson] has not created any new theory of art" (CW 191), T.E. Hulme stresses as artistic creation "a process of discovery and disentanglement" supporting the Bergsonian concept of reality: the flux:

the big artist, the creative artist, the innovator, leaves the level where things are crystallised out into these definite shapes, and, diving down into the inner flux, comes back with a new shape which he endeavours to fix. He cannot be said to have created it, but to have discovered it, because when he has definitely expressed it we recognise it as true. (CW 194)

For Hulme at that theoretical phase, the most important significance of art lies in that "new shape," which the genuine artist brings back with him after plunging into reality as the flux. The artistic significance expresses Hulme's concept of reality as a division between the perceptions and reality as the flux. In contrast to the fluidity of reality, for him, every perception we see, hear, and feel, and its verbal expression, merely signifies "certain conventional types" (CW 193). Every perception, which is compacted into a verbal expression, originally belongs to the ancestors, and is grafted onto the next generation. But when they have taken over the perception which was vivid at its first contact with the external object and gotten accustomed to the ordinary verbal use, the people on the next generation forgets the freshness of perceived images. Such concepts as the rotten images of objects are conveyed through and within the web of the words in Hulme's early aesthetics. In "Cinder" (1906 and later), "The ideal of knowledge: all cinders [Hulme's early expression of the flux] reduced to counters (words); these counters moved about on a chess-board, and so all phenomena made obvious. / something is always lost in generalization" (CW 14); and in "Notes on Language and Style" (*circa* 1907):

An analogous phenomenon happens in reasoning in language. We replace meaning (i.e. *vision*) by words. These words fall into well-known patterns, i.e. into certain well-known phrases which we accept without thinking of their meaning, just as we do the x in algebra. (CW 24)

This derogatory algebraic side of words and their relation to their images are also Hulme's major critical targets as late as "Romanticism and Classicism" (late 1911 or early 1912). And around 1912, he finds out the ideal expressions in Bergson's philosophy to represent the aesthetic concepts he has embraced from the early stage.

The concept of the flux Hulme employs and accommodates to his own aesthetics, moreover, shows very complex aspects combined with the concept of "action." These are expressed in Hulme's account of Bergson as anti-intellectual in respect of aesthetics:

The two parts of Bergson's general philosophical position which are important in the theory of aesthetic are (1) the conception of reality as a flux of interpreted elements unseizable by the intellect (this gives a more precise meaning to the word reality which has been employed so often in the previous page, when art has been defined as a more direct communication of reality); and (2) his account of the part played in the development of the ordinary characteristics of the mind by its orientation towards action. (CW 193)

The juxtaposition of the flux and the action above lets us assume a practical connection of the flux to the action. Shortly after this passage, Hulme further comments on the relation between reality as the flux and the action:

Man's primary need is not *knowledge* but *action*. The characteristic of the intellect itself Bergson deduces from this fact. The function of the intellect is so to present things not that we may most thoroughly understand them, but that we may successfully act on them. Everything in man is dominated by his necessity of action. (CW 193)

In this passage, we can see Hulme's sceptical attitude toward the external objects. If reality as the flux is regarded as possessing the same kind of quality as Kant's noumenon, human beings lose any legitimate ability to understand the external world, or at best, end up with the same kind of positivist resignation and retreat from the outside objects, resulting in satisfaction with the mere frivolous passive perceptions. The artistic action in this sense might endorse such frivolity of the intellect. We can also see a similar kind of action in a romantic attitude when F. Schlegel introduces the concept of "Ironie" or when Thomas Carlyle's early devilish hero, Tefelsdröckh during the course of his life notices the importance of action, eventually supplanting his sceptical concept of the world. Instead of such a frivolous world, there is a steady base for the two to rely on in order to prevent

themselves from disappearing within the ever-changing phenomena of the external world. For F. Schlegel, it is an intuitive *Idee* which is inherited from the Greek traditions; for Carlyle, it is his ardent belief in God and heroes' intuitive access to manifestations bestowed from the absolute reservoir of Knowledge. Such an intuitive base rules human behaviour towards the external world. Even if they cannot recognise the outside object, it continues to illuminate the path towards that object. Actually, for a time, fascinated by the Bergsonian tenet, Hulme holds a similar intuitive view, which he contrasts squarely to the working of the human intellect.² However, later in Hulme's mature philosophy, he constructs his own philosophy to deconstruct such a blind impetus of intuition. But at that time very much under the influence of Bergson, Hulme does not recognise that Bergson's philosophy is permeated by such a romantic disguise, and he works under its yoke.

In this sense, together with the problem of its mystic intuitionism, would Hulme's epistemological stance merely show the positivist tendency? However strange it sounds, Hulme's aesthetic aim in the early period shows the opposite tendency. Even so, if he considers reality as the flux, artistic representations might be taken as illusory. Or in accordance with such a logical and positivist aspect, such artistic or scientific representations could not acquire any legitimate and affirmative relations to the external world. After distancing himself from the Bergsonian tenets, Hulme employs the abstract form as its substitutes, the concept of which is borrowed from Wilhelm Worringer. At a first glance, this shift in his aesthetic theory seems likely from the viewpoint of his early poetic praxis and his theoretical reliance on reality as the flux. Then, is such an abstract form another expression of the flux? At that time, the study of *Weltanschauung* undertaken by the neo-Kantian philosophers and Husserl differentiates Hulme's concept of the world from the Bergsonian or positivist sense of the world. Thus at the end of this paper, we develop a diametrically different answer from the one we have assumed above, namely Hulme's logical or phenomenological understanding of the world. And with such a concept of Hulme's, artistic expression obtains the position as a part of *Weltanschauung*. This fact also indicates that Hulme can never be regarded as a formalist, who discriminates art for its own sake. As we see later, for Hulme, the new plastic art just means "a side direction" and "springs from and corresponds to a certain general attitude towards the world" (CW 269-70). In this sense, Hulme's inclination towards abstraction in art should be considered through a much wider epistemological stance rather than limited to a certain special type of art. Accordingly, in order to understand this conversion, not only aesthetic but also philosophical thoughts Hulme has learnt during his visit to Germany have to be investigated. In this paper, however, I focus on the aesthetic aspect, especially the meaning of abstraction, which clearly indicates that Hulme's epistemological stance should be differentiated from the Bergsonian and the positivist concepts of the world. This difference also reflects Hulme's detachment from the intuitive formula of action. Investigating these two aspects in Hulme's new theory of the abstract form, confirms Hulme's eventual detachment both from the narrower Bergsonian influence and the wider romantic influence. Actually, Hulme borrows the concept of abstract form from Worringer. However consciously

or not, Hulme utilises this theory in his own way and develop another kind of art theory without falling back again into his previously held Bergsonian theory, or the last disguise of romanticism.

