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From Liberalization to Renationalization: Ideational Power in Shifting Thailand's Energy Policies (1987-2018)

チュンポン, アウンパッタナーシップ

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From Liberalization to Renationalization: Ideational Power in Shifting Thailand's Energy Policies (1987-2018)

(自由化から再国有化へ：タイ・エネルギー政策転換における「概念」の政治的パワー （1987 -2018 年））

Chumphol Aunphattanasilp

3GS15033G

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Abstract

State energy enterprise policies in Thailand shifted from liberalization to recentralization and renationalization from 1987 to 2018. The dissertation questions why and how did this policy shift occurred?

Previous studies identified key elements of policy shift as changes in decision makers, energy cost, fiscal burden, international market price, bureaucratic structure. Based on the above scholarship, this dissertation questions the most important remaining question; how did the political leaders initiate the change. Powerful interest groups and actors are often structured around energy policies. A de-facto energy regime is established that cuts across government, market, and society. Thus, to shift policies, the key question would be how to transform the existing energy regime. In other words, what political tools and strategies they utilized in changing the energy regime then the energy policies. This dissertation analyses this political process.

The research was conducted based on government archive materials especially the records from the National Energy Policy Committee (NEPC) and interviewing stakeholders in the government and the state-owned enterprises. Historical analysis of the social movements and media reports supported the above in understanding the interaction between the government and society.

The main finding of the dissertation is that the ideational power was the most effective weapon to delegitimize existing policies, to popularize and legitimize alternative or new energy proposals. The addressed ideas and concepts rearranged the priority order of conflicting interests and agendas among different decision-making actors. Political leaders utilized concepts such as nationalism, security, conflict of interests, fair

competition, environment and health, efficiency, in legitimizing and popularizing new energy policies. This use of ideational power was particularly useful to create a coalition between urban middle-class movements and the political leadership in making the shift form liberalization to renationalization possible.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research background

Thailand started the liberalization of its state energy enterprises, especially in the petroleum, electricity, and refinery sectors, in the 1980s[1]. The government at that time attempted to reduce state ownership of the energy enterprises by promoting the private sector to own and enter into joint-venture energy projects with state energy enterprises. Another effort of the Thai government to promote the liberalization and privatization of state energy enterprises was realized through initial public offerings (IPOs) of energy state enterprises' shares on the stock market. The IPOS aimed at changing the ownership of state energy enterprises from full state ownership to partly private ownership.

Notably, the liberalization and privatization processes have been challenged by waves of anti-liberalization. After the coup d'etat in 2006, Surayud Chulanont's government, the military government that ruled from 2006 to 2008, announced it would establish bureaucratic regulators to control electricity policies and transfer PTT's power, a privatized petroleum company listed on the Thai stock market, to make decisions regarding land exploration and gas pipelines to state control[2]. The shift of state energy enterprise policy was recognized as the energy recentralization which bureaucratic

[1] Chris S. Greacen and Chuenchom Greacen, "Thailand's Electricity Reforms: Privatization of Benefits and Socialization of Costs and Risks," *Pacific Affairs* 77, no 3 (2004): 517–541.

[2] Cabinet Resolution, November 21, 2006.

agencies tried to recentralizes power to administrate state energy enterprises[3].

The second wave of anti-energy privatization occurred the mid-2010s, when General Prayuth Chan-ocha's government, the military government that ruled after the 2014 coup, implemented a cabinet resolution to approve a proposal to study the feasibility of establishing the National Oil Company (NOC);[4] and established a new policy unit, the so-called the State Enterprise Policy Committee, to create and approve business plans for all the state enterprises with authority over the state energy enterprises[5]. The transition of energy policy created Prime Minister centric-role over the administration of state energy enterprises, so-called the energy renationalization.

Why did the policy packages regarding energy state enterprises shift from liberalization to renationalization? The previous studies described the transition of Thailand's energy policy took place because of the five conditions: 1) government decision-making and changes of energy enterprises' organization, 2) concerns of energy cost, energy supply, and fiscal burden, 3) changes of decision makers, 4) changes of policy imaginations, and 5) changes of decision makers along with policy imaginations.

The first group of studies based on historical analysis. They attempted to describe the development of state energy enterprise policy in each government, and the findings illustrate the chronology of the liberalization policy packages formulated by each government: when the policy was produced, by which government, and in the context of

[3] Noppanon Wannathepsakul, "Network Bureaucracy and Public-private firms in Thailand's Energy Sector," in *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth and Power*, ed. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), 97–115.

[4] Cabinet Resolution, December 8, 2015.

[5] National Council for Peace and Order, The Order of National Council for Peace and Order No. 75/2557 on the Appointment of the State Enterprise Policy Committee, June 26, 2014.

what types of energy problems[6]. Moreover, the studies in this group also explain the biography of the state energy enterprises, especially the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). Their results revealed the changes in the organization, business activities and business performance under the liberalization policy of state energy enterprises by answering the following questions: What did the EGAT and PTT do to respond to the liberalization policy? How was the organization structure of the state energy enterprises restructured? How the EGAT and PTT achieved or failed regarding their business performances[7]? Notably, the research was typically conducted by government agencies attempting to create a policy database for further research.

The second group of studies focused evaluations of the liberalization policy and attempted to evaluate the outcomes of the liberalization policy of the state energy enterprises by concentrating mainly on economic outcomes and energy supply management. The questions raised by this group were concerns regarding how the liberalization policy of state energy enterprises could develop a stable and reasonable price of electricity, the reliability of power supply, fuel diversity and security, equitable access to supply and social equity[8]. Moreover, the problems from the economic effects of the liberalization policy were raised in this research group, for example, did the privatization of state energy enterprises affect the revenue maximization goal, the

[6] Morakot Limtrakul, *History of State- Enterprise Privatization Policy and the Free Flow of Energy Policy* (Bangkok: Ministry of Energy, 2004).

[7] Pandict Chanrochanakit and Somsri Chatskulwilai, *Petroleum Enterprises* (Bangkok: Institute of Policy Studies, 1994); Pandict Chanrochanakit, Kalaya Udomwitit and Wimonrat Sukcharoen, *Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand* (Bangkok: Institute of Policy Studies, 1994).

[8] Surapong Chirarattananon and Supattana Nirukkanaporn, "Deregulation of ESI and Privatization of State Electric Utilities in Thailand," *Energy Policy* 34 (2006): 2521–2531.

distributional goal, the efficiency maximization goal, and capital market development[9]. The findings from this research group contributed to the in-depth analysis of policy packages, such as a cost-benefit analysis of each policy option and expected an outcome from the policy packages. Economic scholars were the main researchers who conducted this style of research.

The third group of studies was based on the investigations of actor-network creation to support or resist the liberalization policy. The researchers in this group attempted to identify the influential political groups that vehemently opposed the privatization plans of state energy enterprises or groups of government agencies that were able to occupy the energy policy unit to redesign the liberalization policy. The findings from this research group typically emphasized the interplay or interaction between bureaucratic groups, labor unions, and the military[10], that is, who or which coalition played a pivotal role in redesigning the policy of state energy enterprises and who were the members of the coalition. The scholars in the field of political economy and political science were the main investigators in this group.

The fourth group of studies initially applied rhetoric analysis to discover the plots of story or imagination of state actors in creating the liberalization policy of the electricity[11]. The findings based on the approach of rhetoric analysis advanced the

[9] Puree Sirasoontorn, *The Privatization of State Enterprises in Thaksin's Government (2001–2004)* (Bangkok: The Thailand Research Fund, 2007).

[10] R.S., Milne, "The Politics of Privatization in the ASEAN States," *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 7, no. 3 (1991): 322–332; Noppanon Wannathepsaku, "Network Bureaucracy and Public- private firms in Thailand's Energy Sector," 97–115; Tawatchai Pongsri, "The Dynamics of EGAT Anti-privatization Movement after the 1997 Economic Crisis" (Master Thesis of faculty of Political Sciences, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 2009).

[11] Supannika Wattana, Deepak Sharma and Ronnakorn Vaiyavuth, "Electricity Industry Reforms in Thailand: A Historical Review," *GMSARN International Journal* 2, (2008): 41–52.

understanding of how the government agencies (re)framed stories to persuade the public to accept the liberalization policy of state energy enterprises. The majority of the researchers in this group were in the policy analysts.

The last group of studies combined the two key approaches, namely, actor analysis and rhetoric analysis, to explain the shift in state energy enterprise policy. The findings of this research group began with the categorization of the key stakeholders in the energy policy arena that control the setting of the energy agenda and could make decisions regarding those agendas. Then, the research findings identified the key stakeholders' story, namely the state actors, to dominate the energy policy arena for creating the liberalization policy[12]. These research findings offered two layers of analysis: who played a crucial role to formulate the liberalization policy and how they framed the stories or imaginations to achieve their goals. The scholars who worked with civil society groups were the main producers of this style of research.

However, the five domains in explaining the transition of energy policy still cannot address the following puzzles:

First, if the government decision making is able to create the transitions of energy policy, why the policy proposal by Yingluck Shinawatra government (2011-2014) to privatize PTT shares in the second round for reconverting the recentralization to liberalization was not successfully implemented?[13];

[12] Decharat Sukkumnoed and Supakirt Nantaworakhan, *An Analysis of Energy Public Policy Process* (Nonthaburi: Health System Research Institute, 2006), 34-35; Chuenchom Sangarasri Greacen and Chirs Greacen, "Thailand's Electricity Reforms: Privatization of Benefits and Socialization of Cost and Risks," *Pacific Affairs* 77, no. 3 (2004): 517–541.

[13] Manager, "The Government Confirms PTT Is Not Privatized," February 10, 2012, 11.

Second, if the transition of energy policy was shaped by the policy outcomes regarding energy price, energy supply, and government fiscal burden, why the policy packages in bringing energy enterprise back to bureaucrats' and Prime Minister's control (recentralization and renationalization) which would increase energy prices and fiscal burden were accepted and formulated?;

Third, the compositions of actor network are not significantly changed in the period of recentralization and renationalization because the key decision makers were the military government and bureaucrats particularly energy agency, economic agency, and Prime Minister Office. If the decision makers still are the same actor group, why the energy policy packages shifted from recentralization to renationalization?;

Fourth, by investigating the government policy statements from 1987 to 2018 as the blueprint of policy formulation, the concerns of security of energy supply and stability of energy price are the main plot of story in designing energy policy. If the plot of energy supply and prices still exists in the government concern, why the transitions of energy policy took place?;

Moreover, the most important remaining question; how did the political leaders initiate the change, is still not addressed by the above scholarship. Powerful interest groups and actors are often structured around energy policies. A de-facto energy regime is established that cuts across government, market, and society. Thus, to shift policies, the key question would be how to transform the existing energy regime. In other words, what political tools and strategies do political leaders utilize in changing the energy regime then the energy policies. This dissertation aims to reexamine the transitions of Thailand's energy policies to analyses this political process.

To analyze tools and strategies in changing energy regime and policies, this dissertation combines the analytical frameworks of previous studies that investigated politics of energy policy transition to create an alternative framework for examining the shifts of state energy enterprise policy in Thailand. The prominent approach of the previous studies provided four tools or strategies in changing energy regimes and policies, namely global energy phenomena and financial crises, policy packages design, discourse framing, and composition of actor network[14].

This alternative approach would elaborate more explanations and improve the understanding of the three transitions of state energy enterprise policy in at least four aspects. First, the global energy phenomena and financial crises would result in international politics that could generate a serious concern regarding shaping the policy contents, the ideas of the host governments, policymakers, and the public which lead to reframing policy discourses. The global energy circumstances and financial crises would not be easily identified as a global history because they would be the uncontrollable factor for an energy-scarce country like Thailand. The global energy phenomena and financial crises would determine the levels of energy price, the volume of energy supply, energy technology, and energy practices or consumption within energy-scarce countries. Hence, studying the shifts in state energy enterprise policy by considering the global energy phenomena and financial crises would illustrate the uncontrollable global factor that has ability (re)shape the actors' ideas and interactions in the energy policy arena which lead to reframe policy discourses and modify policy packages.

[14] Benjamin Sovacool, "What Are We Doing Here? Analyzing Fifteen Years of Energy Scholarship and Proposing a Social Research Agenda," *Energy Research & Social Science* 1 (2014): 1-29; Llewelyn Hughes and Phillip Y. Lipscy, "The Politics of Energy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 16 (2013): 449–469.

Second, considering the policy package design would elaborate the politics in selecting policy model. In designing policy packages to address problems or concerns, the government or policymakers must select one policy option and reject other options. This process must have the acceptance of political decision-makers such as the cabinet members, parliament members, and bureaucratic technocrats. Selecting this option instead of others to formulate a policy would present a pattern of selection by these political actors that indicates the ideas, experiences, interests, and desires of these political actors to address global pressures, combine actors' interests, and respond to policy discourses. Investigating the policy package design would advance the understanding of the policy options or models that the political actors rely on to shift the state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization.

The current study focuses mainly on policies that related to the EGAT and PTT, the two monopoly energy enterprises in Thailand. The EGAT, a full electricity state-owned enterprise, was established on May 1, 1969 to take responsibility for producing and supplying electricity[15]. The PTT, at first, was established as a full state-owned enterprise on December 29, 1978 to run petroleum businesses regarding petroleum exploration, production, refinery, and retail[16]. The 30 % of PTT shares were privatized on the Thai stock market in 2001, however, the Ministry of Finance still holds 49% of PTT shares[17]. The EGAT and PTT play a significant role in Thai economy, politics, and energy supply management.

[15] Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, *25 Years of Intention* (Nontaburi: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 1994), 25.

[16] Anuk Pitukthanin, "Becoming PTT": A History of the Petroleum Oil Industry in Thailand from 1946 to 1978 (A Master Thesis of Faculty of Art, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 2013), 202.

[17] PTT, "PTT Background" (Available access: http://www.pttplc.com/TH/About/pages/Background.aspx, June 9, 2019).

Economically, the PTT and EGAT are the first and second highest net profit enterprises. The PTT- from 1998 to 2015- made a net profit of 847,470.77 Million Baht (US$ 25.680 Billion) which is the first highest net profit enterprise among 59 state enterprises in Thailand. The EGAT is ranked second having made a net profit of 379,935.23 Million Baht (US$ 11.513 Billion) (See Table 1.1)

Table 1.1: Top 10 state enterprises in making net profit in Thailand (1998—2015)

Name	Net Profit (Billion US$)
PTT	25.680
EGAT	11.513
Krung Thai Bank	7.227
Government Saving Bank	6.608
Provincial Electricity Authority	5.486
Thai Airways	3.657
Airports of Thailand	3.552
TOT	3.108
CAT	2.573
Metropolitan Electricity	2.248

Source: "Fiscal Information", Ministry of Finance (Available access: http:// dataservices.mof.go.th/Dataservices/StateEnterpriseTopProfit, June 8, 2019)

According to the numbers of net profit, the EGAT and PTT are a significant source of government revenues because the EGAT and PTT are also the first and second rank of state enterprises that delivered the highest revenue to the government. For 1998 to 2015, the EGAT and PTT delivered 188,223.24 Million Baht (US$ 5.703 Billion) and

185,373.72 Million Baht (US$ 5.617 Billion) to the Thai government (see Table 1.2). These numbers of revenues are equivalent 1.25 % and 1.23% of Thailand GDP in 2018.

Table 1.2: Top 10 state enterprises in terms of revenue in Thailand (1998—2015)

Name	Revenue (Billion US$)
Electricity Generating Authority	5.703
PTT	5.617
Government Lottery	5.116
Government Saving Bank	2.934
Provincial Electricity Authority	2.615
Thailand Tobacco	2.516
CAT	2.317
TOT	2.260
Metropolitan Electricity Authority	0.935
Airports of Thailand	0.671

Source: "Fiscal Information", Ministry of Finance (Available access: http:// dataservices.mof.go.th/Dataservices/StateEnterpriseTopIncomeSubmit?language=TH, June 8, 2019)

Politically, the state of EGAT and PTT were major issues motivating the anti-government movements, when the People Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and People Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) wished to oust Thaksin Shinawatra's and Yingluck Shinawatra's government in 2006 and 2014 respectively. The PAD was an urban middle-class movement that played a leading role in ousting Thaksin Shinawatra's government and Thaksin's network governments—the Samak Sundaravej government and Somchai Wongsawat government (2007–2009). The main leader of the PAD was

Sondhi Limthongkul, a media tycoon who owned the Manager Media Group. The PAD articulated the campaign of anti-EGAT privatization, and anti-PTT privatization, in order to criticize and delegitimize the Thaksin administration[18]. Moreover, in 2014, the PDRC, another urban middle-class movement, played a leading role from 2013 to 2014 to topple the Yingluck government. The PDRC was led by Suthep Thaugsuban, the ex-secretary of the Democrat party. A sub-group of PDR led by Buddha Isara used the campaign of anti-PTT privatization to mobilize people to participant in the movement[19].

In terms of energy reserve and supply management, the PTT and EGAT are the monopoly energy state enterprises that control domestic energy production and external energy imports. The energy consumption (oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity) in Thailand has continuously increased from 389,009 barrels per day in 1987 to 2,120171 barrels per day in 2017 (Figure 1.1).

[18] Bangkok Post, "Police Refuse to Charge Thaksin," March 28, 2006, 3; The Nation, "PAD Besieges PTT Premises," July 26, 2008, 2A.