Aesthetic Volition and Abstraction

In “Modern Art and Its Philosophy” delivered on 22 January 1914, T.E. Hulme develops his art theory based on the historical discrimination between “geometrical and vital” arts. The revived geometrical tendency in the contemporary art indicates a new attitude towards the world, which should be differentiated from the traditional one held since the Renaissance. Although he has already vaguely predicted the change of attitude after seeing the Byzantine mosaics of Ravenna in 1911, he must wait for its formulation until Worringer expresses it in his theory of the abstract form:

At that time, in an essay by Paul Ernst on Byzantine art, I came across a reference to the work of Riegl and Worringer. In the latter particularly I found an extraordinarily clear statement, founded on an extensive knowledge of the history of art, of a view very like the one I had tried to formulate. This later year I heard him lecture and had some conversation with him at the Berlin Congress of Aesthetics. (CW 271)

The word “At that time” above denotes Hulme’s visit to Germany from Nov. 1912—May 1913 to re-introduce “to a London readership a whole generation of German poets with which it was previously familiar” (Ferguson 137).³ During this first visit, the impact he received was so immense that his political antipathy towards the country was nearly forgotten. As his letter shows: “I spent most of my time here between the library and the cafes” (Ferguson 140), he absorbs the latest German theories of philosophy as well as aesthetics. Later in the same year he visits Germany again to attend “The Congress on Aesthetics and General Art Theory” (*Kongress für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*) held at the University of Berlin where he listens to Worringer’s lecture for the first time and converses with him. At that time, Worringer’s theory was not widely known until Hulme introduced it to London where he played the role of missionary for German art as well as its aesthetic theories.⁴ Thereafter, Hulme also vigorously evaluates and defends the modern art of such artists as Jacob Epstein and Wyndham Lewis.

Worringer’s most influential work for Hulme is *Abstraction and Empathy*. It might be safely assumed that Hulme read the original German edition during his visit to Germany.⁵ Seeing the great change in Hulme’s aesthetic theory, we can understand Worringer’s theoretical impact upon him. Before Hulme’s visit to Germany, his aesthetic theory is coloured by Bergson’s theory which focuses upon the artist’s intuitional action behind the work of art. However, after gaining access to Worringer’s theory of art, such an intuitive action is completely replaced by Hulme’s new emphasis on the plastic abstract form of art. The fact that the intuitive action of his former aesthetic theory is abandoned also signifies

that the concept of “the flux” also loses its theoretical significance for Hulme. As we have already seen, the flux was coupled with such an instinctive blind action, which was “the faculty that we must use in attempting to grasp the nature of reality” (CW 91). In this sense, the abstraction of art is considered to possess a quality that replaces all the intuitive elements Hulme had earlier insisted upon. Then, just what aspects of Worringer’s theory of abstraction, does Hulme discover that overturns his earlier intuitive and romantic theories of art?

Before overviewing Worringer’s concept of abstraction in art, the aesthetic and philosophical kinship between Worringer and Hulme should be considered. As we have already seen, in some sense, Worringer’s theory is nothing novel for him. Yet the most likely possibility for Hulme’s access to Worringer can be found in Hulme’s unrealised project of a book concerning modern theories of art, the outline of which was published posthumously as “Plan for a Work on Modern Theories of Art” in the appendices of Read’s *Speculation* (Read 261-264). This plan shows us Hulme’s aesthetic and theoretical debts, none of which are mentioned in any of his previously published writings. As Ferguson suggests, its composition date can be assumed to be sometimes during Hulme’s visits to Germany or, at the latest, before he reads Worringer.⁶ The plan is based on a neo-Kantian philosopher Theodor Lipps’ *Ästhetik*, and concerns the differences between the Bergsonian and the German aesthetic theories.⁷ Hulme describes the most urgent question at that time in the plan’s third chapter as follows:

Taking modern arts as known, ask this question—Is there any specific emotion which characterises them all and found in no other activity?—a specifically aesthetic emotion, the experiencing of which constitutes beauty—the sceptical answer to this question—the affirmative—if there is, then what is the nature of this emotion, how can it be defined; this [*sic*] the problem of aesthetics and the one this book principally deals with. (Read 262)

If Kantian practical reason and the romantic practical principle based on the “Idea” as an emotional and aesthetic entity are properly remembered, Hulme’s problem here should be easily understood.⁸ Once deeply influenced by the Bergsonian tenets, namely, a blind belief in intuitive action, Hulme now turns his dubious eye to the intuitive action itself, or more precisely speaking, the relationship between the artistic emotions and the artistic action. The plan says:

Most discussed question—Is art independent or subordinate to human activities and needs?—Kant, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, etc.—though really outside aesthetics proper, yet has bearing on question in (b), for if art is merely a means of conveying ordinary human emotion, then it cannot be defined by any specific aesthetic emotion—in this region come old disputes—romantic, classic, etc. (Read 263)

Though fragmentary, the plan manifestly shows how Hulme has distanced himself from the Bergsonian tenets and the new problems he faces now, which concern whether artistic emotions are applicable to non-artistic fields. If applied to them, especially, “if art is merely a means of conveying ordinary human emotion,” the pure aesthetic emotions are untenable. As already indicated, it is evident that such theoretical self-reflection derives from Hulme’s early belief in the Bergsonian aesthetics in which Hulme formulated intuitive action, or the return to the flux exclusively as the artist’s acquired creative force. Actually, the parenthesized “b” in the quotation above denotes the Bergsonian principle for artistic creation in Hulme’s original plan. At this point, however, Hulme acknowledges the need to compare Bergsonian aesthetic creation to the views of the three philosophers above, and to investigate the romantic emotional and intuitive action, or the practical principle as a purely artistic foil. Yet this reconsideration is still not actually under way. At this time, Hulme is still far from confirming the validity of this reconsideration. In fact, this plan also shows that Hulme is also considering Lipps’ *Einfühlung*, or empathy theory as an alternative basis for his art theory. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the plan, furthermore, ends with Hulme’s indeterminacy which is seen after the chapter of the neo-Kantian aesthetics in the plan: “the problem still open. Future of the Subject” (Read 264). This suspended conclusion suggests both Hulme’s increasing uncertainty about the validity of aesthetic feeling and his dissatisfaction with the neo-Kantian support for the empathy theory. In this context, the art critic who tackles the validity of empathy theory in accordance with Riegl’s historical investigation of art forms, is Worringer. Thus, to Hulme’s theoretical development, it is natural that he is attracted to the first art critic who questions the vital art and the problems of empathy after the Renaissance, which are uncritically presupposed in Lipps’ theory of art.