[19] Thai Post, "They Betray us," October 5, 2014, 2-5.

Figure 1.1: Amount of energy consumption in Thailand (1987–2017)



Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office, Energy Statistics of Thailand 2018 (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2018), 32.

More than 65% of the energy supply was imported from abroad, and approximately 35% of the energy supply was produced by domestic energy materials[20]. The quantity of crude oil imports rose dramatically from 161,404 barrels per day in 1987 to 949,950 barrels per day in 2017. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are the two main crude oil exporters to Thailand. On the other hand, the level of domestic crude oil production grew gradually from 16,733 barrels per day in 1987 to 141,248 barrels per day in 2017 (See Figure 1.2). 63% of crude oil imports were imported by PTT to supply three refineries owned by PTT. Almost 100% of domestic crude oil production was produced by PTTEP, a PTT subsidiary. Some of this production was done by PTTEP as

[20] Energy Policy and Planning Office, *Energy Statistics of Thailand 2018* (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2018), 17.

part of joint-ventures with international petroleum companies such as Chevron, Shell, and Esso[21].

Figure 1.2: Amount of crude oil production and imports (1987–2017)



Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office, Energy Statistics of Thailand 2018 (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2018), 32.

Regarding electricity supply, natural gas was a major source, producing 60% of electricity production. All natural gas production in Thailand comes from the Gulf of Thailand, and PTT is the sole natural gas producer in Thailand. The quantity of natural gas production continuously increased from 1987 to 2014, and then steadily declined from 731,874 barrels per day in 2014 to 650,523 barrels per day in 2017. However, Thailand began importing natural gas in 1998, importing 389 barrels per day that year. Importation increased to 256,332 barrels per day in 2017 (Figure 1.3). Malaysia and Myanmar are the main natural gas exporters to Thailand.

[21] Berra Company, *Research Project and Data Base of Historical Development of Thailand Energy Policies* (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2003), Appendix 2.

Figure 1.3: Amount of natural gas production and import (1987-2017)



Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office, Energy Statistics of Thailand 2018 (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2018), 32.

Coal is another important source in the production of electricity supply in Thailand. 18% of electricity supply was produced by coal in 2018. The domestic coal which goes towards producing electricity comes from the Mae Moh coal mine, owned by EGAT. The amount of domestic coal production dropped from 119,305 barrels per day in 1999 to 82,606 barrels per day in 2017. On the opposite side, the amount of coal imports rose dramatically from 20,424 barrels per day in 1998 to 277,519 barrels per day in 2017 (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4: Numbers of coal production and imports (1987–2017)



Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office, Energy Statistics of Thailand 2018 (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2018), 32.

12% of electricity consumed was imported from Laos. The amount of electricity imports grew significantly in 2010 when EAGT, the sole electricity buyer, imported electricity at 7253.78 gigawatt hours per year. In 2017, the importing numbers of electricity rose to 24427.42 gigawatt hours per year (Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5: Amount of electricity production and imports (1987—2017)



Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office, Energy Statistics of Thailand 2018 (Bangkok: Energy Policy and Planning Office, 2018), 162.

As mentioned above, the PTT and EGAT are not only state enterprises, but also major sources of government revenue, political targets for anti-government movements, and dominant players in supplying energy. Considering that state energy enterprise policies regarding PTT and EGAT has significant impact on increases or decreases of government incomes, it gives an incentive for forming anti-government movements, and creating a change or obstacle in formulating non-fossil fuel energy policies such as ethanol fuel policy, wind power, and solar power.

Third, the framing of government and the social movement discourses cannot be simply justified as a slogan or campaign of governments or movements to design or formulate energy policy. Discourse is a crucial frame that shapes the perception of state energy enterprise policy. An analysis by Sovacool, a well-known professor who specializes in energy policy and politics, noted that discourse is the regime of energy truth that collects perspectives regarding how people and institutions think about and act on energy policy[22]. Framing discourse is the fundamental frame for constructing a perspective regarding energy problem identifications, decision-making to solve energy problems, recruiting a new policy actor to or excluding incumbent actors from the energy policy arena and evaluating solutions. In other words, if an individual could control framing discourse, she or he could create the definition of state energy enterprise policy and shape the perception to accept or resist the policy shifts from liberalization to renationalization. Examination of discourse would display the "ideational power" in making a coalition between key political actors for shifting Thailand's energy policies.

[22] Benjamin K. Sovacool, et al., "New Frontiers and Conceptual Frameworks for Energy Justice," *Energy Policy* 105 (2017): 677–691.

This dissertation adopted the definition of ideational power from an article by Carstensen and Schmidt. They defined ideational power as the capacity of actors to influence other actors' normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements such as discourses, practices, narratives, frames, grammars or identities[23]. This definition fits with a core aim of this dissertation which intends to illustrate how civil society movements influence bureaucrats to make a coalition in shifting Thailand's energy policies.

How is this idea powerful in policymaking process and policy changes? Articles by Kuzemko and Beland have touched upon on this puzzle[24]. The two scholars pointed out that ideas play a powerful role in policy decision-making stage in three regards. Firstly, ideas have the ability to form and structure policy making processes because ideas create a framework to actively constrain the cognitive range of useful solutions. Moreover, a framework can influence policy actors to interpret and construct policy problems in formulating the policy agenda- as well as objective- and instruments of policy that are deemed appropriate. Secondly, ideas construct a form of knowledge that actors can employ as the terms of reference or assumption in negotiating with other groups. Thirdly, ideas would become powerful ideological weapons to highlight problems and the failure of exiting institutions in contesting or challenging dominant ideas, embedded practices, and incumbent institutions.

[23] Martin B. Carstensen and Vivien A. Schmidt, "Power Through, over and in Ideas: Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism," *Journal of European Public Policy* 23, no. 3 (2016): 318-337.

[24] Caroline Kuzemko, "Ideas, Power, and Change: Explaining EU—Russia Energy Relations," *Journal of European Public Policy* 21, no.1 (2014): 58-75; Daniel Beland, "Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change," *Journal of European Public Policy* 16, no. 5 (2009): 701-718.

What types of ideas exert an impact upon policy making? An article by Campbell closely scrutinized the concept of ideational power and found four types of idea that affected policy making[25]. First, programmatic ideas are elite policy actors' prescriptions which help policymakers devise concrete solutions to policy problems. These types of ideas specifically focus upon how to solve specific policy problems. Second, paradigmatic ideas are assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful solutions available to policy makers. These ideas help to categorize solutions that policymakers perceive and deem useful and practical for solving problems. Third, framing is an idea that constitutes concepts or symbols in helping policymakers to legitimize policy solutions to the public. Frames typically appear in the public pronouncements of policymakers such as campaigns, speeches, press releases or public statements in order to mobilize public support for policy proposals. Fourth, public sentiment and public assumptions act to constrain the range of solutions that people view as an acceptable policy. Public sentiments consist of broad attitudes and normative assumptions regarding what is, or is not, a desirable solution from people's viewpoints. This dissertation mainly analyzes two types of ideas, namely framing and public sentiment to understand what kinds of concepts and attitudes policymakers and civil society groups employed in shifting state energy enterprise policies in Thailand.

When ideas come to operate in policymaking process, they generate power for policy actors; however, which directions and/or in what ways would idea generate power? An analysis by Carstenses and Schmidt mentioned to three characters of

[25] John L. Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy," *Theory and Society* 27, no. 3 (1998): 377-409.

ideational power[26]. Firstly, ideas provide actors with the power to persuade other actors to accept and adopt their views of what to think and do. Secondly, ideas give actors the power to control and retain the meaning of ideas in maintaining the same actor group in- or excluding- other actor groups from the policymaking arena. Thirdly, ideas provide actors with the power to construct systems of knowledge, discursive practices, and institutional arrangements. The concept of ideational power is outlined here in order to help to explain what ideas matter and how these ideas have provided ideational power to actors in shifting Thailand's energy policies.

This research focuses on state actors and movements that have produced powerful discourse. The state is a powerful actor in framing policy discourse. Scrase and Ockwell[27] described that policy in all policy arena, including energy, was formulated by guiding of the state interests or government preferences. Without government preference, an alternative idea would not be promoted to be a policy. The Thai state also has controlled the energy industry since World War II by following the guidelines of the United States, World Bank and International Monetary Fund[28]. Experience, knowledge, and networks have made the state actors a crucial discourse creator in energy policy decision-making. However, social movements' discourses could be examined as the counter-framing to the government discourse that could (re)shape the transitions of state energy enterprise policy. The movements that have energy agendas as a discourse strategy have been active

[26] Martin B. Carstensen and Vivien A. Schmidt, "Power Through, over and in Ideas: Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism," 318-337.

[27] Ivan J. Scrase and David G. Ockwell, "The Role of Discourse and Linguistic Framing Effects in Sustaining High Carbon Energy Policy—An Accessible Introduction," *Energy Policy* 38 (2010): 2225-2233.

[28] Xiaojiang Yu, "Regional Cooperation and Energy Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-region," *Energy Policy* 31 (2003): 1221–1234.

participants in Thailand's energy policy arena since 1987[29]. In addition, the movements have developed their role as a key actor by co-operating with research units, university scholars, and the media to provide their energy discourse to persuade the public and debate with government agencies.

This research does not consider the private sector's discourse because the energy companies do not seem to play a pivotal role in shaping energy discourse. This hypothesis has been confirmed by the analyses of a former CEO of Bang Chak Public Company Limited, energy scholars and a former energy minister. The private actors do not create any notable energy discourse; their discourse is normally the same as the government's discourse because the state and private sectors typically negotiate with each other before launching energy discourse. In this sense, the private energy companies would adopt the government discourse as a key guideline to perform their role and operate their businesses[30].

Fourth, the actor analysis, however, could not be rejected to conduct the present study. Discourse does not occur in a vacuum. Some individuals or some groups intend to popularise their agenda through framing discourse to set a new frame for transiting existing policies. Who are these individuals or groups? Who or which groups can control the choices of discourse? Combining the actor network analysis with discourse analysis displays who or which groups produce and take advantage of discourse. In other words, which groups of actors are served by discourse? Moreover, the present study uses actor network analysis to discover the partner coalitions at the level of discourse, which

[29] Sukkumnoed and Nantaworakhan, *An Analysis of Energy Public Policy Process*, 29.

[30] Manoon Siriwan, interview, October 19, 2017; Dusit Kruangam**,** interview, October 23, 2017; Pichai Naripthaphan, interview, September 14, 2017.

become the advocacy groups that articulate the same ideas, to project the picture of actor network creation.

The main focus of this research is Thailand because of the following three rationales:

First, Thailand is a part of the global trend to renationalize state energy enterprises that began in the 2010s. Many researchers have attempted to monitor and investigate the renationalization of state-owned electricity and petroleum enterprises around the world. A report by the World Bank mentioned that renationalization was a backlash against the liberalization of public energy utilities in the 2010s, particularly in developing countries[31]. Shaffer's analysis elaborated on the trend of the renationalization of public energy enterprises; that is, the renationalization of public energy enterprises has normally occurred in the group of energy-abundant countries[32]. However, several questions might be raised; for example, how does the renationalization of public energy enterprises occur in a country outside of the group of energy-abundant countries, and what types of policy packages and ideas are created to design and push the renationalization in energy-scarce countries. To offer an alternative understanding of the shifts in state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization within energy-scarce countries, the Thai case is used.

Second, Thailand is a case that reflects the shifts in state energy enterprise policy in an unconsolidated democratic country that has an elected and military government. As aforementioned, a policy option to (re)design the policy of state energy enterprises must

[31] John E. Besant-Jones, *Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned?* (Washington, DC: Energy and Mining Sector, World Bank, 2006), 109.

[32] Brenda Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 31.

be agreed on by government agencies. The shifts in state energy enterprise policy in Thailand from 1987 to 2018 occurred under different forms of government—elected and military governments—composed of different stakeholders. In this sense, investigating Thailand would reveal a comparative policy study between the two forms of government: how the elected and military governments created the shifts in state energy enterprise policy and whether the elected and military governments share policy packages and ideas in shifting the policy of state energy enterprises.

Finally, using Thailand as the case to explore the policy of state energy enterprises would result in a new research question in the field of energy policy and politics. This dissertation surveyed 67 articles that used Thailand as a case study: 39 articles on Energy Policy (1992–March 2019), 24 articles on Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews (1997–March 2019) and four articles on Energy Research and Social Science (2014–March 2019). After collecting the articles, the present study analyzed the articles' titles, keywords and author backgrounds (affiliations) as can be seen in Appendix 1.

The statistical findings revealed that the 67 articles were produced by researchers in the disciplines of energy engineering (34%), energy and environment (30%), energy and technology (13.5%), social science (13.5%) and energy economy (9%). The articles based on the engineering, technology, environment, and economic perspectives had attempted to find a model to improve energy technologies and knowledge, promote renewable energy technologies, mitigate the CO_2 emission in energy production and reduce the production costs of renewable energy. However, the articles relied on a social science perspective employed in the context of policy analysis to analyse companies' investment policy regarding renewable energy, nuclear policy, biodiesel policy, renewable policy, fossil fuel policy, policy to promote biomass power plants in local

communities, and policy for the mitigation of climate change in the oil and gas industry. The survey data showed that no article had used Thailand to analyze the transitions of state energy enterprises policy, which could powerfully promote or oppose the renewable policy, fossil fuel policy, biodiesel policy and so forth. Hence, using the Thai case to examine the policy of state energy enterprises would offer a new question to discuss with researchers in the field.

1.2 Research objectives

This dissertation has the broader intention to offer an alternative explanation regarding politics in designing the shifts of state energy enterprises policy from liberalization to renationalization by using Thailand as the main case study. In deep consideration of the broader purpose, several specific and particular details were referred to in composing the research objective.

First, this study attempts to reveal the development of state energy enterprise policy in Thailand from 1987 to 2017. The investigation reviews the history of energy policies and links the global energy phenomena to demonstrate the external factors that pushed the shifts in state energy enterprise policy.

Second, this dissertation attempts to investigate discourse to explore the set of ideas and concepts in creating ideational power that connects bureaucratic agencies and civic society movements to be a partnership in changing existing energy regime and shifting state energy enterprise policy.

The final aim of this research is to assess actor network creation at the level of discourse. This research attempts to identify groups of actors that create and shape the

main ideas of the discourses, the main stakeholders that control the content of the discourses, and the partner coalitions at the level of discourse. Moreover, this dissertation also presents the changes of actor composition in the government agencies and social movements during the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy.

1.3 Research questions

The main question addressed in this study is as follows: Why and how did the policy of state energy enterprises in Thailand shift from liberalization to renationalization from 1987 to 2018? To answer these questions in the context of politics in energy policy transition, the following four research questions are established.

1. What types of global energy phenomena occur during the shifts in state energy-enterprise policy? This question is posed to project the international conditions that apply pressure on government agencies and the public.

2. How do government agencies design policy packages to shift the policy of state energy enterprises from liberalization to renationalization? This question is posed to reveal the policy options or models that the government employed to create the policy shift.

3. How are key concepts framed, selected and introduced by state actors and members of movements in the design of Thailand's energy policies? This question is posed to assess the bases of discourse to shift the policy from energy liberalization to renationalization.

4. Who or what types of government agencies and civil society groups in the social movements play a pivotal role in framing energy discourses? This question

examines the creation of energy actor networks: who share sets of energy discourse or who produces counter-discourses. The results of this question indicate that the shifts in energy policies occur on what types of actor network compositions.

How can the three research questions provide the answers to the research problem? Subsection 1.4 proposes some answers.

1.4 Research assumptions

According to the research questions, this research proposes the hypotheses as the context for answering the research questions. The transitions of state energy enterprise policy start with liberalization as the first stage, recentralization as the middle stage, and renationalization as the final stage. These three prime shifts occur because of the changes in politics on energy policy which composes of the different global energy phenomena, several policy packages, various sets of ideas and logic and different compositions of actor networks. These combinations are the primary motives behind state energy enterprise policy. What characters of the four combinations result in the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy? More details are explained follows.

First, the liberalization of state energy enterprises seems to have been based on the global trend during the 1970s' oil price crisis, liberalization of public energy utilities in the 1980s, and the 1997 financial crisis. The policymakers typically formulate the policy packages of public-private partnership by increasing private investment and selling the shares of energy enterprises on the stock market. Under the wave of liberalization, the government agencies create discourses regarding the problems of public financing, the security of the energy supply, and competition in the energy market to promote the

liberalization of state energy enterprises. Additionally, social movements frame their discourse on the problems related to the environment and health, social class, transparency in the external investigation, democracy and the changes in local socio-economic development to dialogue with the wave of liberalization. The key actors who create the discourses for supporting the liberalization policy of state energy enterprises tend to be a group of economic agencies. On the other hand, affected members of local communities seem to be the core civil society group who produce the counter-discourses.

Second, the recentralization of state energy enterprises occurs in the context of the global trend of the second oil crisis in the 2000s. The government agencies rely on the policy packages to establish the new bureaucratic commission and reshape of the power relations among incumbent actors in energy agencies to create the recentralization. This policy shift is primarily based on the government's discourse theme of separating the power relations between policymakers and regulators, conflicts of interests and fair competition in the petroleum business. However, based on the trend of the recentralization of state energy enterprises, the social movements seem to frame their dialogue based on the discourse regarding energy price concerns, public energy enterprises as a national asset and corruption. According to the framing of discourses, the bureaucratic energy network plays a dominant role in creating the government discourses. However, the anti-government movements led by urban middle-class groups play a leading role in producing the social movements' discourses.

Finally, energy renationalization tends to be shaped based on the global trend of the renationalization of public energy utilities in the 2010s. To create the renationalization of state energy enterprises, the government formulates the policy packages based on restructuring energy organizations and suspending some existing regulations. Problems, for example, the delay of bureaucratic agencies' performance, the

security of the energy supply, national interests, economic concerns, and garbage management, are used as the basis for the discourse to legitimize renationalization. However, the social movements create their discourse to discuss the trend of renationalization based on energy prices, environmental and health concerns, democracy, criticism of energy capitalists and the idea that the control of public energy enterprises should be based on the public's interests. Under the wave of renationalization, the Prime Minister's Office seems to be the main group controlling the bases of government discourse; additionally, affected local residents and urban middle-class groups are the dual actors that play leading roles in framing the social movements' discourse.

Moreover, the current study proposes that ideational power, social and political thoughts in framing discourses, would be another powerful factor to connect bureaucratic agencies and civil society movements to overthrow incumbent interest networks that counter the transitions of energy policy.

1.5 Conceptual framework

To answer the research questions and prove the hypotheses, this dissertation combines the analyses of global energy phenomena, policy package, framing analysis, and actor composition for creating an alternative framework, so-called politics of energy policy transition.

1.5.1 Global energy phenomena and financial crises

The analysis of global energy phenomena and financial crises is a key framework of international relations to understand how international events regulate energy policy. The concept of Multi-level Perspective (MLP) as a main framework to investigate the

transition of sustainable energy policy assumes that global energy phenomena such as oil crisis and macro-economic trends such as financial crisis and economic globalization trend are a significant impact to destabilize existing policy practices and patterns of idea[33]. Llewelyn Hughes and Phillip Y. Lipscy pointed that international organizations also had strong influences over the transition of energy policy. Because, cross-national institutions such as OPEC, the International Energy Agency, the Intranational Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have played a hegemonic role in setting international energy systems such as energy management standards, energy tariffs, and energy regulatory instruments to destabilize existing energy policies[34].

To analyze the global condition of the shifts in energy policy, the present study questioned the influences of global energy phenomena and financial crises in shaping energy decision-making. Global energy incidents and financial crises would be the most useful context for this study to explore pressures from the global phenomena over the shifts in state energy-enterprise policy in Thailand. Moreover, this dissertation further examines specifically the role of international organizations, international systems, and foreign energy policies by superpower countries in steering the energy policy transitions. This research, under the useful guide of the aforementioned concepts, establishes the analytical context for understanding global factors by exploring whether there are any relating global energy phenomena and financial crises that occur during the energy policy transitions.

[33] Florian Kern, "Using the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions to assess innovation policy," *Technological Forecasting & Social Change* 79 (2012): 298-310; Daniel A. Lachman, "A Survey and Review of Approaches to Study Transitions," *Energy Policy* 58 (2013): 269—276.

[34] Llewelyn Hughes and Phillip Y. Lipscy, "The Politics of Energy," 449–469.

1.5.2 Policy package

This framework concentrates on how and what kinds of policy packages are produced to reform energy policy. Previous researches in this field normally focused on contents or substances of policy that could reform existing energy policy or shift fossil fuel-based policy to renewable based-policy. Marvin T. Lagonera in his master thesis analysed policy contents in the strategic, operational, and tactical level in shifting fossil based-energy system to renewable energy-based system in Kyoto city, Japan and Quezon City, the Philippines[35]. Florian Kern and Adrian Smith also examined policy contents in the National Environmental Policy Plan of Netherland to find out policy model, strategic versions, and creation of organizations for shifting fossil energy system to renewable energy system[36].

Some previous studies investigated politics on energy policy through analysing of policy packages along with actors' interactions in decision-making process to further understand politics of decision makers in selecting policy options. Leah C. Stokes studied the politics of renewable energy policy and in Ontario, Canada, by focusing on the content of feed-in tariffs program along with the role of government in communicating to people, generating key information, reducing side effects and forming coalitions to promote policy design and implementation[37]. Using the same way of analysis, a research on wind energy policy at the provincial level in China by Xun Cao et al. also described

[35] Marvin T. Lagonera, "Governing Urban Sustainability Transtions: A Comparative Case Study of Local Energy and Climate Governance in Kyoto City (Japan) and Quezon City (Philippines) " (A Master Thesis of Global Politics Program, Faculty of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University, The Philippines, 2016).

[36] Florian Kern and Adrian Smith, "Restructuring Energy Systems for Sustainability? Energy Transition Policy in the Netherlands," *Energy Policy* 36 (2008): 4093—4103.

[37] Leah C. Stokes, "The Politics of Renewable Energy Politics: The Case of Feed-in Tariffs in Ontario, Canada," *Energy Policy* 56 (2013): 490–500.

energy politics by analyzing provincial leaders' characteristics to determine groups of provincial leaders that had a positive attitude towards promoting the wind energy policy[38].

To understand the policy design for the transition of Thailand's energy policy, the present study looks for government actions and interventions for controlling the energy policy formulation and implementation. Moreover, the present study adopted the analytical guideline of policy package to analyse policy contents by focusing on types of policy option or model that the governments select to shift the policy of state energy enterprises.

1.5.3 Framing analysis

Erving Goffman, an expert in frame analysis, mentioned that frame analysis referred to the examination of a cognitive structure or organization of collective experiences that create meaning, perception or worldview of reality in everyday life. We created a frame to perceive or understand something such as language, meaning, and actions through our previous experiences. If someone needs to cancel a conventional framework, he/she has to develop a new frame in some sort of logic to reshape the conventional belief[39]. Existing energy policies were a conventional framework that constituted hegemonic ideas, embedded practices, and established institutions. When an individual aims to reshape the existing energy policies, she or he must create a new frame to convince or persuade others. To understand the frame in shifting the energy policy, the

[38] Xun Cao, Andrew Kleit and Chuyu Liu, "Why Invest in Wind Energy? Career Incentives and Chinese Renewable Energy Politics," *Energy Policy* 99 (2016): 120–131.

[39] Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 11; F. Senger, R.P.J.M. Raven, and A. Van Venrooij, "From Riches to Rags: Biofuels, Media Discourse, and Resistance to Sustainable Energy Technologies," *Energy Policy* 38 (2010): 5013– 5027.

present study integrated the concept of rhetoric analysis and discourse coalition as a core concept in the framing analysis to create the analytical framework.

Rhetoric analysis is a classic popular framework in linguistic studies and mass communication. Social scientists broadly adopted the rhetoric analysis in the period of linguistic turn[40]. Policy analysts have also adopted rhetoric analysis in terms of narrative policy analysis to examine persuasive language used in designing energy policies and politics. Public policy scholars have defined the meaning of rhetoric analysis as the reconstruction of the stories that actors tell regarding an aspect of policy and how the same policy term or measures are given meaning in different and conflicting manners[41]. Policy scholars used three elements to examine the reconstruction of policy stories by different actors: story, text, and narration.

A story refers to the sets of events, characters, or plots being narrated or abstracted from their representation in the text. The word 'text' refers to the telling of the story in spoken or written discussions published in printed media narration concerns the act of narrators producing the narratives and the reactions of narrates after receiving the narratives[42].

Sovacool employed rhetoric analysis to further investigate logical ideas for the transitions of energy technologies: steam engines, automobiles, hydroelectric dams, and nuclear reactors. The main focus of Sovacool's research relied on a logical implication of

[40] John Barry, Geraint Ellis and Clive Robinson, "Cool Rationalities and Hot Air: A Rhetoric Approach to Understanding Debates on Renewable Energy," *Global Environmental Politics* 8, no. 2 (2008): 67– 98.

[41] Michel J. G. van Eeten, "Narrative Policy Analysis," in *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods,* ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller and Mara S. Sidney (Florida: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 251– 267.

[42] Ibid.

the linguistic frames selected by the advocacy coalitions of those energy technologies. Sovacool mentioned that the logical implication of the linguistic frames was the rhetoric or narrative, which was used to develop plot lines for reducing complexities into meaningful stories that people can share, create and elaborate[43]. In this sense, Sovacool further developed the concept of rhetoric analysis to focus not only on the patterns of story and interaction between storytellers and audiences but also on the attempt to understand the patterns of ideas or logic behind the stories embedded in actors' minds and perceptions.

Discourse coalition is another concept that explains ideas or logic related to the transitions of energy policy. Initially, the studies on discourse were a core focus of linguistic studies that concentrated on the patterns of language use in the texts and further investigated how the social and cultural contexts were linked to the patterns of language use or how the use of language affected social identities and relations (critical discourse analysis)[44].

Hajer adopted discourse analysis in the linguistic field to offer the concept of argumentative discourse analysis in policy studies. The researcher identified the discourse analysis in policy studies as the examination to discover the storyline that linked various stories from policy actors together. He elaborated on the domain of the concept, that is, the purpose of discourse analysis was to determine how to combine analyses of the discourse production of reality with analyses of sociopolitical practices from which social constructs emerge and in which actors are engaged. The approach to study discourse was

[43] Benjamin K. Sovacool and Brent Brossmann, "The Rhetoric Fantasy of Energy Transitions: Implication for Energy Policy Analysis," *Technology Analysis & Strategic Management* 26, no.7 (2014): 837–854.

[44] Brain Paltridge, *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 1–2.

to monitor how people position one another through language use widely employed in discourses[45].

Hajer contributed several analytical contexts to investigate discourse in policy studies that integrated actor analysis into discourse analysis. The conceptual tools that facilitated the discourse analysis comprised storyline, discourse coalition, discourse structuration, and discourse institutionalization. The storyline was the actual discussion of specific problems or the cluster of discussions coded from various discourses. A storyline does not emerge in a vacuum and requires a group of actors who share a social construct or way of thought to highlight and articulate the similar meaning of discourses. This group of actors was identified as the discourse coalition.

Hajer emphasized the relation between the storyline and discourse coalition, that is, discourse coalitions comprise different actors from various backgrounds that form specific coalitions based on a specific storyline. The storylines were the instrument actors used to impose their ideas of reality on others, suggest certain social practices to society and criticize alternative social arrangements. When a storyline started to dominate how a social group conceptualized the world, this process was defined as discourse structuration. The final stage to establish a storyline within society was discourse institutionalization. This process referred to a successful discourse that a majority of people used to conceptualize the world or a discourse that has become part of organizational practices and traditional ways of reasoning[46].

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[45] Maarten A. Hajer, "Discourse Analysis and the Study of Policy Making," *European Political Science* 2, no.1 (2002): 61–65.

[46] Maarten A. Hajer, "Discourse Coalition and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain," in *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, ed. Frank Fischer and John Forester (London: Duke University Press, 1993), 43–76.

Building on the two ground theories—rhetoric analysis and discourse coalition—in investigating ideas and concepts behind public policy, this dissertation develops the analytical lens to study types of ideas or concepts in the government language that were used to frame the discourse theme as the storyline for supporting the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy. However, the movement discourse should be studied as a counter-storyline in the transition of the energy policy. This dissertation explores types of ideas or concepts in the movement campaigns that were employed to reflect the discourse theme for opposing the transition of state energy-enterprise policy. The actor composition in the discourse coalition is another research question of the present study. However, the analytical framework by Hajer was criticized based on the question of the stability of a coalition. Thus, this dissertation integrates the concept of actor network analysis.

1.5.4 Actor network analysis

The discourse coalition argument made by Hajer is as follows: The main assumption of the concept was associated with the belief in the stability of coalition over time. Notably, Hajer seems to have overlooked the changes in actor coalition that would lead to changes in the storyline for designing the policy. Notably, changes in the actor coalition occur all the time following the exchanges of interests and beliefs among policy actors in the policy arena. The assumption behind the concept of discourse coalition would be more useful and appropriate in a study of policy stability than that of policy transition,[47] a focus of the present study. In this sense, this research refers to policy network analysis to investigate the composition of actor coalitions in each transition of a state's energy-enterprise policy.

[47] David J. Hess, "Coalition, Framing and the Politics of Energy Transitions: Local Democracy and Community Choice in California," *Energy Research & Social Science* 50 (2019): 38–50.

The policy network can be identified by referring to many aspects such as policy network as an analytical framework, social structure or a form of governance. However, this dissertation uses the concept of policy network as the form of policy organization[48] to understand the changes in membership of energy policy organizations that would result in transitions in energy policy. The policy network typically referred to sets of formal institutional links and informal links between government actors and other actors structured around making and implementing public policy[49]. Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider further elaborated the 'linkage of policy network' as communication channels for exchanges of information, expertise, trust, and other policy resources[50].

Hugh Compston has pointed out that for one to understand the policy transition, examining the change of membership in the policy network is necessary because new members would bring new perceived problems and solutions, new policy network-specific standards and norms, new preferences, new resources and new strategies for policy formulation. These elements would result in policy change[51].

Hess built his research on this concept and proposed an approach to examining the transition of energy policy through the changes of coalition composition in pro-policy and anti-policy coalitions. Hess suggested that the change in policy advocacy coalitions

[48] Jorg Raab and Patrick Kenis, "Taking Stock of Policy Network: Do They Matter?," in *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Method*, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller and Mara S. Sidney (New York: Taylor & Francis group, 2007), 253.

[49] R. A. W. Rhodes, "Policy Network Analysis," in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy,* ed. Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E. Goodin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 426.

[50] Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, "Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox," in *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations*, ed. Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 43.

[51] Hugh Compston, *Policy Networks and Policy Change: Putting Policy Network Theory to the Test* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 34–51.

occurred all the time because of policy conflicts: differences in interests, different identification of problems, and expected outcomes between the actor groups in one coalition. The policy conflict resulted in the exclusion of incumbent actors from and inclusion of new actors into the policy arena. When the policy coalition composition changes, some former ideas or concepts are erased from an existing frame or storyline, and some new ideas or concepts are adopted to develop a new frame or storyline. To improve the understanding of the politics of policy transition in the level of actor analysis and logical analysis, Hess more suggested that the coalition of policy supporters and their frames along with the coalition of policy protesters and their counter-frames should be considered in the investigation as the competition between arguments and rebuttals to shift the policy[52].

The actor network analysis in this dissertation is associated with the examination at two levels. The first level is to consider the changes in membership in the government energy policy organizations to understand the composition of the policy-supporter coalitions, who play a pivotal role in controlling the ideas for creating a frame or storyline, and groups of government agencies that become advocacy groups who rely on the same frame to promote the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy. The second level examines the changes in the membership of civic groups who form their coalitions around the social movements to understand the composition of policy–protester coalitions, who play a leading role in selecting the ideas or concepts for creating a counter-frame or counter-storyline, and civil society groups that become advocacy groups who rely on the same counter-frame to oppose the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy.

[52] Hess, "Coalition, Framing and the Politics of Energy Transitions: Local Democracy and Community Choice in California," 38–50.

1.6 Methodology

This section discusses the appropriate research design to enable the author to answer the main research question. According to the research objectives, this dissertation intends to understand the politics of state energy enterprise policy transition through the four subquestions regarding the global energy phenomena, policy design, framing discourse, and composition of actor coalitions. To achieve the research objectives, the qualitative approach based on the guidelines of methodological approaches in the literature is selected as the methodological foundation of this dissertation.

Methodological approach: According to the aforementioned research objectives, the quantitative approach in energy social science research that focuses on analyzing big numeric data, computer-based assessment of policy outcomes, and simulation of statistic data for finding the reliable model[53] will not be the main target of this study. The qualitative approach is the appropriate analytical method because this dissertation attempts to identify patterns of global energy phenomena, policy models, sets of ideas and concepts, and actor groups that influence the transitions of state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization. The research typology of this study is a case study that attempts to capture and present insights on Thailand's politics on energy policy phenomena from 1987 to 2018 by focusing on electricity and petroleum enterprise policies.

Moreover, in response to the four sub-research questions, the samples, data types, data sources, tools, and techniques used in collecting and analyzing data are as follows.

[53] Sovacool, "What Are We Doing Here? Analyzing Fifteen Years of Energy Scholarship and Proposing a Social Research Agenda," 1-29.

For sub-question 1, this study finds the global events that influenced the transitions of state energy enterprise policy in the secondary literature, research articles, and books that explained energy crises, global energy trends, financial crises, international energy policies, and incidents. This study searches for these materials in the database of Google Scholar to show the global historical phenomena from 1987 to 2018 within the research scope.

For sub-question 2, this study explores the policy packages for shifting the state energy enterprise policy in government statements and cabinet resolutions. When a new government comes to power, it has to declare a government statement to the public. A part of the government statement is a guideline for energy policy designs, and the cabinet resolution on energy policies is the adaptation of energy policy packages by the executive power. This study examines the government statements and cabinet resolutions on energy policies from 1987 to 2018 to trace models or packages of energy policy that the government agencies relied on to influence the transitions of energy policy. The government statements and cabinet resolutions have been published on the official website of the Prime Minister's Office: http://www.cabinet.soc.go.th/soc/ Program2-1.jsp?menu=1.

For sub-questions 3 and 4, this dissertation focuses on the discourses and coalition compositions of government actors and social movements. These two types of actors are the crucial discourse producers that could lead and (re)shape the transitions of state energy enterprise policy in Thailand. The main discourse creators for the government are the National Energy Policy Committee (NEPC), the National Energy Reform Committee (NERC), the cabinet members, the parliamentary members, and a

group of high-ranking energy bureaucrats. Additional background is described in Chapter 2.