The most serious problem Riegl and Worringer face in history of art was a materialist view which dominated art history at that time. “Since the florescence of art history took place in the nineteenth century, it was only natural that the theories concerning the genesis of the work of art should have been based on the materialist way of looking at things.”⁹ But for Worringer, the materialistic art theory is just “a point of support for hostility to progress and mental laziness” (Worringer 8). In such a denunciation of the materialist view, Worringer evaluates Riegl’s revolutionary contribution to art history, especially his anti-materialistic art critique to enable himself to make a theoretical shift from the materialistic to the psychological approach in art history:

Riegl was the first to introduce into the method of art historical investigation the concept of ‘artistic volition’. By ‘absolute artistic volition’ is to be understood that latent inner demand which exists *per se*, entirely independent of the object and of the mode of creation, and behaves as will to form. It is the primary factor in all artistic creation and, in its innermost essence, every work of art is simply an objectification of this *a priori* existent absolute artistic volition. The materialistic method, which, as must be expressly emphasised, cannot be altogether identified with

Gottfried Semper, but is partly based on a petty misinterpretation of his book, saw in the primitive work of art a product of three factors: utilitarian purpose, raw material, and technics. For it the history of art was, in the last analysis, a history of *ability*. The new approach, on the contrary, regards the history of the evolution of art as a history of *volition*, proceeding from the psychological pre-assumption that ability is only a secondary consequence of volition. (Worringer 9)

Worringer exclusively focuses on the “artistic volition” in his art theory. Unlike Riegl, however, Worringer gives this concept an *a priori* artistic connotation. As we will see shortly, Worringer’s strategy for solving the materialistic limitations in art history was to contrast the artistic volition and its outcome, abstract forms, to the materialistic world of reality. In such a dualism between the realms of art and reality, Worringer makes a kind of artistic leap of faith over reality as the flux and into the crystalline abstract forms of art. Such an artistic feat for art’s sake, however, is no more than a *tour de force* to cover up and suspend the philosophical and epistemological question of reality. True as it is, in Worringer’s aesthetics, reality as the flux is left untouched and squarely discriminated from the realm of art. As I will discuss later, such an epistemological stance to reality will be the very point to differentiate Worringer’s aesthetics from Hulme’s.¹⁰

Though different, however, Hulme agrees with Worringer’s historical investigation of different attitudes toward the world which are manifestly displayed between the Egyptian and the Greco-Roman, and the Byzantine and the Renaissance forms of art. The Egyptian and Byzantine forms of art are typically abstract in contrast to the naturalistic styles of the Greco-Roman and Renaissance arts. However, these abstract forms of art can by no means be attributed to their deficiencies as the materialist theory explains about these styles, rather reflects their psychological conditions or attitudes towards the world, which he regards as “the root of artistic creation” (Worringer 15). Worringer explains the psychological pre-conditions behind “the urge to abstraction” as follows:

the urge to abstraction is the outcome of a great inner unrest inspired in man by the phenomena of the outside world We might describe this state as an immense spiritual dread of space. ... this same sensation of fear may also be assumed as the root of artistic creation. (Worringer 15)

By stressing these spiritual fears of the early people for the bewildering phenomena of the mysterious world, Worringer explicates the meaning of abstract forms:

Tormented by the entangled inter-relationship and flux of the phenomena of the outer world, such peoples were dominated by an immense need for tranquillity. The happiness they sought from art did not consist in the possibility of projecting themselves into the things of the outer world, of enjoying themselves in them, but in the possibility of taking the individual thing of the external world out of its

arbitrariness and seeming fortuitousness, of eternalising it by approximation to abstract forms and, in this manner, of finding a point of tranquillity and a refuge from appearances. (Worringer 16)

Thus, by approximating the abstract forms of art to the phenomena of the mysterious world, these peoples escape from the vertigo of reality as the flux. In other words, the abstract form attains the quality of being “necessary and irrefragable, to approximate it [the abstract form] to “its *absolute* value” (Worringer 17) against it. The artist who tends to bind such dizzy and dismaying frivolity of phenomena to the abstract form shows a liking for the plane as an art form because like naturalist forms “perception of three-dimensionality” induces a “succession of perceptual elements that have to be combined; in this succession of elements the individuality of the object melts away” (Worringer 22). Similarly, “foreshortening and shadow” are also rejected because these elements reveal “the dimensions of depth,” “so that a vigorous participation of the combinative understanding and of habituation is required for their apprehension” (Worringer 22). In other words, the artists’ abstract forms as necessary and lawful spellbind the flux of phenomena.

However, the necessity and the lawfulness, here, should never be understood literally as we might imagine them in the fields of logic or science. For Worringer, abstraction denotes no more than “Suppression of representation of space,” which clearly indicates his sceptical attitude the world. As he says, “it is precisely space which links things to one another, which imparts to them their relativity in the world-picture, and because space is the one thing it is impossible to individualise” (Worringer 22). In the same way as phenomenologists are satisfied with the mere perceptions of phenomena and proclaim their complete retreat from the mysterious world, Worringer finds in the abstract form an escape from reality as the flux. However, Worringer cannot accept a logical or phenomenological investigation of the world as a world-picture because Worringer’s sense of the world is still influenced by the old romantic tenet: *Das Ding an Sich*.

Worringer acknowledges the sceptical attitude of science towards the world, which characterises the general psychological state after the Renaissance:

The feeling for the ‘thing in itself’, which man lost in the pride of his spiritual evolution and which has come to life again [through the Greco-Roman era and after the opposite tendency of the Byzantine art] in our philosophy only as the ultimate result of scientific analysis, stands not only at the end, but also at the beginning of our spiritual culture. (Worringer 130)

Worringer, furthermore, gives historical significance to the scientific tendency after the Renaissance. For him, a historical transition is brought about with just an alternative between “instinct and understanding” (Worringer 128-9). Here, the “understanding” represents the scientific approach after the Renaissance while the “instinct” means the artistic

tendency towards abstraction. Worringer reduces the whole historical dynamics to these two poles. Even so, however, it would be too naïve to consider that the whole historical transition corresponds to the reciprocal changes between these two attitudes, and it must be too trusting to accept that the abstract form offers the final solution to the sceptical attitude towards the world.