Regarding the social movements, this study uses the eight movements that have added the energy agenda to be part of their strategic campaign. The eight movements are the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant and Coal Mining Movement, the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement, the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement, the Anti-Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) Privatization Movement, the Anti-Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) Privatization Movement, the Energy Reform Movement, and the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement. The data from the online archive showed that there were eight main social movements in the survey of digital newspapers from 1987 to 2018. Thus, the movement discourses would have been widely published to the public through these newspapers. Moreover, each movement was recognized by the governments through the formation of commissions to manage their energy claims or problems. The governments' recognition of the movements does not mean that the movements achieved their goals; by contrast, it implies that the movements had come to the attention of the top policymakers and that they had an opportunity to create a discourse to convince the dominant actors to reshape their power relations. The list of the example movements and their energy agendas are summarized in Table 1.1. Additional background information and their activities are described in chapter 2.

Table 1.3: Names of the movements and their energy agendas

Name of the movement	Energy agenda
1. Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement	To resist the construction of the Pak Mool Dam for generating electricity in the northeastern region of Thailand
2. Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement	To cancel the coal power plant in Lam Pang province, the northern region of Thailand
3. Anti-Thai–Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement	To cancel the gas pipeline project from the Thai Gulf to the southern region of Thailand
4. Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement	To oppose the construction of a coal power plant in Prachuapkhirikhan province in southern Thailand
5. Anti-Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) Privatization Movement	To obstruct the selling of EGAT shares on the stock market
6. Anti-Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) Privatization Movement	To obstruct the selling of PTT shares on the stock market
7. Energy Reform Movement	To establish the National Oil Company and create the system of production sharing contract as an alternative system of petroleum concession
8.Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement	To resist the construction of a coal power plant in Krabi province in southern Thailand

Source: Summarized by the author

The following data sources contain sets of discourse for understanding ideas and concepts in creating a frame to promote or a counter-frame to oppose the transitions of energy policy; moreover, these data sources also provide the changes in coalition configuration of the government actors and civic groups surrounding the eight social movements.

- Meeting report of the NEPC: The NEPC is a key institution in making energy policy proposals for Thai governments. The NEPC's meeting reports display sets of discourse to convince and persuade the governments and the public. This research selects the meeting reports of the NEPC from1987 to 2018 by focusing mainly on electricity and petroleum enterprise policy proposals. The study searches the meeting reports for hard copies from the library of the Office of National Energy Policy and Plan and for digital files from http://www.eppo.go.th/index.php/th/committees-subcommittees/committees;

- Energy regulations: Some energy policies are implemented in terms of laws and regulations to force energy consumers' behaviors. The energy laws and regulations provide logic and discourse to legitimize enforcements. This study selects the Electricity Act, Petroleum Act, Energy Industry Act, Royal Decrees of Energy Ministry, NEPC Act, Fuel Control Act, Fuel Trade Act, and Orders of Leader of the National Council for Peace and Order, which were promulgated or amended from 1987 to 2018, as the main data to reflect the logic behind the implementation of regulations. The hard copies of these laws and regulations were located in the library of the Office of National Energy Policy and Plan;

- Parliamentary meeting report: Drafts of energy laws and regulations must be debated and discussed by the parliamentary members. The discussions in the parliament or the national assembly that have been recorded in the parliamentary meeting reports

indicate what types of discourses the members of government coalitions and the members of opposition parties articulated in discussing energy bills. This study searches the parliamentary debates following the implementation of energy laws and regulations as aforementioned in 95 meeting reports from 1987 to 2018. This research explores the parliamentary meeting reports in the library of parliament;

- Energy reform plan of the NERC: The 2014 military government established the NERC to study and propose the energy reform plan. The NERC has become a key energy discourse producer who can suggest that the government reform energy policies and plans. After conducting research for almost three years, the NERC published the National Strategic Plan for Energy Reform in 2017. This energy plan displayed many sets of discourse to promote an influential change in Thailand's energy policy. This study downloaded the National Strategic Plan for Energy Reform from the official website of the parliament: http://dl.parliament.go.th/handle/lirt/522645;

- Official Statements: The movements have typically produced their discourses to articulate their agendas through statements. Then, their statements have been reported by the mass media. Some movements have their online channels such as Facebook or webpages to announce their statements. This study collects the statements from the Facebook account of the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement, https://th-th.facebook.com/ stopcoalkrabi/, and the webpage of the Energy Reform Movement, https://th-th.facebook.com/ thaienergyreform/. In the statements, there were lists of advocacy groups who endorsed the movements' activities and discourses. This type of data helps this research understand the network creation of civic groups;

- News coverage: The research collects the news clippings that reported the statements of movements, interviews of movement leaders and government agencies, and

the sentences of the courts regarding energy policies. Many useful articles in the news clippings provided analyses of the compositions of government coalitions on energy policy boards and the movements' participants. This group of articles helps to map the actor network on the government and movement sides. To obtain this type of data, this study accesses a digital archive of newspapers from the so-called Matichon Information Center (http://mic.matichon.co.th/), which has collected news clippings from 29 national newspapers in Thai and English[54]. This research used the program by mentioning keywords in the names of energy policies, the names of social movements, and the names of the prime ministers to search for related data such as "EGAT Privatization, PAD, and Thaksin government." There were 433 available clippings that showed the policy statements, policy contents, movement statements, claims, speeches, campaigns, press interviews with leaders of the movements, petitions to the court, and activities of the movements;

- The undocumented materials: In this dissertation, the undocumented materials refer to conversations, speeches, oral narratives, symbols, or actions that represent discourses and relationships between actor groups; however, the materials were not available in writing or in print. The undocumented data is from discussions at public seminars, speeches at demonstrations, and talking with key participants during energy policy process, energy scholars, and movements' leaders.

[54] The 29 national newspapers consist of Bangkok Biz News, Khaosod, Kaohoon, Kom Chad Luck, Thassettaki, Dokbia Online, Thunhoon, Bangkok Today, Banmuang, Prachachat, Manager, Pimthai Online, Matichon, Matichon Weekly, Daily World Today, Siam Sport, Siam Turakit, Siamrat, Siamrat Weekly, OPT News, Dailynews, Nation Weekly, Telecom Journal, Naewna, Post Today, Thairat, Thai Post, Bangkok Post, and The Nation.

Tools for data collection: This research also employs basic qualitative tools: document surveys, observations, and face-to-face interviews to collect data regarding global energy phenomena, policy packages, discourse, and actor network compositions. This research uses document surveys from libraries and digital archives as the tool to collect the sets of aforementioned data. Moreover, the document survey helps to categorize the tentative groups of energy discourses and established semi-structural questions as the guideline for interviews and observations.

This research conducted ten interviews: 5 government informants and 5 movement informants. The author held the ten face-to-face interviews during the second field trip in Thailand from September 13 to October 23, 2016. The positions of the interviewees are listed in Table 1.2.

Table 1.4: Background of informants

Government Informants	Movement Informants
1. The first secretary of the Office of Energy Policy and Plan, a former energy ministers, and a former president of PTT Public Company Limited	1. A former Senate and a leader of anti-energy privatization movement
2. A Former energy minister and an energy policy analyst	2. A leader of the People Alliance for Democracy Movement and a specialist on energy policy
3. A Secretary of the Office of Energy Policy and Plan	3. A key energy scholar in the anti-energy privatization movement
4. A former member of National Energy Reform Committee (NERC), a former	4. A key scholar in Anti-Pak Mool Dam and a professor at Chulalongkorn University

energy professor from Chulalongkorn University, and an owner of solar energy company	5. The leader of the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement
5. A former CEO of Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited and a former member of NERC	

Source: Summarized by the author

This study used the interview as the tool to collect opinions, hidden meanings, and interpretations of discourses from those energy informants who have directly participated in framing energy discourses. The 10 informants were first identified by using snowball or chair referral concept, which utilized the interviewees' social connections to identify the others who are involved in the same activities[55]. The interview also helps to assess the creation of the network through actors' connections and relationships. In other words, the data from interviewing key informants indicate why a group of actors is included to the coalition, why some groups of actors are excluded from the coalition, why a group of actors can play a pivotal role in movements. Moreover, the historical backgrounds or contexts in framing energy discourses are revealed by interviewing those interviewees.

This study observes two public seminars: the public seminar on "Question-Answer: Energy Reform for National Reconciliation" held by the Petroleum Institute of Thailand on August 27, 2014, and the public seminar on "Sustainable and Governance Way for Reforming State energy enterprises" held by the anti-energy privatization group on September 19, 2017. This research also observes the movement discourses through watching video clips on YouTube and Facebook from the Energy Reform Movement and

[55] Greg Guest, Emily E. Namey, and Marilyn L. Mitchell, *Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied Research* (London: SAGE, 2013), 50.

the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement. The data from the observation technique provides actors' behaviors, performances, and interactions of movement's participants. This set of data helps to map the actors' relationships in those movements.

Techniques for data analysis: This dissertation employs the qualitative analytical method by following these steps. First, this study employs content analysis to identify global energy phenomena, financial crises, and policy packages. This research begins with surveying global energy phenomena and financial crises mentioned in the energy policy section of the government policy statements. The global energy events and financial crises listed in the government policy statements reflect the global conditions that were serious concerns for the government and would affect government decision-making. After identifying the global energy phenomena and financial crises in government policy statements, this study investigates the historical background of these global circumstances, what these global energy phenomena are about, what is the main cause that created these global events, and what are effects of these global energy phenomena and financial crises, to analyze the patterns of global conditions that occur during the transitions of Thailand's state energy enterprise policy.

This research also uses content analysis to group the policy packages of electricity and petroleum enterprises formulated in each period of the policy shifts. This study refers to the policy purposes, processes of implementation, and expected outcomes that the government announced; what is the main goal that the government articulates in formulating this policy; what are the procedures for the policy implementation; and what is the major change after implementation of this policy; to interpret the patterns of policy packages in shaping the transitions of energy policy.

Second, analyzing government and movement discourses, so-called coding process, relies on qualitative discourse analysis which is the subjective interpretation of the content of data: which way the discourse is delivered and how the discourse is said matters[56]. Qualitative discourse analysis analyzes the language used in framing discourses through a systematic classification process of coding and identifying a particular ideational themes or logical patterns embedded in the texts[57]. This analytical approach composes of the following techniques: textual analysis, transcribing, and mapping[58]. This process starts with reading all of data materials to assess the government agencies' and social movements' language use that contains ideas, concepts, and meanings to promote or oppose the policies of state energy enterprises. During reviewing all of the documents, the author transcribes the key ideas for categorizing similar and different ideas. However, there are many sets of ideas or concepts that the actors articulate to create the discussion regarding one policy such as concerns about energy prices, the environment, health problems, or corruption. This study reduces many sets of ideas into a systematic group by a frame or storyline, namely, a cluster of discussions that can combine many similar sets of ideas into a stable meaning system such as energy nationalism, decentralized energy

[56] L.L. Benites-Lazaro, L. Giatti, and A. Giarolla, "Topic Modeling Method for Analyzing Social Actor Discourse on Climate Change, Energy and Food Security," *Energy Research & Social Science* 45 (2018): 318-330.

[57] George Brown and Benjamin K. Sovacool, "The Presidential Politics of Climate Discourse: Energy Frames, Policy, and Political Tactics from the 2016 Primaries in the United States," *Energy Policy* 111 (2017) 127-136.

[58] Danial Rosenbloom, Harris Berton, and Meadowcroft, "Framing the Sun: A Discursive Approach to Understanding Multi-dimensional Interactions within Socio-technical Transitions through the Case of Solar Electricity in Ontario, Canada," *Research Policy* 45 (2016): 1275-1290; Laura Tozer and Nicole Klenk, "Discourse of Carbon Neutrality and Imaginaries of Urban Futures," *Energy Research & Social Science* 35 (2018): 174-181; Romy Listo, "Gender Myths in Energy Poverty Literature: A Critical Discourse Analysis," *Energy Research & Social Science* 38 (2018): 9-18; Niels Smeets, "The Green Menace: Unraveling Russia's Elite Discourse on Enabling and Constructing Factors of Renewable Energy Policies," *Energy Research & Social Science* 40 (2018): 244-256.

supply, or decentralized energy policy. A frame that comprises the sets of idea would reveal the pattern of ideas, languages used, and meanings for shifting the energy policy.

Third, the actor analysis for this study starts with the separation of actors into two groups: government agencies that associate with the energy policy formation and the civic groups that attempt to be involved with the decision-making for redesigning the policy. However, this research looks further into the core group and advocacy groups within the government and social movement coalitions, who play a leading role in framing discourse and who support and articulate the same discourse. Core actor groups in the government and social movements are classified by numbers of memberships (which actor groups occupy majority seats in committees) and their activities (who or which groups frequently give press interviews to articulate their agendas, whose vocals, ideas or words are frequently accepted as the final statements or last decision-making). The actor who plays this prominent role is identified as the core actor group in the coalition. This study further examines the changes of members in the key actor group to understand the changes in coalition composition.

1.7 Research significance and originality

This dissertation attempts to provide the theoretical, empirical and practical contributions of at least three aspects.

First, in terms of theoretical implications, this research offers the combination of four analytical layers to understand the politics of energy policy transition by focusing on the shifts in state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization. This dissertation develops the analytical framework by integrating various existing lenses in the field of energy policy and politics. The global history, particularly the global history

of energy phenomena, is the first perspective that the present study applies to understand the dynamics or changes at the global level. The policy design is another well-known lens in the field of policy analysis that the present study uses to analyze designing policy package for shifting the state energy enterprise policy. The discourse analysis, which is a famous framework in the field of communication and linguistics, is adopted to study the framing of government and movement discourses to steer the three prime moves of state energy enterprise policy. This research also employs the actor analysis as the grounded concept for analyzing the shifts in state energy enterprises in Thailand to investigate the partner coalition at the level of discourse. The combination of these four existing concepts is used to provide an alternative conceptual framework for studying energy policy and politics in the future.

Second, in terms of empirical implications, the dissertation is to explain how to connect the key political actors, particularly bureaucrats and social movements to explain the shifts of energy policies. This dissertation is the first research that connects two political arenas (state actors and civil society groups) to explain the transforming of Thailand's energy policies. Previous studies did not connect these powerful political actors to explain the shifts of energy policies in Thailand meaningfully. In order words, previous explanations on the shifts of Thailand's energy policies divided into two schools of thought, namely bureaucratic-based explanation and civil society movement-based explanation. In this sense, this dissertation could reveal the integration of two key conventional frameworks to re-examine the shifts of Thailand’s energy policies.

Third, in terms of practical implications, the final discussion in the present study is to propose ideational power as another useful factor to create a coalition between political leaderships and urban middle-class movements who have strong and powerful

voices in Thai politics for making the shifts of state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization. This analysis is a significant database for energy decision-makers, technocrats, operators as well as civil society movements in creating the partnership to smoothly and successfully transit energy policies.

1.8 Dissertation structure

The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The introduction is the first chapter. A brief introduction to the other chapters is as follows.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of important government energy agencies and prominent movements in Thailand from 1987 to 2018 to provide a basic understanding of key actors in Thailand's energy policy arena. The first section of the chapter introduces the NEPC and the NERC, the members of the NEPC and the NERC, the changes of the NEPC, and the NERC memberships to understand the background of these two crucial energy agencies in preparing and proposing energy policy agendas. The backgrounds of the eight movements are explained in the second part of Chapter 2 by focusing on the significant activities of the movements, their claims and the impacts of the movements' operations on the shifts in state energy enterprise policy.

Chapter 3 identifies the energy politics that shape the liberalization policy of state energy enterprises from 1987 to 2006. This chapter highlights the three global energy trends—the Oil Price Crisis in the 1970s, the liberalization trend of public energy utilities in the 1980s, and the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997—that had a global impact on Thailand's energy policies. The key domestic policies identify the sets of policy packages for liberalizing state energy enterprises. The framing of government and movement

discourses and characters of actor networks are discussed to present the logic and network creation to steer the energy liberalization.

Chapter 4 begins with an explanation of the second wave of the energy crisis, namely the Oil Price Shock in the 2000s as the key factor that increased international pressure to recentralize state energy enterprises from 2006 to 2014. Some petroleum and electricity policies are selected to describe the energy recentralization policy package. The framing of energy agendas and creation of actor networks by the government and movements are also discussed to illustrate the logic and network building to create the recentralization.

Chapter 5 discusses the renationalization policy of state energy enterprises from 2014 to 2018. The widespread energy renationalization trend in the 2010s, especially within energy-abundant countries, is explained as a crucial global factor. The procedures for establishing the NOC and renationalizing energy policy and planning are presented to illustrate the policy package for renationalization. Additionally, framing energy agendas and forming actor networks are identified to present the ideas and network creation for steering the renationalization.

Chapter 6 proposes conclusions regarding the main research findings and the main characteristics of energy politics in Thailand from 1987 to 2018. The discussion presents the theoretical, empirical and practical implications for further study in the fields of energy policy and politics. The limitations of the study are explained to increase the transparency of this dissertation. To address the gaps created by the limitations, recommendations for further research are offered.

Chapter 2

Historical Background of Energy Policy Institutions and Social Movements in Thailand (1987–2018)

This chapter provides a brief historical background of energy policy institutions and social movements as creators of energy discourse. Who are they? What are their backgrounds and agendas? What are their activities and prime move in each period of time? These are the questions this chapter examines. Rough categorizations of policy actors normally set government and social movements on opposing sides. However, a look into the networks of government and social movement actors reveals many different interests and agendas. For example, ministers of energy, economics, and defense serving in the same cabinet perceive energy issues through differing interests and agendas. The Ministry of Energy concerns itself with energy demand and supply. The Ministry of Economy raises issues of energy cost or price tied to economic development. The Ministry of Defense views energy issues through the lens of armament and military operations. Social movements may perceive energy issues as they affect the rural poor, communities, consumers, unions, and the environment. The group of rural people may concern about the change of their job, land, and health as an effect from the energy projects. Labor unions would be concerned about job and salary after privatizing public enterprises. However, personal interests of the local people and labor unions may not concern environmentalist groups because the energy project would affect the global environment.

Due to differing interests and agendas among those government agencies and civil society groups, it is important to analyze the background of these actors because the

politics of different actor groups in government and social movement networks lead and design the narratives or storylines in the discourse, what is energy all about, and power relation among the actors in producing the discourse, who has power to control and produce the choices of discourse. Moreover, understanding the background of these discourse creators in government and social movement sides illustrate the alliance making in the level of discourse, who or which groups articulate the same or different discourses, which mobilizes wider supports from those who are not key stakeholders in those energy issues.

This chapter first describes the historical development of government agencies that create the discourse of energy policy: the Energy Authority Commission (EAC), the NEPC, and the NERC. The second part explains the background of the social movement's discourse creators. Eight social movements are prominent in the reports of the newspaper archive: the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant, the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement, the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement, the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement, the Anti- PTT Privatization Movement, the Energy Reform Movement, and the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement.

International and private actors arguably influence the discourse in many countries, particularly those abundant in energy. However, this study disregards these two actors because no clear confirms their role in framing the discourse of energy policy in Thailand. One Thai energy expert, a former CEO of several energy companies, said these two kinds of actors play roles as energy policy operators rather than the discourse producer[59]. Naturally, the state sets the energy agenda through cooperation and

[59] Manoon Siriwan, interview, October 19, 2017.

negotiation among international actors, and private sector[60]. Considering discourse of state actor would reveal the combination of international and private agendas in framing the discourse of energy policy.

2.1 Government's discourse creators

The NEPC and the NERC directly create the discourse of energy policy and propose policy for the government's decision. However, before the NEPC was established, The EAC offered energy policy suggestions to the government. The EAC's and the NEPC's boards are composed of representatives of ministries and related agencies who are ex-officio members of each other's boards. The NERC's board includes representatives of government agencies, private organizations, and civil society groups. The NERC includes a wider network than the NEPC. Nevertheless, the NERC is under the dominant network of Thailand's prime minister in terms of the recruitment process.

2.1.1 Energy Authority Commission (EAC)

The EAC was created by the National Energy Authority Act of 1953[61]. Section 5 placed the EAC in the position to explore and provide energy supply national development and security. Moreover, the EAC had responsibility to formulate policies to control energy production, purchase and sale, distribution, and safety.

The EAC's board as first established was composed of:

Prime Minister	Chair
Minister of the Interior	Vice-chair

[60] Pichai Naripthaphan, interview, September 14, 2017.

[61] Act of the National Energy Authority, 1953.

Minister of Industry	Vice-chair
Director-General, Department of Public Works	Committee
Director-General, Department of Irrigation	Committee
Director-General, Department of Iron	Committee
Director-General, Department of Forestry	Committee and Secretary

The government was allowed to appoint five to nine persons who were experts in electrical engineering and civil engineering, geology, finance, economics, and law. Appointees served five-year terms.

The EAC's board was restructured in 1964 to include the Ministry of National Development, a new organization. Another important change was reassigning the secretary position from the director-general of the Department of Forestry to the director-general of the Department of Public Works. The EAC's board after the 1964 restructuring included[62]:

Prime Minister	Chair
Minister of National Development	Vice-chair
Minister of Interior	Committee
Minister of Industry	Committee
Director-General, Department of Forestry	Committee
Director-General, Department of Irrigation	Committee
Director-General, Department of Iron	Committee
Director-General, Department of Public Works	Committee and Secretary

The government retained the prerogative of appointing five to nine experts to five-year terms.

[62] Act of the National Energy Authority (No. 2), 1964.

The final adjustment to the EAC's board occurred in 1979. In this round, the energy agencies were set up and added into EAC's board; the specific knowledge qualification to select the committees appointed by government was removed[63]. The EAC's post-1979 board included:

Prime Minister	Chair
Minister of Science, Technology, and Energy	Vice-chair
Minister of Interior	Committee
Minister of Industry	Committee
Director-General Department of Irrigation	Committee
Director-General Department of Mineral Resources	Committee
Director-General Department of Forestry	Committee
Director-General Department of Public Works	Committee
Secretary, National Energy Authority	Committee and Secretary

The government could appoint up to nine experts without special qualifications to be a committee of the EAC's board.

From the three shifts of the EAC's board, the government agency that took responsibility for energy affairs such as the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Energy and National Energy Authority was included to the EAC's board in the last adjustment. Who or which groups of agencies controlled the EAC's agendas or proposals? By investigating the work background of EAC's board members from 1953 to 1987, research indicated three groups could create their dominant network over this energy commission (Figure 2.1).

[63] Act of the National Energy Authority (No. 3), 1979

Figure 2.1: Government agencies on EAC's board from 1953 to 1987



Source: Collected by the author from the Government Gazette on the Appointment of Energy Authority Commission from 1953–1987.

The data show that the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior comprised EAC's biggest network. The 36 representatives from these three ministries belonged to EAC's board. The economic agency such as the Ministries of Finance, Industry, and Office of the Economic and Social Board, and the social agency such as the Ministries of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Environment were another important network in EAC's board. The 28 and 29 representatives of economic and social agencies were recruited as members of this energy policy commission. The energy agency such as the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy, EGAT, and the group of Prime Minister's Office such as the Prime Minister, the deputy prime minister, and secretary to the Prime Minister were the fourth-biggest network on EAC's board. The energy agency was able to create its network as equal as the Prime Minister office to occupy the energy board at 10 seats. The last group was the judicial agency and the academic group created their network to participate in this energy board at six and five seats respectively.

In the first establishment of energy policy commission, energy policy seems to be considered by the state point of view as an issue of national security rather economics or

the environment. As can be seen from the members of EAC's board, the security agency was the biggest network that occupied the majority seats in the 34 years of EAC's board. EAC's board was dissolved in 1987, and the government set up the NEPC as the new energy policy commission. Did the security agency still create the biggest network in the NEPC board? Were there significant changes in the new energy policy board? The next section elaborates upon these questions.

2.1.2 National Energy Policy Committee (NEPC)

The NEPC was established in 1987 by cabinet resolution in September 1986 as the main institution to administer Thailand's energy agenda and devise comprehensive plans and proposals for cabinet approval[64]. The initial purpose in establishing the NEPC was to solve the problem of energy agencies' fragmentation by creating an energy policy unit as a center of energy policy administration[65]. For this reason, the NEPC was designed as the core discourse producer to set energy policy initiatives, convince government decision-makings, coalesce related bureaucratic agencies, public enterprises, and private organizations, determine national energy costs, and shape criteria for evaluating energy policy outcomes. NEPC's rhetoric could reshape not only the energy policy cycle but also energy cognition of all actors in energy policy arena. Per the National Energy Policy Committee Act of 1992, NEPC's responsibilities are:

- Recommend energy policies, administrative plans, and development plans to the cabinet;

[64] Prime Minister's Office, *Historical Background of the National Energy Policy Committee and the National Energy Policy Office* (Bangkok: Prime Minister's Office, 1991), 1.

[65] National Energy Policy Committee, *The five year anniversary of National Energy Policy Committee* (Bangkok: National Energy Policy Office, 1992), 1–6.

- Establish rules and conditions in determining energy prices to conform to energy and development policies and plans;

- Monitor, consider, facilitate, support, and accelerate operations of other commissions, agencies, public enterprises, and private organizations that relate to energy issues to conform to energy policies, plans, and development plans;

- Evaluate implementations of energy and development policies plans;

- Perform tasks assigned by the cabinet.

When initially established, the NEPC had 19 board members[66]:

Prime Minister	Chairman
Deputy Prime Minister (assigned by the Prime Minister)	Vice-chairman
Deputy Prime Minister	Committee
Minister to the Prime Minister's Office	Committee
Minister of Defense	Committee
Minister of Finance	Committee
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Committee
Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Committee
Minister of Transportation	Committee
Minister of Commerce	Committee
Minister of Interior	Committee
Minister of Science, Technology, and Energy	Committee
Minister of Industry	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry	Committee
Secretary-General, the Juridical Council	Committee
Secretary-General, the National Economic	

[66] Act of National Energy Policy Committee, 1992.

and Social Development Board	Committee
Director, Bureau of the Budget	Committee
Director-general Department of Energy Development and Promotion	Committee
Secretary, Energy Policy and Planning Office	Committee and Secretary

In 2007, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry, one deputy prime minister, and the director-general of the Department of Energy Development and Promotion were removed from the board. The Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, and the director of the Energy Policy and Planning Office were appointed to replace the three agencies as mentioned before. The 19 NEPC board members after 2007 included[67]:

Prime Minister	Chairman
Deputy Prime Minister (assigned by the Prime Minister)	Vice-chairman
Minister to the Prime Minister's Office	Committee
Minister of Defense	Committee
Minister of Finance	Committee
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Committee
Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Committee
Minister of Transportation	Committee
Minister of Natural Resources and Environment	Committee
Minister of Energy	Committee
Minister of Commerce	Committee
Minister of Interior	Committee

[67] National Energy Policy Committee Act (No. 2), 2007.

Minister of Science and Technology	Committee
Minister of Industry	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Energy Ministry	Committee
Secretary-General, Juridical Council	Committee
Secretary-General, National Economic and Social Development Board	Committee
Director, Bureau of the Budget	Committee
Director, Energy Policy and Planning Office	Committee and Secretary

After Thailand's 2014 coup, the military government adjusted the NEPC board by appointing the permanent secretaries from the related ministries[68]. Thereafter NEPC's 18-member board included:

Leader of National Council for Peace and Order	Chair
Deputy Leader of National Council for Peace and Order	Vice-chair
Deputy Leader of Economic Consultant of National Council for Peace and Order	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Transportation	Committee

[68] National Council for Peace and Order, The Order of the Leader of National Council for Peace and Order 54/ 2557 on Appointment of the National Energy Policy Committee, June 6, 2014.

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources And Environment	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry	Committee
Secretary-general of the Juridical Council	Committee
Secretary-General, National Economic and Social Development Board	Committee
Director, Bureau of the Budget	Committee
Director, Energy Policy and Planning Office	Committee and Secretary

However, the NEPC's board retained much of its previous authority. The NEPC board relied on this structure in 8 months. In March 2016, the military government restored the 2007 structure of the NEPC board to formulate energy policies[69].

The majority of NEPC board members (15 persons) are ministers from the economic, security, and prime minister's offices and the others (five persons) are high-ranking government officials. The Prime Minister chairs the board ex-officio. By administrative structure, NEPC is the most powerful institution behind energy policy, reporting directly to the cabinet. Historically, the Thai government has approved energy policies guided by the NEPC's discourse. Piyasawat Amaranand, the NEPC's first

[69] National Council for Peace and Order, The Order of the Leader of National Council for Peace and Order 2/ 2558 on Adjustment of the National Energy Policy Committee, March 16, 2015.

secretary and former Energy Minister, mentioned that the government[70] routinely approved almost every energy proposal NEPC submitted.[71] The NEPC's structure featured numerous sub-committees, such as the Energy Regulatory Commission, Oil Fuel Fund Commission, the Petroleum Commission, and the Energy Policy Management Commission. In sum, NEPC occupies the center of administrative energy power in Thailand. It sets the official energy discourse and that energy-related commissions dealing with budgets, renewable, petroleum, and electricity. Figure 2.2 depicts its administrative structure.

Figure 2.2: Administrative structure of key governmental energy agencies



Source: National Energy Reform Committee, **The National Energy Reform Plan** (Bangkok: Prime Minister's Office, 2018), p. 30.

[70] Piyasawat Amaranand, interview, October 11, 2017.

[71] Ibid.

Legally, the NEPC resolutions require a majority approval[72]; in reality, energy proposals in the NEPC's resolutions were not made through disputes as a majority of the NEPC board[73]. NEPC's proposals are framed by collaboration among board members; that is, through consensus, they determine problems or issues addressed in the energy agenda. NEPC board members seek consensus rather than taking resolutions to a vote[74]. In this sense, if the vote for making a decision does not matter, discourse would become a crucial tool in convincing actors from the different groups to accept an energy agenda. Chapters 3-5 address how NEPC's board creates frames or storylines to achieve consensus through discourse.

However, another active commission articulates the discourse of energy policy: the NERC established by the 2014 military government. The next section discusses it.

2.1.3 National Energy Reform Committee (NERC)

After the 2014 coup, the military government created new energy policy networks within the NEPC board and outside by establishing the NERC. Its responsibility was to shift from planning energy reform plan to monitoring implementation of the 20-year energy strategic plan. Since 2014, the NERC has become significant in the discourse of energy policy creator that could advance energy agendas to public attention and government consideration. The NERC lack statutory authority to recommend proposals for government decision. However, its discourse could kindle public attention and guide governmental decisions. The NERC has been developed in three phases: the Energy

[72] National Energy Policy Committee Act, 1992.

[73] Twarat Sutabut, interview, October 24, 2017.

[74] Pichai Naripthaphan, interview, September 14, 2017.

Reform Commission (ERC) from 2014–2016, the Energy Reform Steering Committee (ERSC) from 2016–2017, and the NERC thereafter.

The ERC was established as a commission within the National Reform Council[75] authorized to study, analyze, and propose guidelines for reforming Thailand's energy administration[76]. Selected from the 250 members of the National Reform Council, ERC's 26 members are energy scholars, energy officers, politicians, NGOs, business owners, directors of state energy companies, members of commercial chambers, and soldiers (Table 2.1). The government set the time limitation for one year in formulating the energy reform plan. After submitting the plan to the government, the NERC was abolished following the article 38 of the 2014 Interim Constitution of Thailand.

Table 2.1: Energy Reform Commission's members

Name	Work Experience
1. Thongchat Hongladarom (Chair)	Former Governor, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
2. Kurujit Nakornthap (Vice-chair)	Director-General, Department of Mineral Fuels
3. Manoon Siriwan (Vice-chair)	Former Deputy Managing director, Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited

[75] In selecting the 250 members, NCPO established 11 national selecting commissions to list 50 experts in 11 fields: local administration, national administration, politics, education, economics, energy, social affairs, media, public health and environment, justice and law, and others. NCPO set up 76 provincial commissions to list five nominees from each Thai province. NCPO selected the 250 members of National Reform Council from lists provided by the national and provincial selection commissions.

[76] Interim Constitution of Thailand 2014, Article 27.

Name	Work Experience
4. Rosana Tositrakul (Vice-chair)	Former Senator President, Consumer Federation
5. Anchalee Chavanich	Former Governor, Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Former chairman of Board of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
6. Wiboon Khuhiran	Governor, Provincial Electricity Authority
7. Dusit Krueng-Ngam	President, Association of Solar PV Energy Industry
8. General Prasuti Rasamepatch	Director, Internal Security Command
9. General Kanit Suwan	Deputy Supreme Commander
10. Manoon Leopairote	Permanent Secretary, Department of Industry
11. Hannarong Yaowalert	Coordinator of Environmental NGOs
12. Anusorn Sangnimnuan	Former Managing Director, Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited
13. ThornThamrongnavasawas	Professor
14. Jane Namchaisiri	President, Federation of Thai Industries
15. Siri Chiraphongphan	Director, Petroleum Institute of Thailand
16. Kasidetthanadet Sekkhunthod	Member, Political Development Council

Name	Work Experience
17. Chalermsak Obsuwan	Member, Commercial Chamber of Thailand
18. Charlie Charoensook	Vice President, Chachoengsao Commercial Chamber
19. Thamrong Asawasuthirakul	President, Kamphaeng Phet Commercial Chamber
20. Praipol Koomsup	Professor
21. Yongyuth Sarasombat	Former Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office
22. General Lertrat Ratanavanich	Board Member, PTT Petroleum Exploration and Production Public Company Limited
23. Saiyan Chanwipaswong	Businessman
24. Suwat Viriyaphongsukit	Doctor
25. Anon Sirisaengtaksin	Businessman
26. Alongkon Phonlabut	Politician

Source: Secretariat of the House of Representatives, *Yearbook of Members of National Reform Assembly B.E 2557* (Bangkok: Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2015).

The military government in 2016 created the National Reform Steering Assembly (NRSA) to steer implementation of the many reform plans. One commission within the NRSA was the Energy Reform Steering Committee (ERSC), many of whose members used to be ERC members (Table 2.2). ERSC's 15 members were recruited and appointed

by the military government in consultation with advisors from the Prime Minister, the soldier group, and the deputy prime minister group[77]. The ERSC had authority similar to the NERC: studying, analyzing, and proposing methods to implement the energy reform plan. The ERSC had to determine the specific time frame and suggest ways to implement it[78]. The ERSC had one year to study and suggest how to implement the energy reform plan.