In contrast to the “understanding,” the abstract form itself cannot possess any mathematical or geometric qualities. Worringer rejects any possibility of understanding his instinctive artistic volition towards abstraction in the mathematical and geometric senses. On mathematics, he says:

These regular abstract forms are, therefore, the only ones and the highest, in which man can rest in the face of the vast confusion of the world-picture. We frequently find the, at first sight, astonishing idea put forward by modern art theoreticians that mathematics is the highest art form; indeed it is significant that it is precisely Romantic theory which, in its artistic programmes, has come to this seemingly paradoxical verdict, which is in such contradiction to the customary nebulous feeling for art.... Only between this verdict and the elemental instinct of primitive man, there lies the same essential difference that we have just seen to exist between primitive humanity's feeling for the ‘thing in itself’ and philosophic speculation concerning the ‘thing in itself.’ (Worringer 19)

Though only mathematics is mentioned here, we can expand Worringer's rejection to geometry as well. However, even if we can understand the reasons why Worringer rejects any scientific or geometrical formulations, we have to be embarrassed with the two types of the “thing in itself” here. This difference here should not be recognized from an epistemological but from a psychological viewpoint because the two poles mentioned above include psychological classifications as well. Besides, it is much fairer to the anti-materialist art critic Worringer to interpret the “thing in itself” from a psychological viewpoint rather than a materialistic one. This consideration will offer us the perfect explanation as to why Hulme supports Worringer's art theory despite their epistemological differences at that time.

In addition to his attack towards the materialistic history of art, Worringer also polemizes “the theory of empathy.” This theory shifts its focus from the materialistic objectivism of art to “aesthetic subjectivism,” which “no longer takes the aesthetics as the starting-point of its investigations, but proceeds from the behaviour of the contemplating subject, culminates in a doctrine that may be characterised by the broad general name of the theory of empathy” (Worringer 4). However, for Worringer, the contemplation of the subject's behaviour is not at all satisfactory as a basis for the general history of art: “the assumption that this process of empathy has at all times and at all places been the presupposition of artistic creation, cannot be upheld” (Worringer 7) because both the new theory and the materialistic theory uncritically presuppose a typical type of psychic state

since the Renaissance.

Worringer refutes a hedonistic type of psychology propounded by Theodor Lipps, the major representative of the new theoretical trend. According to his theory, artistic activity can be reduced to two empathetic feelings towards the art object: "positive empathy" and "negative empathy." These two feelings work as decisive factors in selecting the art object. The art objects into which human beings project their empathic feeling become their spiritual possessions. Thereafter, they can feel felicity by engaging in an artistic, or precisely apperceptive, activity to these objects. In other words, "To enjoy aesthetically means to enjoy myself in a sensuous object diverse from myself, to empathise myself into it," and "Aesthetic enjoyment is objectified self-enjoyment" (Worringer 5). For Worringer, the empathy theory denotes no more than a psychological determinism of the beautiful and the ugly in the same way as the materialists used to express them in the empirico-materialistic sense. Although Worringer admits that the theory of empathy was a decisive step from aesthetic objectivism towards aesthetic subjectivism, the theory falls into the same fallacy as materialistic determinism made, especially when the supporters of the empathy theory consider that empathic feelings towards these aesthetic objects to vindicate the *a priori* will for them: "This apperception [which is permeated by such a will] is therefore not random and arbitrary, but necessarily bound up with the object" (Worringer 7).

The theoretical strategy Worringer employs against Lipp's theory of empathy is to contrast the instinctive artistic volition for abstraction to the theory of empathy. Thus, two other discriminative qualities must be added to the attributes of the two poles we have first defined; namely, the one pole consists of understanding and empathy; the other of instinct and artistic volition for abstraction. In order to differentiate his theory squarely from this apperceptive and empathic theory, Worringer stresses the psychic state of the Egyptian and the Byzantine arts. Actually, for Worringer, art history makes clear "the feeling about the world," or "the psychic state in which, at any given time, mankind found itself in relation to the cosmos, in relation to the phenomena of the external world" (Worringer 13). Then what kind of psychological differences do these two poles reflect?

For Worringer, the two poles mirror the differences in their religious attitudes towards the external world. Worringer especially explains a psychic state relevant to the urge to empathy as follows:

the urge to empathy can become free only where a certain relationship of confidence between man and the external world has developed, as the result of innate disposition, evolution, climatic and other propitious circumstances. Amongst a people with such a predisposition, this sensuous assurance, this complete confidence in the external world, this unproblematic sense of being at home in the world, will lead, in a religious respect, to a naïve anthropomorphic pantheism or polytheism, and in respect of art to a happy, world-revering naturalism. Neither in the former nor in the latter will any need for redemption be disclosed. (Worringer 45)

After the Renaissance, the human attitude towards the external world is characterised by its “confidence in the external world” and “unproblematic sense of being at home in the world.” The confidence in the world, furthermore, denotes their faith in the “reality of being” and in “the understanding.” However, this reliance on the understanding does not signify a complete victory over reality as the flux. As Worringer admits, it signifies “their satisfaction in pantheism and naturalism” (Worringer 45) or in “paltriness of rationalistic-sensuous cognition” (Worringer 46). Especially in art, the pantheistic tendency induces the artist’s strong aspiration to imitate a natural model, and the imitated frivolous artistic representations cause the “concept-splitting” situation (Worringer 26). Worringer attributes this kind of satisfaction with the incoherent imitative representations of the external world to the scientific attitude since the Renaissance. Or, more precisely speaking, the problem of “the urge to empathy” above lies in their pantheistic tendencies in which they feel “self-enjoyment” in empathising with the external object, or being spellbound by the mysterious quality of that object as *Das Ding an Sich*. If so, how can they free themselves from this enchanted spell?

Worringer’s quotation above explaining the spiritual conditions after the Renaissance includes the words “propitious” and “redemption” which have a religious tone. Worringer, furthermore, criticises the anthropomorphic pantheists and polytheists after the Renaissance: “Neither in the former nor in the latter will any need for redemption be disclosed.” In this way, Worringer relates the problem of empathy theory to a religious concept and attitude. If so, what is redemption and from what do they have to be redeemed in order to retreat from the mysterious effect of the external world? Worringer’s religious words indicate that the post-renaissance population which is full of confidence and belief in the understanding, lacks the sense of sin. However pantheistic and polytheistic it may be, they believe in their understanding and anthropomorphise the external world. Thus for Worringer, this kind of anthropomorphism is brought about by suppressing the primitive ‘dread of space’: “As such a man of the earthly world, in whom sensuousness and intellect move likewise, full of confidence, within the world-picture and dam back all ‘dread of space’...” (Worringer 46). Worringer seeks for the spiritual redemption in the abstract form of art in the same way as the primitive people feared the flux of the world and took refuge in their abstract forms of art:

Consequently the keynote of his nature is a need for redemption. As regards religion, this leads him to a sombre-toned religion of transcendence dominated by a dualistic principle; as regards art, it leads to an artistic volition directed entirely toward the abstract. (Worringer 46)

In considering the population’s pantheistic world and its sinful anthropomorphism, we can easily understand that “a dualistic principle” in religion in the passage denotes a sanctified boundary between the human beings and the external world. The sin lies in ignoring

this unfathomable gap. Thus if the abstract art form possesses the redemptive quality, the force of the form must break up the anthropomorphised empathic tie between the human beings and the outside object, and re-demarcate the sanctuary of the external world and the secularised human realm.

This kind of working of the abstract form is explained as “self-alienation” by Worringer:

In the urge to abstraction the intensity of the self-alienative impulse is incomparably greater and more consistent. Here it is not characterised, as in the need for empathy, by an urge to alienate oneself from individual being, but as an urge to seek deliverance from the fortuitousness of humanity as a whole, from the seeing arbitrariness of organic existence in general, in the contemplation of something necessary and irrefragable. (Worringer 24)

In the explanation of self-alienation, Worringer rigidly discriminates between the effects of the urge to empathy and the effects of the urge to abstraction. Although Worringer does not clearly explain the different psychological effects between these two, we can assume the difference. Worringer describes the self-alienation seen in the former urge as “self-affirmation” : “In empathising this will to activity into another object, however, we *are* in the other object” (Worringer 24). The art resulting from the former seeks the pleasure that is aroused by projecting both the individual’s feelings into and his/her apperceptive repetitive activities into the art objects. Thus, the euphoria can come from the mysterious qualities of these external objects. In such a psychic condition, it is clear that the artists themselves cannot feel and arouse happiness and satisfaction among people with their forms of art because the pleasure rather originates in the external object itself. Thus in this condition, “the ego” works “as a clouding of the greatness of the work of art, as a curtailment of its capacity for bestowing happiness...” (Worringer 23). By contrast, the abstract art forms of the primitive people, recognising their inability to position themselves on the same level as the external world, try to give their aesthetic abstract form “*its* absolute value,” thereby purifying themselves from “the unending flux of being.” “Where they were successful in this [making the absolute abstract form], they experienced that happiness and satisfaction which the beauty of organic-vital form affords *us...*” (Worringer 17). Through such a satisfactory art form, they can feel rested and safely segregated from the flux of the world, enabling to block out or to “seal” the flux into the abstract work of art. Speaking from a psychological viewpoint, they will break up any empathic ties to the external world and refrain from projecting all psychological energy into it, satisfied by their abstract forms.

However, no matter how they are satisfied by their art forms, once they lose their pious awe of the external world, they once again fall back into eternally humbling for the “genuine” form of art, required by the naturalistic imitative impulses. According to Worringer’s concept of the history of art, whatever completed abstract forms they can

obtain, the religious fall comes back again necessarily as the inescapable historical cycle. Human beings must shudder at any faint disastrous omen of future disasters, in which horrible mother nature returns again and again to devour all their attainments of human beings. At all times, their on-going sin ensures that the distance between glorious redemption and inglorious destruction is just a hairbreadth away.

Abstract Forms and Hulme

It can be safely assumed that at the time Hulme is reflecting upon his theoretical debt to Bergson and is fumbling for the substitution, Worringer's theory offers him a means to deal with the flux in a wider sense. However, this influence would be limited because Hulme does not completely accept the aesthetic significance propounded in Worringer's theory. Rather, in Ferguson's phrase, Hulme "Hulmified" Worringer's theory of the abstraction (Ferguson 154). The difference between the two is clearly shown in their concepts of reality as the flux. Thus the reason for Hulme's access to and affinity with Worringer does not lie in Worringer's epistemological stance on abstract form, but more probably on his view of the psychological effect produced by the art form. Even concerning the psychological influence, however, it can be said in a rigid sense that Hulme's theory is also differentiated from Worringer's. Hulme, unlike Worringer, never employs a kind of deterministic conception of art with its instinctive aesthetic volition towards the abstract form of art. In this sense, then, what Hulme accepts from the contemporaries' views of the abstract form can be squarely differentiated from what Worringer accepts in his aesthetic theory. Hulme's theory of abstraction is not a result so much of Worringer's influence but of his newly complete detachment from the Bergsonian yoke.¹¹ Indeed, although at a first glance, Worringer's influence upon Hulme might prove that Hulme still holds onto part of Bergson's philosophy, the fact that Hulme changes Worringer's theory into his own art theory indicates that Hulme has chosen to distance himself from Bergson's theory as well. Thus I would like to investigate the theoretical differences between Worringer and Hulme in order to endorse the fact that Hulme has completely escaped from the Bergsonian tenets.

There are three examples from Hulme's theoretical relation to Worringer to confirm Hulme's detachment from the Bergsonian philosophy: Hulme's focus on the artistic attitudes in relation to philosophy, the differences between them in their concepts of the abstract form and Hulme's rejection of the aesthetic emotions.

First of all, Hulme's interest in modern abstract form cannot be singled out by itself, but rather must be considered in relation to philosophy. As he says, he "commenced by a change in philosophy and illustrated this by a change in art rather than vice versa" (CW 270). Actually, he never clearly answers the question as to which field triggers this change in thought. He just says: "The art of people, then, will run parallel to its philosophy and general world outlook" (CW 274). In this passage, we can find a concept of art that is similar to Riegl rather than to Worringer. As mentioned in my note, on Riegl, art history reflects historical representations of the world. For Hulme as well as for Riegl, at

least in an historical sense, art and philosophy are not separated but, rather, intimately connected.