Table 2.2: National Reform Steering Committee's members

Name	Work Experience
1. Kurujit Nakornthap (Chair)	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy
2. General Lertrat Ratanavanich (Vice-chair)	Board Member, PTT Petroleum Exploration and Production Public Company Limited
3. Dusit Krueng-Ngam (Vice-chair)	President, Association of Solar PV Energy Industry
4. Admiral Nalukpun Na Bargchang	Deputy Chief Navy Commander
5. Kitti Kittichokwattana	Former Governor, Yala Province
6. Surin Chirawisit	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labor
7. Police General Wirachai	Assistant Commission-general

[77] Dusit Krea-ngam, interview, October 24, 2017.

[78] Energy Reform Steering Committee Act 2015, Article 73.

Name	Work Experience
Songmetta	
8. Kasidethanadet Sekkhunthod	Member, Political Development Council
9. Kasidit Achuakhun	President, Agricultural Learning Center in Nakhon Nayok Province
10. Praphat Kongdead	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
11. Somchai Charoenchairit	Businessman
12. Seri Atipattha	Inspector General, Ministry of Industry
13. Anusorn Jiraphong	Consultant to Governor of PTT
14. General Saravudh Chaloryoo	Director-General, Department of Defense Energy
15. Sonchai Khamnunseth	Governor, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

Source: Data Base of the National Reform Steering Assembly (Available access: https://hris.parliament.go.th/ ss_th.php, February 7, 2019).

After abolishing the ERSC, the military government created the NERC in 2017. Its 10 members were recruited by the Prime Minister's advisor team and approved by the Prime Minister[79]. Half had been members of the ERSC and the ERC (Table 2.3). Members serve five-year terms and have authority that differs from the ERC and the ERSC. The NERC has authority to construct the strategic energy plan as a part of a

[79] Dusit Krea-ngam, interview, October 24, 2017.

national strategic blueprint. It also has authority to monitor observance of the strategic energy plan by the cabinet and governmental organizations. The NERC can report their violations of the energy strategic plan to the National Strategic Committee (NSC) for investigation. Governmental organizations must obey the NSC resolutions[80].

Table 2.3: National Energy Reform Committee's members

Name	Work Experience
1. Pornchai Rujiprapha (chairperson)	Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy
2. Danucha Pitchayanand	Deputy Secretary-General, the National Economic and Social Development Council
3. Dusit Kruangam	President, Association of Solar PV Energy Industry
4. Bandit Uanarphon	Rector, Chulalongkorn University
5. Piyasawati Amaranand	President, PTT Board
6. Manoon Siriwan	Former Deputy Managing Director, Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited
7. Gen. Lertrat Ratanawanich	Board Member, PTT Petroleum Exploration and Production Public Company Limited
8. Sonchai Khamnoonset	Former Governor, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

[80] Plan and Procedures of the National Reform Act, 2017.

Name	Work Experience
9. Samorjai Sooksumek	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy
10. Kawin Pangsupapit	Former Secretary, Energy Regulatory Commission

Source: Collected by the author

Evolution of the energy reform committee from the ERC in 2014 to the ERSC in 2016 and the NERC in 2017 underscores its role as a creator of energy policy discourse. The committee's authority increased continuously under military rule from 2014 until 2019. During its first and second years, it shaped Thailand's energy agenda through proposals and planned reforms. Currently, it has authority to set Thailand's energy agenda through the energy strategic plan, which binds the cabinet and public energy authorities. In this sense, the 2017 NERC seems to hold power in framing the discourse of energy policy parallel with the NEPC, incumbent creator of discourse in the energy policy arena.

Even through NERC's members came from different background, their recruitment was centralized in the Prime Minister's Office. Deputy prime ministers and advisory teams to the Prime Minister made the list of candidates and selected nominees for appointment to the NERC by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's Office has a close connection with NERC members to design the discourse of energy policy through the energy reform plan and energy strategic plan.

2.2 Creators of discourse among social movement

Many social movements operated in Thailand from 1987 to 2018, but eight confronted the government and the public concerning energy issues: the Anti-Pak Mun Dam Movement, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant, the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement, the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement, the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement, the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement, the Energy Reform Movement, and the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement. These eight non-state actors shaped energy policy discourse with the state and society. They fall into two groups. The first group primarily sought to cancel emerging energy policies: the Anti-Pak Mun Dam Movement, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant, the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement, the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement, and the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement. The second group sought to topple governments by employing energy as an issue: the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement, the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement, and the Energy Reform Movement.

2.2.1 The Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement

The Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement defied construction of the Pak Mool Dam proposed by the NEPC[81] for Ubonratchathani Province in northeast Thailand. The dam's initial purpose was to produce electricity for power-deprived northeast Thailand[82]. The movement began operating in the early 1990s and came to public note during a 1992 protest at Government House[83]. The government disregarded the movement's proposals

[81] Thai Post, "Pak Mool Dam and Drought Problems," February 15, 2001, 3.

[82] Manager, "The War of Life in Pak Mool River: A Pain of Sacrificers," May 26, 2000, 6.

[83] Bangkok Biz News, "10 Years of Pal Mool Dam, the Anger Is Still Existent," December 22, 1999, 1–2.

and continued construction. The movement revised its initial proposals and petitioned to open the Pak Mool Dam sluice gates permanently in 2001[84].

The origins of Anti-Pak Mool trace to a cabinet resolution in 1991 when the government approved constructing the Pak Mool Dam. The government budgeted 6,600 million baht (UD$ 200 million) to build the dam and planned to finish construction in 1994. During construction, the movement demonstrated continuously against the government and the EGAT as the project's owner. After negotiations, the EGAT consented to compensate residents who lost property and jobs from the dam's construction. The EGAT paid 3,195 households 90,000 baht (UD$ 2700)[85]. When the dam was finished in 1995, local fisheries suffered because marine life was lost by the change of river flow. In 1996, the movement demonstrated for more compensation from the government. In 1997, the government paid 525,000 baht (UD$ 15,900) to residents who lost fishery jobs,[86] but the 1998 government remade a decision to cancel the payments due to the budget deficit. This decision engendered a huge Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement's demonstration in Bangkok and around the dam site. The movement demanded that the dam cease operating and permanently open its gates to restore the Pak Mool River ecosystem. From 1998 to 2000, Anti-Pak Mool demonstrated continuously, building and occupying shelters surrounding the dam. Violence erupted many times

[84] Bangkok Post, "Governor Agrees to Open Pak Moon Dam," July 20, 2007, 4.

[85] Sorapong Sriyanong, "The Politics of Dam Construction Policy: A Case Study of Pakmoon Dam" (A Master Thesis of Government Program, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 1996).

[86] Decharut Sukkumnoed, et al., *A Key to Open Healthy: Energy Health, and People Power* (Nonthaburi: Health Systems Research Institute, 2002), 20–21.

between protesters and police. The tension seemed to dissipate in 2002 when the government resolved to open the dam's gates four months each year[87].

2.2.2 The Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement

The Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement arose in 1992, when the Mae Moh Coal Power Plant in Lampang Province in northern Thailand emitted quantities of sulfur dioxide that exceeded limits prescribed by safety standards. The movement called for measures to counteract air, soil, and water pollution; evacuation of the affected; and closing the power plant.

The Mae Moh Coal Power Plant started generating electricity in 1978. Four times from 1981 to 1992 the 2,410 households in 10 communities were relocated to a safety zone[88]. Excessive sulfur dioxide emission during October–November 1992 led to being air pollution and acid rain in 14 villages of five districts. More than 1,000 locals were admitted to hospitals[89].

The sulfur dioxide emissions occurred again in 1998, affecting 1,225 people in 12 villages in four districts[90]. In response, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement demonstrated before the main gate of the power plant and sued EGAT and the plant for compensation and an end to operations. The court ordered compensation in 2009 to residents who had been affected, but it did not order the power plant to stop operating.

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[87] Ibid.

[88] Poonsook Khuntaroj, "Bureaucracy and the Life of Modern Organization: A Case Study of the Coal-Fired Power Plant" (A Master Thesis of Anthropology Program, Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology, Thammasat University, Thailand, 2011).

[89] Ibid., p. 43.

[90] Ibid.

2.2.3 The Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement

The Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant is in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province in southern Thailand. The Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut movement campaigned against its construction and the transport of coal for its operation. Its members demonstrated in front of Government House on December 28, 1999, demanding cancellation of the project because of its adverse impact on local residents and marine resources[91].

The Thai government expected Bor Nok-Hin Krut's energy infrastructure to support economic development along Thailand's western coast and to supply electricity as far as southern Thailand[92]. Local administrators approved the plan of the power plant construction in early1997, and by mid-1997 local residents were demonstrating at government agencies, police stations, and the provincial hall. Bowing to the pressure, local administrators revoked permission to build in late 1997. However, national agencies such as the EGAT still promoted construction. In early 1998, the Office of Environment Policy and Plan approved the impact assessment of the plant's construction. The EGAT signed the electricity purchasing contract and allowed the private companies to start construction. This decision prompted a huge demonstration by the movement. In late-2008 it mobilized more than 1,000 people to occupy the highway that links southern and central Thailand[93]. The government could not dislodge the crowd, and a week after it cracked down on the movement it pledged to revive public hearings as a stage

[91] Khaosod, "Prachuap Mob Speak out No Any Coal Power Plant," December 29, 1999, 11.

[92] Nobutaka Kuze, "The Multi-organizational Relations in Social Movement: A Case Study of Anti-Power Plant Movements in Hinkrut and Bonor," (A Master Thesis of Government Program, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 2002).

[93] Ibid., p. 45.

renegotiations between the EGAT and stakeholders. The government announced in 2003 to postpone indefinitely.

2.2.4 The Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement

The Trans-Thai-Malaysia natural gas pipeline is a joint venture between Thailand and Malaysia to exploration for natural gas Thai Gulf[94]. Governments of Thailand and Malaysia signed the project contract on May 30, 1990[95]. The Thai government planned to locate natural gas industries in Songkhla Province, an economic center in southern Thailand. The Anti-Natural Gas Pipeline Movement tried to obstruct a public hearing on July 29–30, 2000, provoking violence from project supporters and police that spread to local communities[96].

The pipeline was proposed by the NEPC and approved by the government after exploration in the Thai Gulf. The Thai and Malaysian governments agreed to invest in the gas field through a joint-venture with the national oil company, PTT, and Petronas[97]. Many memorandums and contracts were signed by governments of both countries between 1990 and 1997. Extracting the natural gas from the Gulf and deliver it to Thai territory required constructing a natural gas pipeline and stations in Songkhla Province. Construction started in 1998. At that time local residents and environmental groups formed their movement to oppose it. The movement demonstrated repeatedly to pressure

[94] Matichon, "Summarizing the Development of the Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline," August 2, 2000, 7.

[95] Prachachat, "The National Economic and Social Development Board Notes The Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline is Losing Money," July 12, 1999, 4.

[96] Natser Yeema, "The Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline: Human Rights and State Power," *Bangkok Biz News*, August 31, 2002, 9.

[97] Chokdee Noppawan, "Environmental Legal Principle on Participation for the Proceeding of Mega-Project: Case Study Gas Pipeline and Gas Separation Plant Project of Tran Thailand-Malaysia," (A Master Thesis of Law Program, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, Thailand, 2007).

the Thai and Malaysian governments to cancel the project. The most serious and widely reported demonstration occurred during the first public hearing on the project in July 2000, when the movement was able to close the meeting hall. The government tried to hold a second public hearing with police assistance, but the movement's members attacked police and government officials[98]. In 2002 the government ordered PTT to suspend construction for three months. After meeting with the project's stakeholders, the government proceeded with constriction in May 2002. The pipeline and stations were completed in July 2003 under guard of police and military troops.

2.2.5 The Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement

After the 1997 financial crisis, the Thai government formulated plans to privatize the EGAT[99]. Thaksin government approved a privatization plan on October 14, 2003, and attempted an IPO[100]. Thereafter EGAT's labor union and other state enterprise labor unions protested EGAT privatization. Thaksin's government initially delayed privatization, but revived it in February 2005[101]. Ensuing demonstrations were even more massive than previous protests. The Supreme Administrative Court eventually suspended privatization after ruling one member of the EGAT privatization committee had conflicts of interests. The public hearing process was never completed[102].

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[98] Hathaisiri Chaowattana, "Communication Process of Local People Against the Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline Project," (A Master Thesis of Speech Communication Program, Faculty of Communication Art, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 2003).

[99] EGAT is a virtual monopolized electricity state-owned company in Thailand, especially in electricity generation and transmission systems.

[100] Matichon, "Cabinet Approves EGAT Privatization," October 15, 2003, 4.

[101] Komchadluek, "The EGAT Mob Gathers on February 22 for Anti-Privatization," February 5, 2005, 19.

[102] Khaosod, "Stopping EGAT Privatization: The Court Sentenced the Privatization Is Illegal," March 24, 2006, 11.

In response to the economic stagnation that followed the Asian Financial Crisis, the Thai government decided to sell shares of state-owned energy enterprises. The government resolution on August 20, 2002, proposed privatizing 18 state-owned enterprises, including the EGAT[103]. One year later, EGAT's labor union joined with unions of other public enterprises to oppose EGAT's privatization, but their demonstrations were unsuccessful. On October 9, 2003, the government approved NEPC's proposal to sell EGAT shares in stock markets. EGAT's labor union occupied the area in front of EGAT headquarter in continuing protest from February to December 2004. The movement suspended demonstrations in early 2005. The government spent this time to enact the decree, selling 25% of outstanding EGAT shares in the market[104]. In late February 2006 after enactment of the privatization decree, the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement was reformed and joined by the PAD. Protests included distributing anti-privatization leaflets and demonstrating before Government House, Parliamentary House, government agencies, and the embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Leaders of the movement Rosana Tositrakul, Sirichai MaiNgam, and Suriyasai Katasila took EGAT's privatization plan to the court in November 2005 seeking its revocation and suspension of selling EGAT shares. On March 23, 2006, the court ruled privation invalid, citing a conflict of interest by one member of the privatization commission. The court also ruled that EGAT intended to construct facilities on public property. The PAD used the ruling to incite occupying the Government House and attempting to topple Thaksin government.

[103] Pongsri, "The Dynamic of EGAT-Anti Privatization Movement After 1997 Economic crisis," 48.

[104] Ibid.

2.2.6 The Anti-PTT Privatization Movement

The PTT is a large natural gas, oil, and petrochemical monopoly that has been listed on the Thai Stock Market since 2001. The Ministry of Finance as representative of Thai government owns 51% of the company[105]. The plan of PTT privatization was formulated by the NEPC in the early 1990s, but the IPO was implemented on July 10, 2001, by Thaksin's administration[106]. The Anti-PTT Privatization Movement actively operated during 2004–2008, 2011–2012, and 2015.

To resolve the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the cabinet on July 2, 2001, approved NEPC's proposal to privatize PTT by selling shares on the stock market. The government approved selling 30% of PTT's shares on July 10, 2001. They sold successfully on September 10, 2003[107]. Three years later, the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement was formed and led by Rosana Tositrakul and the Foundation for Consumers. She and the Foundation sued the Supreme Administrative Count to revoke PTT's privatization decree, citing its illegality, conflicts of interest among members of the commission overseeing PTT's privatization, and the illegitimacy of public hearings before privatization[108]. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled against the movement on December 14, 2007, but ordered PTT to transfer its expropriated assets and lands to the state as national assets[109].

In July 2008, the PAD became a partner in the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement. PAD mobilized its members against privatization and sued for its revocation in August 2011. It renewed demonstrations in the late 2013 and early 2014 after the government

[105] Post Today, "Legend of Selling National Asset," September 3, 2014, A1.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Narumon Sa-artchom et al, *Investigating of PTT Privatization* (Bangkok: NIDA, 2018), 17–19.

[108] Bangkok Post, "PTT's Listing Ruled as Legal," December 15, 2007, 1.

[109] Bangkok Post, "Court Ruling Sets a New Benchmark for Privatization," December 15, 2007, 1.

announced the second round of PTT stock sales. In January 2012 the government decided to sell 2% of the PTT shares held by the Ministry of Finance[110]. The People's Democratic Reform Committee Movement (PDRC)[111] in 2013 mobilized to topple the government of Yingluck Shinawatra (Thaksin Shinawatra's sister). The Yingluck government canceled the PTT privatization plan during the second round.

2.2.7 The Energy Reform Movement

The Energy Reform Movement descended from the PAD[112]. After the PAD and the PDRC ceased demonstrations, leaders from the two movements created their movement directed toward the petroleum issue and the National Oil Company (NOC). However, members of the movement separated into a southern based-group and a Bangkok-based group.

The movement launched in August 2014. Members in southern Thailand started a 1,600 kilometer march from Songkhla Province to Bangkok to present five proposals to the government and people along the way. They were[113]:

1. Changing the petroleum contract from the concession system to a profit-sharing agreement[114];

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[110] Siam Business, "The Government Cancels the PTT Privatization Due to the Concerning of Protests," January 28, 2012, 1.

[111] The People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) is another urban middle-class movement that played a leading role from 2013 to 2014 to topple Yingluck Shinawatra's government. The PDRC was led by politicians from the opposition party, including Suthep Thaugsuban, the ex-secretary of the Democrat party.

[112] Pichit Likitkijsomboon, "Politics of Thailand' Energy: The Movement of Yellow Shirt," *Daily World Today*, March 15, 2013, 8.

[113] The Nation, "Energy Reform Group Warns NEPO," August 22, 2014, A3.

[114] The petroleum concession system is an arrangement whereby a host government permits a company to explore for and produce oil and natural gas on land or undersea. The host government retains

2. Setting the National Oil Company;
3. Separating the petroleum production, agriculture, and tourism;
4. Canceling coal power plants;
5. Supporting renewable energy.

Members in Bangkok also marched on behalf of the five proposals. However, the military arrested their leaders in both areas. After their release, members in the south separated from their Bangkok-based counterparts and joined the Anti-Karbi Coal Power Plant Movement[115] (details in Subsection 2.2.8).

During August–September 2014, the movement held the two public debates between its leaders and the government's energy officials on petroleum management in Thailand. They were broadcast on television and Facebook. The movement continuously protested petroleum concession biding. In October 2014, the Thai government invited private companies to bid on new petroleum sources in the Gulf of Thailand for exploration and production. After the movement's demonstration before the Parliamentary House and the Ministry of Energy, the government delayed the biding[116]. From late 2015 to mid-2016, members based in Bangkok proposed to add a new section for setting National Oil Company into the new petroleum act. After this effort was rejected by the government and parliament, the Bangkok-based members gathered outside Parliamentary House to protest the new petroleum act and oust the government.

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land rights. The company receives production rights and pays the government royalties at a contracted rate. A profit-sharing agreement seems more beneficial to the government than the concession system. The company that has permission to seek and produce oil and natural gas pays the host government a fee and share production with the host government. Under a profit-sharing agreement the host government profits from fees and from production.

[115] Prasitchai Nunuan, interview, September 14, 2017.

[116] Naewna, "Postponing Biding of Petroleum Concession," October 30, 2014, 7.

2.2.8 The Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement

This group opposed the Krabi Coal Power Plant, a clean coal project announced by the government. The project actually was two sub-projects—a power plant and a port for transporting coal from the sea to the plant. This project was to be located in southern Thailand's Krabi Province, a province popular with tourists[117]. The movement usually operated around the project site and elsewhere in southern Thailand. It demonstrated outside Government House twice on July 20, 2015, and February 17, 2017[118]. The second demonstration received significant public and media attention because the military government arrested its leaders for violating military orders[119].

The Krabi plant was a project to support economic development in southern Thailand. According to the Power Development Plan 2012, the southern economy was growing 5% to 6% yearly and outstripping its capacity to provide electricity. Constructing the Krabi plant was a good solution to this problem[120]. After the government announced its construction, residents around its site began organizing in opposition. Their protest in March 2014 led to the cancellation of public hearings. When officials tried to reconvene in October 2014, safeguarded by soldiers, the movement mobilized more than 200 protesters to block entry to public hearing stage[121]. After negotiations between the

[117] Kom Chand Luek, "No Coal Is the Answer for Krabi Power Plant," February 17, 2017, 5.

[118] Naewna, "Arresting the Five Leaders of Anti-Krabi Power Plant Movement," February 19, 2017, 9–10; Naewna, "Andaman Network Invades the House of Government to Call PM for Cancelling Krabi Power Plant," July 21, 2015, 2.

[119] Matichon, "Releasing the Five Leaders of Anti-Krabi Power Plant Movement," February 21, 2017, 7.

[120] Way Magazine's Editor, "The Krabi Coal Power Plant under the Era of the National Council for Peace and Oder," *Way Magazine*, February 21, 2017. (Available access: https://waymagazine.org/coal_technology_power/, February 9, 2019).

[121] Ibid.

military and movement leader, the military could control the protesters and the hearing proceeded.

The movement first demonstrated against a power plant in Bangkok in July 2015, occupying the area in front of Government House and calling for the government to cancel its construction. After 13 days of demonstrations, the government suspended plans for construction and created a commission to address the movement's issues. However, NEPC's board, on February 18, 2017, decided to let EGAT begin construction[122]. This decision rekindled the movement's protests in Bangkok. Around 200 people gathered before Government House to oppose NEPC's decision. The military arrested five leaders of the movement after the demonstration started. One day later, they were released and the demonstration ceased. The government announced, on February 21, 2017, it would review the project's impact assessment and postponed construction indefinitely.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed three governmental organizations that set the energy discourse in Thailand: the EAC, the NEPC, and the NERC. These organizations create policy and convince other agencies in governmental decision-making. The EAC, Thailand's first energy policy unit, was a network of security agencies, suggesting that the government then viewed energy policy as security issue rather than an economic or environmental issue. When the NEPC took the EAC's place, economic agencies, the Prime Minister's Office, and energy agencies were included into the network of policy. Their inclusion indicates that the government's perspective on energy policy had expanded beyond security concerns to include economic issues and issues dealing with

[122] Ibid.

energy production. The NEPC became a stage for the rise of bureaucratic power. From 2014 to 2015, for example, its board was composed of ranking officials such as permanent secretaries of related ministries who framed the discourse of energy policy and proposals. The 2014 military government employed a new energy policy organization to legitimate its reform process. The NERC, for example, became the mechanism for processing energy reform plans; its members had work experience in the public and private sectors, academia, and NGOs. They constituted a larger network than previous energy policy units.

This chapter also introduced eight social movements whose agendas encompassed energy issues. They fall into two groups. The first group politicized energy issues to resist proposed or extant energy policies and projects. The second group politicized energy issues agendas not only to oppose policies but to topple governments. These two categories share techniques of opposing energy policies. Demonstrations or continuing protests in hallmark governmental locations and outside energy project sites are their common tools for pressuring the government to redesign energy policies. Petitioning courts is another technique that these invoked to suspend or rescind energy policies. This technique might be more successful in redressing national policies such as privatization than local energy projects. The movements shared two kinds of outcomes. First, they successfully interrupted some policies and projects, notably coal plants and privatization of public electricity enterprises. Second, they were unsuccessful in halting others, dams, coal plants, natural gas pipelines, and privatizing public petroleum enterprises.

This chapter provides a foundation for discussing the shift of state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization. For example, when different networks of bureaucratic agencies are included in energy policy units, how do they create

the discourse to mobilize acceptance from other agencies, ordinary citizens, or even opponents? Do they employ the same discourse? Or do they totally change it when framing proposals? When the network is recreated, which agencies control the choices of discourse in proposing policy? As we have seen, some movements could halt and change energy policies and projects, and some could not, even though their backgrounds were similar. How do the successful civil society movements create ideational power to connect with bureaucratic networks in popularizing and legitimizing their agendas? Although movements might share backgrounds, their coalitions are from different groups in society. Who are they? Which group designs the discourse when connecting with political leaders? Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss these questions.

Chapter 3

Politics of De-concentration: Sharing State Power with the Private Sector and Locally Affected Residents (1987–2006)

This chapter describes four factors shaping the first wave of Thailand's shift in energy policy. It is guided by four questions: What kinds of global energy incidents occurred? How were policy initiatives designed? How did government agencies and social movements create the language framing policy and discourse? Which players control the choice of discourse? The four conditions describe the condition of global energy phenomena, the designing of energy policy, framing discourse, and building networks to shift of energy policy from state-centric to liberalization.

Previous studies describe the privatization of Thailand's public energy enterprises as the prime move in energy policy shaped by multiple factors. Former studies share the consensus that the shift to liberalization—allowing private parties to buy, own, and invest in public energy enterprises—was triggered externally by the 1970s Oil Crisis, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and economic neo-liberalism imposed by the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian Development Bank. However, domestic factors coincided with global forces to influence the policy shift. Most studies concentrate on the interplay of key participants in the energy policy arena such as the NEPC's board, public energy enterprises, the EGAT, the PTT, and politicians and bureaucrats as ruling elites of public energy enterprises[123]. However, Sukkumnoed and Nantaworakhan note that four kinds of discourse governed Thai energy policy discourse during 1987–2006[124]:

[123] Wattana, Sharma, and Vaiyavuth, "Electricity Industry Reforms in Thailand: A Historical Review," 41–52.; Greacen and Greacen, "Thailand's Electricity Reforms: Privatization of Benefits and

1. State monopoly guarantees energy security and economic development (EGAT).

2. Competition in energy markets improves the performance of public enterprises (NEPC's board).

3. Developing Thailand's energy enterprises to become being the energy hub of the ASEAN (Thaksin government).

4. Reducing state centralization of energy policy decision (social movements).

Previous studies did not comprehensively analyze why these institutional players tried to liberalize state energy enterprises. Nor did they examine the global conditions under which the four tropes of energy policy discourse were framed, what kinds of policy initiatives were formulated under them, and which actors among government agencies or civic group in social movements controlled their choice.

This chapter proposes that Thailand and the global energy market have been dominated by superpower states and energy-abundant countries. The oil crisis in the 1970s was a global incident that generated problems in managing fuel supply for Thailand's government and governments worldwide. After the first wave of the energy crisis, privatizing public energy enterprises in the 1980s was the trend in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Privatization became the international standard of policymakers' decisions. The 1977 economic crisis accelerated Asian governments' privatization plans. Under these three situations, the Thai government policy was to liberalize and deregulate the energy industry, especially electricity and petroleum.

Socialization of Costs and Risks," 517– 541; Thomas B. Smith, "Privatizing Electric Power in Malaysia and Thailand: Politics and Infrastructure Development Policy," *Public Administration and Development* 23 (2003): 273–282.

[124] Sukkumnoed and Nantaworakhan, *An Analysis of Public energy Policy Process*, 61–65.

Sharing power to administer energy was a theme government agencies and social movements shared, but specific concepts within that theme were not shared. The economic agency at the center of the network framed the discourse; local residents and communities at the center of social movements producing the discourse.

This chapter is divided into four parts, each addressing the main questions posed earlier. Its first part introduces the global energy phenomena generated Thailand's energy policy from 1987 to 2006. The 1970s oil crisis, the 1980s trend toward privatization, and the 1997 Asian economic crisis are explained there key international factors. The second part of the chapter discusses energy policies, especially public electricity and petroleum enterprises designed and implemented during the first wave of the shift in energy policy. The third part of the chapter explains the language used to design policy initiatives. It starts with the discourse framing by government agencies to propose policy, and then it examines the shaping of discourse by social movements to deal with the government's discourse. The fourth part reveals the building of coalitions of government agencies and social movements to frame discourse.

3.1 Global energy trend: From energy crises to privatization

The 1970s oil crisis, privatization of public energy enterprises in the 1980s, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis were global conditions that mark the initial shift in Thailand's energy policy. These three phenomena reflected two primary problems. First, curtailing supply by energy-exporting countries affects global energy prices and consumption in energy-importing countries as seen in the 1970s oil crisis. Second, economic difficulties within countries prompt a change in energy policy—under the name

of reform—to earn revenue to relieve financial stresses. Such was the case during the wave of privatization in the 1980s and the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

3.1.1 The 1970s energy crisis

The 1970s energy crisis was triggered by political conflict in the Mideast. It created concerns about oil prices and petroleum supply. This incident would be divided into two rounds: 1974–75 and 1979–80. The first surge in oil prices was triggered by the Yom Kippur War, when Egypt and Syria allied to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Both countries intended to reclaim territory lost during the Six-Day War in 1967. Other antagonists participated actively or passively, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, and Libya. Participants who were OPEC members sided with Egypt and Syria by endorsing OPEC's resolution to embargo oil as long as territory occupied by Israel was not freed and the rights of the Palestinian people were not re-established[125]. The price of oil soared from US$17 in 1973 to US$53.94 per barrel in 1974[126]. The increase of oil price was exceeding 300% within a year.

The second oil price shock was associated with regime change in Iran. The Iranian Revolution of early 1978 ended in 1979, when the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi collapsed and Sheikh Khomeini took control of Iran as an Islamic republic. Political instability in Iran generated concerns for stable petroleum production and global

[125] Pascal Ditté and Peter Dr. Roell, *Past oil price shocks: Political background and economic impact Evidence from three cases* (Berlin: The Institute for Strategic, Political, Security, and Economic Consultancy, 2006) 6–7.

[126] Joel Darmstadter, *Recalling the Oil Shock of 40 Years Ago* (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2003), 4.

supply. This psychological effect drove the price of oil from US$15 per barrel in December 1978 to US$30, a 100% increase within 12 months[127].

3.1.2 The privatization trend of public energy enterprises

At the beginning of the 1980s, Chile was the first country that privatized public energy utilities. Before the privatization process took place, electricity state-owned enterprises in Chile faced with losses because the electricity enterprises by the government order had to keep electricity prices at lower prices than real costs. The electric price subsidy led to huge accumulated deficits. To solve the financial problem, the Chile's government decided to privatize eleven main companies of electricity generation, including ENDESA, a monopoly electricity company, to private hands[128].

Another significant place of the privatization of energy public enterprises is the United Kingdom. The energy privatization started in 1977 when the Labor government decided to reduce the government's holdings of BP from 68% to 51% and use proceeds from selling the BP shares to improve Britain's balance of payments deficit[129]. When the Conservative party came to power, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to privatize three electricity generation companies, namely National Power, Power Gen, and Nuclear Electric by selling shares to private sector to improve the efficiency of electricity industry and lower consumer costs. This event was often cited as the beginning of an age energy privatization[130]. After the collapse of USSR in 1991, energy privatization swept

[127] Pascal Ditté and Dr Peter Roell, *Past oil price shocks: Political background and economic impact Evidence from three cases*, 8.

[128] R.W. Bacon, "Privatization and Reform in the Global Electricity Supply Industry," *Annual Review of Energy and the Environment* 20, no. 11 (1995): 119–1143.

[129] Stephanie M. Hoopes, *Oil Privatization, Public Choice, and International Forces* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 37–38.

[130] R.W. Bacon, "Privatization and Reform in the Global Electricity Supply Industry," 119–1143.

through Eastern Europe. Governments in the region allowed private sector investment in electricity and petroleum, and the purchasing of shares of public energy enterprises[131].

Energy privatization entered Asia and Africa in the 2000s as governments followed the light of economic liberalism[132]. Public energy enterprises, particularly electricity, petroleum, and national oil companies became the first to be privatized. Privatizing public electricity and petroleum enterprises could generate huge revenues to recover from economic stagnation, solve economic crises, or reduce national debts. Many techniques of privatizing public energy enterprises include contracting out, deregulation, joint ventures, and management contract[133]. All technique shares the core idea of increasing the private sector's role in the energy sector and reducing public sector's role.

The World Bank is the institution that propelled energy privatization into the international domain. It has provided innumerable suggestions in doing to. In the 1980s, for example, it advised Thailand to develop its energy sector. It prepared the report that counseled Thai governments to privatize the energy industry as an investment strategy that would provide around US$6 billion in an optimistic scenario or US$3.5 billion in a median scenario[134]. To reduce concerns over public sector foreign debt, the World Bank suggested the Thai government should fully privatize lignite mining because foreign

[131] Tooraj Jamasb, "Between the State and Market: Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries," *Utilities Policy* 14 (2006): 14–30.

[132] Steve Thomas, Devid Hall and Violeta Corral, *Electricity Privatization and Restructuring in Asia-Pacific* (London: Public Services International Research Unit, 2004); Njeri Wamukonya, "African Power Sector Reform: Some Emerging Lessons," *Energy for Sustainable Development* 2, no.1 (2003): 7–15.

[133] Coskun Can Aktan, "An Introduction to the Theory of Privatization," *Theory of Privatization* 20, no. 2 (1995): 187– 217.

[134] World Bank, *Thailand: Issues and Options in Energy Sector* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1985), p.21.

investments would help to lift production above 12–13 million tons yearly and the Thai government could gain around US$180 million from privatization by yearend 1984[135]. Moreover, privatization was set as a factor determining the success of the Thai government's future energy strategy and support from the World Bank[136].

3.1.3 The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis

Energy privatization in Asia, particularly East and Southeast Asia, was forced by the 1997 economic crisis. The finance crisis started in Thailand when the government spent most of its foreign exchange reserve to support its fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. Lacking reserves, the Thai government had to float the baht in July 1997. The bankruptcy of Thailand's economy affected most of Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Taiwan was the first East Asian nation to float its currency following the economic fallout from Southeast Asia.

Hong Kong and South Korea brought the next stages of the crisis[137]. Goldstein pointed to weak financial sectors with poor prudential supervision, large external deficits, appreciating real exchange rates, declining quality of investment, slowing exports, and overexpansion in key industries as factors behind the crisis. These problems arose in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore alongside Thailand[138].

Due to current account deficits, almost all countries that suffered the 1997 financial crisis except Malaysia had to make agreements with the IMF, the World Bank,

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[135] Ibid., p.46.

[136] Ibid., p. 200.

[137] Stephan Haggard, *The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 3–4.

[138] Morris Goldstein, *The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998), 7–22.

and the Asian Development Bank for assistance recovering their domestic economies[139]. Academic consensus holds that requirements for receiving assistance included restructuring public energy enterprises, especially electricity[140]. Electricity reforms under the guideline of the IMF in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea took two forms: inviting independent power producers (IPPs) and privatizing state-owned enterprises or selling shares of state energy enterprises in the stock market through an IPO[141]. With respect to IPPs, those countries had to increase the number of private and foreign investors in electrical production. Research by Nikomborirak and Manachotphong[142] indicates that electricity produced by IPPs in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines rose continuously post-1997. South Korea, under IMF pressure, implemented electricity reform via IPO. South Korean accepted the need to privatize its state-owned electricity monopoly, KEPCO, by increasing the number of privately held shares 40% by yearend 1998[143].