This intimate relationship in Hulme's theory between art and philosophy makes it clear what Hulme acknowledges about art. In art, Hulme finds a change in attitude towards the world. As he explains, "one's mind is so soaked in the thought and language of the period, that one can only perceive the break-up of that period in a region like art—when one's mind is focussed on thought itself—a kind of side activity" (CW 276). If it were contended that thought could be changed by art while "one's mind is focussed on thought itself," it would be contradictory. If so, Hulme might not have positioned art as "a kind of side activity." In this sense, he accepts in art not an expression of a new thought but of a "new attitude" about the world (CW 276). With this "the new attitude," we might imagine the primitive people's "dread of space" as Worringer does. To the contrary, Hulme gives this psychological fear another significance:

The primitive springs from what we have called a kind of mental space-shyness, which is really an attitude of fear before the world; the Byzantine from what may be called, inaccurately, a kind of contempt for the world. Though these two attitudes differ very much, yet there is a common element in the idea of separation as opposed to the more intimate feeling towards the world in classical and renaissance thought. In comparison with the flat and insipid optimism of the belief in progress, the new attitude may be in a certain sense inhuman, pessimistic. Yet its pessimism will not be world-rejecting in the sense in which the Byzantine was. (CW 277)

Hulme seems to acknowledge the same kind of pessimism in art as we have admitted in Worringer with regards to aesthetics. However, although being pessimistic, the new attitude has no relation or affinity to Worringer's view of the past. If we remember that the primitive and the Byzantine pessimism largely derives from their rejection of the world and their awareness of their incapability to understand the world of the noumena, we must understand Hulme's new attitude in his opposition to such a "world-rejecting" fear of the external world. In this sense, when he further describes his new attitude as this: "Expressed generally, there seems to be a desire for austerity and bareness, a striving towards structure and away from the messiness and confusion of nature and natural things" (CW 278), it conveys a meaning which can in no way be reduced to Worringer's "dread of space."

The differences in their world-views also reflect their differing concepts of art forms. For Worringer, in some sense, human attitude towards nature and its abstract forms are inextricably combined. For him, the expression of the "dread of space" the primitive people hold directly gives birth to the concept of the abstract form, which has no bearing on the external world. This clearly explains Worringer's formalist tendency. However, for Hulme, the abstract form possesses a very different aspect. Indeed Hulme, as well as Worringer, acknowledges its structural quality to block out any frivolous phenomena of

reality. In the mechanical form of Picasso, for example, Hulme recognises the artistic quality which “leaves out all these details and qualities [the actual details of life] they [the naturalists] expect” (CW 283). Yet, for him, the artistic attitude, which reflects the artist’s pessimistic feelings, does not affect the form or content of art because “The art of people, then, will run parallel to its philosophy and general world outlook” (CW 274). Here we should not mistake art as simply an artistic expression of the artistic attitude. Even if the artistic attitude is pessimistic, for Hulme, unlike Worringer, art, or the abstract form of art, does not contradict the phenomena of the world. For Hulme, the artistic expression directly denotes the phenomena of the world: “general world outlook” and philosophical thoughts, or especially phenomenological *Weltanschauung* at that time.¹² In this sense, we cannot admit any positive influence from Worringer, when Hulme says:

A perfect cube looks stable in comparison with the flux of appearance, but one might be pardoned if one felt no particular interest in the eternity of a cube; but if you can put man into some geometrical shape which lifts him out of the transience of the organic, then the matter is different. In pursuing such an aim you inevitably, of course, sacrifice the pleasure that comes from reproduction of the natural. (CW 283)

Although Hulme’s passage above seems to support what we have seen in Worringer’s concept of art as to an abstract and geometrical form to cover up the flux and refrain from reproducing “the natural,” we still cannot accept that Worringer had a direct epistemological influence upon Hulme.

In order to confirm Hulme’s epistemological stance, we can refer to Hulme’s refutation of Charles Ginner’s negative attitude toward the abstract form. Hulme criticises the fact that Ginner’s understanding of the abstract form as a “formula” or a “dead convention” derives from “the assumption that art must be realistic” (CW 288). To Ginner, realistic art includes the aspects of three concepts: the first: a personal interpretation of nature; the second: abstract forms to express the personal interpretation; and last; the abstract form and its formula to lead to “decay” and to allow “no personal first-hand observation” of nature (CW 288). It is clear that even behind the realist Ginner and his concept of the abstract form as decay, the mysterious concept “Mother Nature” is still detectible. Hulme defends the abstract form, saying against such a theory: “I do not think that it is the artist’s only business to reproduce and interpret Nature, ‘source of all good’” (CW 292). As the intimate relation of the word “interpret” to the word “reproduce” shows, Hulme here denies any possibility of the repetitive actions to the art objects. As is already seen in Worringer’s aesthetic theory, this repetition presupposes Nature as a mysterious entity. In other words, any natural forms in art must fall into an infinite series of the possibility infinite: “n+1”. If so, Hulme is able to stop such an infinite search for “True” representations of nature through the artistic representation. Hulme does not reject any representation of nature in art, as proven by his refutation of Ginner’s usage of “simplification” of

the abstract form. Hulme considers that Ginner's misunderstanding of "simplification" derives from his confusion between two discriminative aspects: "validity" and "origin": according to Ginner, "The validity of simplification is held to depend on its origin. If the simplification ... is derived from Nature and comes about as the result of an aim which is itself directed back to Nature, then it is held to be valid" (CW 292). On the contrary, Hulme is able to find validity in its mere usage: "the validity of the simplification lay in itself and in the use made of it and had nothing whatever to do with its descent, on its occupying a place in Nature's 'Burke'" (CW 292). By interpreting the meaning of "descent" and "on its occupying a place in Nature's 'Burke [killing of Nature]'" as expressing Ginner's sense of the abstract form as "simplification", we can understand what "simplification" truly means for Hulme. Because he reduces the effect of the simplification to the personal representations of nature, the "simplification," for Ginner, is no more than the decay or killing of nature. By contrast, the fact that Hulme's concept of "simplification" does not abandon nature signifies that Hulme's abstract form is applicable to nature itself because it is capable of making some connection to it instead of simply abandoning it. In other words, his abstract forms gain the same qualities as nature itself. It is in the point that we discover the essential difference between Hulme and Worringer, whose concept of the abstract cannot make up for the gap between the art forms and nature itself. Furthermore, Hulme's abstract form possesses an affinity to Cassirer's concept of function, which translates Kantian *Das Ding an Sich* into a mathematical function.¹³ On this standpoint, we can understand why Hulme searches for both the structure and the whole in abstract forms. Hulme once criticises Wyndham Lewis, saying "They [the pictures of Lewis] fail, in that they do not produce as a whole, the kind of coherent effect which, according to the theory, they ought to produce" (CW 296). Hulme's stress on 'wholeness' in art encourages Hulme to strive for the simple abstract form in order to represent the wholeness of nature. The parts of the whole should blur and reduce the effect of abstract form as a functional, mathematical, or precisely geometrical expression of nature. In other words, the abstract form consists not of its parts, which merely symbolize the existence of some whole, but of the functional whole itself. Cubist pictures are criticised from the same viewpoint. Their "seeing things in simple forms, as a rule only extends to details." It might be said that simplifications are, as it were, " 'accepted' passively [from nature], and are not deliberately built up into a definite organisation and structure" (CW 290). Accordingly, in the Futurists' abstractions, Hulme sees no more than "the exact opposite of the art I am describing, being the deification of the flux, the last efflorescence of impressionism" (CW 277) to indicate some "organic" relation of the parts to the whole as nature.

When the Bergsonian concept, reality as the flux, is overcome by the functional abstract forms of nature, the artistic intuitive emotion is also thrown away. Indeed Hulme does expect to find some redemptive powers, which "sacrifice the pleasure that comes from reproduction of the natural" (CW 283) in the abstract art form, but unlike Worringer, he never admits the existence of any sacralized "artistic volition." Worringer contrasts his

exclusive artistic volition to the empathic theory of Lipps, the tendency of which is accepted in the post-Renaissance naturalist and realist theories of art after the Renaissance. Hulme also criticizes the naturalist and realist theories of art in the same context as Worringer does. For Hulme, the emotional identification with, and the intuitive and repetitive actions to, these art objects are also problematic at a time when Hulme is distancing himself from a similar kind of art theory under the influence of the Bergsonian tenets. However, for Hulme, the abstract form never reflects the instinctive fears and the special emotional qualities like Worringer's "artistic volition" but only "the ordinary everyday human emotions" (CW 306). These ordinary emotions mirrored in the abstract form can be clearly understood when Hulme criticises the spectators who now love the abstract forms and state that "it [the abstract form] produces a particular emotion different from the ordinary everyday emotions—a specific *aesthetic* emotion" (CW 305). This kind of psychological attitude towards the form parallels Worringer's naturalist and realist type of self-alienation, by which the naturalists and the realists hold themselves out to the external mystic entity of the natural object. Speaking more psychologically, self-alienation in this sense presupposes their belief in the supremacy and the Good inherent in the object. Hulme criticises this same kind of psychological state now demonstrated by the spectators' exclusive affections for the abstract forms. Hulme refutes their psychological attitudes with a concise scheme as follows:

What happens, then, is not

S(f) F

Where S is the spectator, F the outside form, and (f) the specific form emotion, but much more this—

S(de) F(if)

Where (de) stands for quite ordinary *dramatic human emotions*, which occur in daily life, and not only in the contemplation of works of art. I do not say that in looking at pure form we are *conscious* of this emotion they produce. We are not fully conscious of it, but *project* it outside ourselves into the outside form F, and may only be conscious of it as (if) '*interesting form*.' But the (if) only exists because of the (de). (CW 306)

Hulme explains that the abstract form of art can convey such ordinary emotion. However, the emotions reified within the art form are distinguished from the traditional aesthetic emotions inherent in the object itself which is explained rather to possess the absolute value worthy of human beings in both the idealist and materialist senses. At first glance, however, the dynamic relationship between emotion and form may remind us of Hulme's previous aesthetics, or more precisely poetics, before Bergson. With regard to the abstract form, Hulme seems to see the same kind of secularizing force against any *a priori* transcendental emotion naturally projected into a certain object, the working of which he searched for in the poetic concrete images found in his early theory. However, after he

passes beyond the Bergsonian intuitive emotional theory of art and Worringer's theory, Hulme's theoretical development can be manifestly understood. First of all, the abstract form in the geometrical and functional sense does not assign to nature any frivolous quality like the flux. The concrete poetic image stressed in his early stage is developed into the more lawful and structural geometrical forms of art. Secondly, the recognition that art mirrors the transition of human attitudes towards the world now indicates a new concept of emotions which can be investigated objectively and scientifically in history. That Hulme explains that the ordinary everyday human emotions are transferred onto the abstract forms of art, does not contradict this concept of emotions. Furthermore, his concept of form and the emotions which can be historically investigated cannot find any theoretical affinity to Bergson and Worringer. Rather, it shows its theoretical affinity to Lukács's reification theory.¹⁴ However, for Hulme, the historical transitions are explained both from the materialistic and the emotional viewpoints. Hulme's understanding of the intimate relationship between the emotion and the action allows us to radically investigate both materialistic and intentional transitions in history. However, we cannot go into this further until Hulme develops his mature philosophy.

We should also bear in mind that at that time, Hulme's aesthetic theory does no more than signify the historical significance of art and the parallel of artistic expressions to the philosophy and the phenomenological world-view. However strongly Hulme stresses the structural and functional elements of the abstract form and its relation to the emotions, Hulme's art theory cannot play more than a descriptive role in history. Even if they feel satisfaction with the abstract art, onto which they can project "the ordinary everyday human emotions," it is doubtful that they can stop searching for the pleasure in that form and repetitive practices to explore a form that is more pleasant than the previous one. Anyway, we should not see any more than aesthetic significance here at this stage of Hulme's theoretical development. Although, as the new form, the abstract form of art has acquired the force needed to deconstruct the traditional realistic and naturalistic tendency in art and the world-view, Hulme does not seem to notice another possibility of art irreducible to a merely descriptive role in history. Probably, before Hulme could establish such an art theory more clearly and structurally, he would have to express it in philosophical terms in his mature philosophy. Unfortunately, however, he could not develop another aesthetic theory because he was killed by a shell in the World War I. Nevertheless, we can now well imagine the art theory which Hulme would have established after developing a more mature philosophy.

Notes

- 1 Karen Csengeri in the notes of *The Collected Writings of T.E. Hulme* (hereafter the abbreviated CW refers to the edition) indicates a factor for T.E. Hulme's actual rejection of Bergson, saying:

In the spring of 1911, during the height of his interest in Bergson, Hulme met literary critic Pierre Lasserre, who endeavoured to prove him that Bergson ‘was nothing but the last disguise of romanticism’.... Their meeting was a factor in Hulme’s eventual rejection of Bergson. (CW 459)

And also, J. Kamerbeek, JR. also admits T.E. Hulme’s theoretical shift from the French to the German around that time and says that “Hulme could not find a lasting satisfaction in Bergsonism” (J. Kamerbeek, JR., “T.E. Hulme and German Philosophy: Dilthey and Scheler” 212).

- 2 In “Searchers after Reality: Bax” (29 July 1909), Hulme explicates the difference of the intuition from the intellect and its working:

From a common origin life has divided in two directions; the ‘élan vital’, in its struggle towards the maximum of indeterminism, has employed two methods, the one instinct, the other intellect; one exemplified in animals, and the other in man. (Intellect being understood here in a definite way as the capacity for making models of the flux, of reasoning in logic.) But round the central intellect in man there is a fringe, a penumbra of instinct. This instinct, or, as it is better to call it here, intuition, is the faculty that we must use in attempting to grasp the nature of reality. One must carefully guard here against a sentimental use of the word. Bergson gives it a precise technical sense. By intellect one can construct approximate models, by intuition one can identify oneself with the flux. (CW 91)

We can notice here that Hulme’s concept of intuition is opposed to the intellect. The intellect brings us “models of the flux, of reasoning in logic” ; on the contrary, through intuition, we can find the access to the flux. Intuition here, in other words, is utilized to denote the direction of the external object and its flux we should pay attention to. Thus we can here safely identify his concept of action with such an intuitive element inherent in human beings. The discrimination between the intellect and the animal or inherent intuition is also seen in Wilhelm Dilthey’s *Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen*. The influence between Hulme and Dilthey is investigated closely by Kamerbeek, JR. (ibid.).

- 3 The report was first commissioned by Harold Monro in order to publish in *The Poetry Review*, he edited. However, he fell out with the proprietors of *The Poetry Review*, and the report appeared in June 1914 in *Poetry and Drama*. See in detail Ferguson 137-140.
- 4 As Ferguson cites, David Bomberg told that Hulme was the only one who knew Worringer in 1913. See in detail Ferguson 150.
- 5 The first English version is published in US in 1953.
- 6 Ferguson states: “Worringer is not included in Hulme’s undated ‘Plan for a Book on Modern Theories of art’, which Read reproduced in *Speculations*, suggesting that the

‘plan’ was outlined before the trip” (Ferguson 286).

- 7 In the planned contents, especially as the German philosophical connection, the neo-Kantian philosopher Cohen’s aesthetic would have been also discussed. As another important German influences, which are rarely or never told in his writings, we could raise Dilthey, Rickert and Scheller. Especially, in Scheller, we could see the strong theoretical or axiological kinship to Hulme’s mature philosophy. I would like to discuss these philosophical influences especially from the neo-Kantian philosophers in another place.
- 8 Kant explains that “taste is basically an ability to judge the [way in which] moral ideas are made sensible ([it judges this] by means of a certain analogy in our reflection about [these ideas and their renderings in sensibility])” (Kant 232), and that the pleasure they feel in the taste derives from the universal moral ideas. Not to mention, the moral ideas is the origin of action of “Sollen.”
- 9 Worringer *Abstraction and Empathy* 8. Hereafter, only his name and page numbers are parenthetically indicated.
- 10 Erwin Panofsky clearly discriminates Riegl’s artistic volition from Worringer’s in respect of their treatments of artistic representation. In the note of the paper concerning Riegl’s artistic volition, he says that “Riegl’s view are very much changed—and not for the better—in Worringer’s work” (Panofsky 24). For Panofsky, Riegl’s artistic volition and representations of art are not based on the “old antithesis between natural art and art which deforms nature” (Panofsky 24). For Riegl, there is no discrepancy between the natural representation and the artistic representation on the contrary to Worringer’s concept of abstract art forms which are squarely discriminated from the representations of the external world, as we will discuss below. Furthermore, Panofsky explains that for Riegl, the art history mirrors “its own view of the world or its own world of views” (Panofsky 24) at a certain historical stage. Art shows us historical changes of the world-view. Hulme’s aesthetics, as for the historical representations of art, shows a theoretical affinity to Riegl rather than Worringer. Actually, in Hulme’s mature philosophy, he refers to Riegl but Worringer.
- 11 Helen Carr in her paper concerning Worringer’s influence upon Hulme, focuses upon the spiritual “dread of space.” She relates Worringer’s expression of the flux to the Bergsonian flux in Hulme’s aesthetic theory: “He had now available a different answer to the reason for his own ‘spiritual dread of space in relation to the extended, disconnected, bewildering world of phenomena” (Carr 104), and concludes that Hulme is still under the influence of the Bergsonian tenets. However, as I will show later, her assumption of the Bergsonian influence left in Hulme cannot be tenable.
- 12 This intimate relation between art and philosophy can be possible when Hulme recognizes phenomenological understanding of the world.
- 13 The fact that Hulme represents the physical science as “geometry” in his mature philosophy will vindicate this geometrical or functional expression of nature in Hulme’s concept of abstract form (CW 426). Ferguson also admits in Hulme’s abstract form

restoration of love for mathematics and geometry: "Because of the role in it of abstract art, his highly personal synthesis might also be said to have stabilized and repaired his damaged relationship with his first love, the mathematics, and especially the geometry, of his Newcastle-under-Lyme schooldays" (Ferguson 154). The concept of the flux, in other words, also signifies the "Other" in nature. Concerning this point, Alan Munton offers us an interesting difference between Hulme and Lewis. They fall in love with the same female, Kate Lechmere. Yet as she explains, there is a big difference in treating with her between Hulme and Lewis. "Hulme does not recognize her as an Other in possession of a significant presence, as Lewis had done" (Munton 84). Further referring to the aesthetic problem Hulme concerns at that time, she attributes the annihilation of the "Other" to his aesthetic theory: "the convergence between Kate Lechmere's body and the sculpture of Epstein" (Munton 84). She also acknowledges that Hulme's aesthetic significance lies in such an expelling force of the "Other."

- 14 For example, Andrew Thacker sees Hulme's affinity to Lukács's reification theory, especially in Hulme's early poetics. (see Thacker 48-50).

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