These global energy phenomena and financial crises shaped global energy markets, energy supply, and energy price. As an energy-scarce developing economy,

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[139] Ibid.

[140] James H. Williams and Navroz K. Dubash, "Asian Electricity Reform in Historical Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 77, no.3 (2004): 411–436.

[141] James H. Williams and R. Ghanadan, "Electricity Reform in Developing and Transition Countries: A Reappraisal," *Energy* 31 (2006): 815–844; Priyambudi Sulistiyano and Wu Xun, "The Political Economy of Power Sector Restructuring in Southeast Asia," in Proceedings of the Conference on Regulation, Deregulation, and Re-regulation in Globalizing Asia, National University of Singapore, Singapore, March 22–24, 2004.

[142] Deunden Nikomborirak and Wanwiphang Manachotphong, "Electricity Reform in Practice: The Case of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines," in Proceeding of the Conference on Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, UNCTAD, Geneva, July 17–19, 2007.

[143] John Byrne el al, "Electricity Reform at a Crossroads: Problems in South Korea's Power Liberalization Strategy," *Pacific Affairs* 77, no. 3 (2004): 493–516.

Thailand is not avoided them. The next section discusses how the Thai governments design policy initiatives under the pressure of these global circumstances.

3.2 Energy policy package: Liberalization of energy sector

This section first examines government policy statements as the blueprint for formulating policy to trace the global context of Thai energy policy. We examine resolutions by NEPC and the cabinet to reveal the contents of policy initiatives. Liberalizing the energy industry by increasing private sector's role and reducing state presence were the main ideas evident in government policy statements. Under liberalization, joint-ventures between public and private enterprises in electricity and petroleum, allowing private companies to own electricity power plants, refineries, and oil and gas stations, and privatizing state-owned enterprises through IPOs were formulated as policy.

3.2.1 Government policy statements: global energy phenomena reflected in the government concerns

The effects and concerns over global energy phenomena long have appeared in the Thai government's policy statements. The guidelines prescribed echo the same idea: increase participation by domestic companies and foreign investors in the energy industry (Table 3.1).

Statements by two Prime Ministers—General Kriangsak Chamanan and General Prem Tinsulanonda in his first term—mentioned to the 1970s oil crisis as factor compelling liberalization of energy enterprises to address fluctuating energy prices and supply shortages. One option was to allow private investors to help the government

supply energy[144]. The Thai government rode the wave of privatization in the 1980s. Liberalizing the energy industry, limiting public agencies, and increasing private appeared in the policy statements of four governments: General Prem Tinsulanonda in his second term, General Chatichai Choonhavan, Anand Panyarachun, and Chuan Leekpai in his first term. These four governments announced their intentions to create effective administrations,[145] adjust economic policy toward liberalization,[146] improve efficiency of public energy enterprises,[147] and create free energy markets.[148] Governments selected many models of liberalization that supposedly encouraging a private role in the energy industry, privatizing public energy enterprises' through IPOs, and allowing private companies to cooperate and invest with the government in the energy industry.

Statements concerning energy policy from 1997–2001 highlighted the effects of the 1997 Financial Crisis that forced the Thai government to reshape energy policies in response. The 1997 crisis was as a top priority for Chuan Leekpai's and Thaksin Shinawatra's governments. Both cited the effects of the financial crisis in the introduction of their policy statements. Moreover, the statement by Chuan's government mentioned that IMF assistance could not halt the crisis[149]. The Thaksin government's statement noted that economic troubles following the financial crisis persisted in 2001[150]. To address the budget deficit and raise revenues, both governments privatized state-owned

[144] Government Policy Statement of General Kriangsak Chamanan's government, June 7, 1979; Government Policy Statement of General Prem Tinsulanonda's government, March 28, 1980.

[145] Government Policy Statement of General Prem Tinsulanonda's government, August 27, 1986.

[146] Government Policy Statement of General Chatichai Choonhavan's government, January 9, 1988

[147] Government Policy Statement of Anand Panyarachun's government, April 4, 1991.

[148] Government Policy Statement of Chuan Leekpai's government, October 21, 1992.

[149] Government Policy Statement of Chuan Leekpai's government, November 20, 1997.

[150] Government Policy Statement of Thaksin Shinawatra's government, February 26, 2001.

energy companies in the Thai stock market. The statement by Thaksin's government highlighted how privatizing public energy enterprises would increase effective management and decrease political intervention because privatization presented ordinary people a chance to own public energy enterprises instead of bureaucrats and politicians[151]. In this sense, the Thaksin government's support for privatization encompassed economic liberalization, de-politicization, and public participation in energy enterprises.

[151] Ibid.

Table 3.1: Government policy statements in response to global energy phenomena from 1979 to 2005

Global Energy Phenomena	Prime Ministers	Government Policy Statements
The 1970s oil crisis	General Kriangsak Chamanan (1979–1980)	"In order to reduce the impact of oil shortage as less as possible, the government would proceed all of measure to mitigate the suffering of domestic oil shortage. Simultaneously the government would increase the volume of oil production by requesting the support from private and public refineries." (June 7, 1979)
	General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–1983)	"The government would mitigate the people suffering from the rise of oil price in energy export countries. The government would improve the structure of oil price in reducing the impact on poor people." (March 28, 1980)
The wave of energy privatization in the 1980s	General Prem Tinsulanonda (1986–1988)	"The government would develop effective energy institutions and would encourage private sector to invest in the energy industry." (August 27, 1986)
	General Chatichai Choonhavan (1988–1991)	"The government needed to adjust the economic policy to be more liberalization. By doing so, the government would reduce the monopolization in the energy industry and support the private role in participating and investing in the energy industry."

Global Energy Phenomena	Prime Ministers	Government Policy Statements
		(January 9, 1988)
	Anand Panyarachun (1991–1992)	"The government had to change the public role to promote and support the private sector in economic activities under the liberalization of economic system. By this concept, the government would improve the efficiency of public energy enterprises by IPO in the stock market. Moreover, the government would allow private sector to participate in managing the public energy enterprises." (April 4, 1991)
	Chuan Leekpai (1992–1995)	"The government would support and promote the de-regulation of oil trading and oil refinery industry in order to create the free energy market. In addition, the government would promote and support private companies to cooperate and invest with the government in the energy industry." (October 21, 1992)
The 1997 Asian financial crisis	Chuan Leekpai (1997–2001)	"Thai economy still was in the crisis due to the trouble of monetary, fiscal, trading, and investment system. The floating Thai currency affected the living cost and goods prices. Furthermore, the financial assistance from the IMF to solve the economic crisis still could not stop the economic stagnation and unemployment… By the

Global Energy Phenomena	Prime Ministers	Government Policy Statements
		economic pressure, the government needed to push the privatization plan of state-owned energy enterprises to address the budget deficit." (November 20, 1997)
	Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2005)	"Thailand still was in the economic crisis. The government needed to dedicate all of resources to recovery the economic system…Developing public energy enterprises to be a key organization in solving the economic crisis and making revenue to the country would be a great way. By doing so, the government would support the public energy enterprises to be privatized by IPO in the stock market. The privatization would increase the effective management, decrease the political intervention, and give a chance to ordinary people in being an owner of the public energy enterprises." (February 26, 2001)

Source: collected and summarized by the author from the digital collection of government policy statements in Legislative Institutional Repository of Thailand (available access: http://dl.parliament.go.th/, January 1, 2019.)

Liberalizing the energy industry was the milestone of Thailand's energy administration. How did government agencies (re)design policy initiatives? What were their main contents? The next section deals with these questions during Thailand's initial shift in energy policy.

3.2.2 Designing energy policy initiatives: Public-private partnership, increasing private investment, and IPOs

The design of energy policy packages during the liberalization period was inspired by liberal ideology through the operations of the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), IMF, and economists from the Office of National Economic and Social Development Council (NESD). An ex-PTT governor, in a newspaper interview pointed out that the first amendment of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand Act of 1978 that allows PTT to be a joint-venture with private companies and invest in petroleum business abroad was guided by the World Bank team and their liberalization model[152]. Moreover, when Thailand aimed to become a member of the WTO in 1994, the Chuan government (1992–1995) adopted the WTO's recommendations to deregulate so as to increase private participation within the energy market[153]. In the second term of the Chuan government (1997–2001) when the IMF provided a loan to solve the 1997 financial crisis, the advisory team from the IMF was also sent to provide suggestions in drafting the privatization plan of state-owned energy enterprises[154]. In the initial stages of energy liberalization, the economist team from the NESD, led by Piyasvasti Amranand, played a leading role in the designing of policy packages regarding state energy

[152] Berra Company, *Research Project and Data Base of Historical Development of Thailand Energy Policies*, Appendix 2.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

enterprises. Amranand graduated with bachelor, master's, and doctoral degrees in economics from the United Kingdom and has been recognized as a pioneer who adopted the idea of liberalism in order to liberalize Thailand's energy industry[155].

Beyond global ideology, domestic politics would be a key force in pushing the IPOs of state energy enterprises. Thaksin assumed power in 2001, along with a cabinet that consisted of many people who came from the world of big business. An economic analyst who became an advisor for the privatization of PTT noted that the Thaksin government had a fundamental policy goal: to promote economic growth through investments in the stock market. By doing so, the Thaksin government tried to implement the IPOs of energy state enterprises, starting with PTT and EGAT[156].

As presented in the global and domestic forces, the liberalization of state energy enterprises involved three initiatives: creating public-private partnerships through joint ventures, increasing private investment in energy, and privatization through IPOs.

3.2.2.1 Deregulation to create public-private partnerships

From 1987 to 2006, the NEPC's board developed numerous proposals focused on decentralization to reduce state intervention and increase the role of private companies in the energy industry. The 1992 amendment to the Electricity Authority Act of 1968 allowed EGAT, the monopoly electricity enterprise, to do businesses with private companies as a joint-venture company, particularly the construction of power plants. The point of this amendment was to let the EGAT engage in the electricity business or enter

[155] Ibid.

[156] Banyong Pongpanich, "Revealing the Facts of Privatization" (Available access: http//: www. thaipublica.org, June 11, 2019).

joint ventures involving electricity[157]. After the implementation of this policy, the EGAT collaborated with private companies to construct the Khanom Electricity Power Plant No.1-2, the Aow Pai Electricity Power Plant No.1-4, and Lampang Electricity Power Plant No.1-6[158]. The EGAT also set up the Electricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) as a joint venture with private companies to buy government power plants (e.g., the Rayong Electricity Power Plant) for conversion to private electricity generation[159]. Amending the electricity act also created a shift in EGAT's power. Previously, the EGAT had discretion in forming electricity policy and decisions. The 1992 Electricity Authority Act limited its discretion in investigating electrical engineering techniques and safety standards[160].

The 1994 amendment to the Petroleum Authority Act of 1978 also deregulated the petroleum industry from the state-centric ownership to public-private partnership. The 1994 Petroleum Act authorized the PTT, a public petroleum enterprise, to do business or collaborate with private companies[161].

Under the new regulation, the NEPC presented proposals for public-private partnerships and invited the private sector to construct petroleum refineries, with government agencies holding no more than a 25% share,[162] thereby increasing the private gas station sector[163]. A Cabinet Resolution on September 8, 1992, approved a joint-

[157] Prime Minister Office, *Performance Report of the National Energy Policy Committee and the National Energy Policy Office in the Fiscal Years of 1987–1992* (Bangkok: Prime Minister's Office, 1992), 10.

[158] Ibid., 9.

[159] Ibid., p. 17.

[160] Cabinet Resolution, December 9, 1991.

[161] Act of Petroleum Authority of Thailand (No.2), 1994.

[162] NEPC Resolution, August 10, 1989.

[163] NEPC Resolution, January 8, 1990

venture for lubricating oil between the PTT and foreign companies BP and Mitsubishi Oil. PTT's privileges (e.g., regulatory protection from the government with respect to tax offsets, low-cost loans, and official guarantees) were removed for this joint-venture. PTT activities were required to act as a private company, not a state-owned enterprise[164].

The PTT further collaborated with international oil companies to invest in refineries, petroleum pipelines, and petroleum operations in neighboring countries. Collaboration among the PTT, Shell, and Caltex in a joint-venture to constructing a refinery in 1990 exemplified public-private partnership creation in the refinery business[165]. The PTT further collaborated with Shell, Caltex, BP, Mobil, and Kuwait to set up Thai Petroleum Pipeline Co., Ltd. to deliver petroleum from the eastern special economic zone to the central region of Thailand[166]. The PTT also created PPT EP (Myanmar) with Unocal (Chevron) to explore for petroleum in Myanmar[167].

3.2.2.2 Increasing private investment

Associated with these proposals were many policies to increase private sector investment in energy. A cabinet resolution by Chatchai's government, for example, mentioned government would promote competition in energy markets by increasing private investment as a priority for the cabinet, government agencies, and state-owned enterprises[168].

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[164] Chanrochanakit and Chatsakulvilai, *Oil Public Enterprises*, 8; Cabinet Resolution, September 8, 1992.

[165] National Energy Policy Office, *The Implementation of Energy Policies and Schemes from the late 1992 to middle 1995* (Bangkok: National Energy Policy Office, 1995), 6.

[166] Ibid., p.7.

[167] Ibid., p, 1.

[168] Cabinet Resolution, January 8, 1990.

The NEPC formed proposals for the electricity sector that allowed the private sector to operate as IPPs, Small Power Producers (SPP) or Very Small Power Producers (VSPP)[169]. Cabinet Resolutions on March 26, 1991, and May 21, 1991, also promulgated regulations to allow private sector investment to construct electric power plants. The government also increased trading volumes and purchase prices to help VSPPs produce and sell electricity to the state[170]. In one year this policy created 32 companies proposing 50 projects with a total capacity of 37,500 megawatts[171]. After the implementation of the SPP policy, 26 companies in four years proposed capacity enlargements of 1,373 Megawatts[172].

In the petroleum industry, the government approved a cabinet resolution to end controls on retail oil prices, open retail markets to private sellers, and let the private sector invest in oil refineries and gas stations[173]. This policy increased many retail oil companies in the oil retail market, including PB, Q8, Susco, PT, MP Petroleum, PA, Sukhothai Petroleum, PC Siam, Cosmo Oil, and TPI. The number of oil and gas stations

[169] NEPC Resolution, April 20, 1989; NEPC Resolution, March 13, 1994; NEPC Resolution, March 10, 1992. Differences between IPPs, SPPs, and VSPPs involve energy materials and production capacity. IPPs may use fossil fuels to produce electricity and must produce more than 100 megawatts per day. SPPs must use renewable energy (solar cells, wind, garbage, agricultural waste, geothermal) to produce more than 50 megawatts per day. VSPPs also must produce electricity using renewable energy, but their capacity is limited to 1 megawatt per day.

[170] Cabinet Resolution, March 17, 1992.

[171] National Energy Policy Office, *5 Years of the National Energy Policy Office* (Bangkok: National Energy Policy Office, 1997), 22.

[172] National Energy Policy Office, *The Implementation of Energy Policies and Schemes from the late 1992 to middle 1995*, 46.

[173] Cabinet Resolution, May 21, 1992.

in Thailand rocketed from 3,473 in 1991 to 5,765 in 1994,[174] an increase of approximately 165% in four years.

3.2.2.3 IPOs

Partial privatization via IPO emerged as a principal policy initiative. Public energy enterprises, especially in electricity, were chosen as the first group of IPOs. In 1990 NEPC's board proposed preparing EGAT, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority of Thailand (MEA), and the Provincial Electricity Authority of Thailand (PEA) to list on the stock market, starting with EGAT[175]. The NEPC board chose public petroleum enterprises—PTT, Petroleum Authority of Thailand for Exploration and Production (PTTEP), and Bang Chack Petroleum[176]—as the second group to privatize via IPOs[177].

It was expected that through IPOs, energy enterprises could become privatized through market trading. Thaksin's government, for example, declared it would support state-owned enterprises, including state-owned energy enterprises, for privatization on the Thai stock market[178]. Cabinet resolutions approved IPOs as the favored choice for

[174] National Energy Policy Office, *The Implementation of Energy Policies and Schemes from the late 1992 to middle 1995*, 55.

[175] NEPC Resolution, September 1, 1990.

[176] PTT was initially established as a fully state-owned petroleum monopoly in 1978. It was partly privatized in the Thai Stock Market in 2001; however, under state enterprise law PTT could be identified as a state enterprise because government still holds the 51% of its shares. In this sense, PTT is a privatized company with publically traded stock and a state enterprise. PTT also monopolizes the petroleum business in Thailand although it was privatized. PTTEP used to be a petroleum exploration and production enterprise that was approved to sell shares by cabinet resolution on September 16, 1997. PTT held 70.89% of PTTEP's shares and general investors 29.02%. Bangchak Petroleum was a state-owned refiner privatized by cabinet resolution on September 16, 1997. The Ministry of Finance and PTT held 48% and 24% of its shares, respectively. Private investors held 32% (See National Energy Policy Office, *Privatization and Liberalization of the Energy Sector in Thailand* (Bangkok: Ministry of Energy, 1999), 8–10).

[177] NEPC Resolution, December 27, 2000; Cabinet Resolution, March 12, 1992.

[178] Cabinet Resolution, February 26, 2001

privatizing electricity and petroleum enterprises; consequently, privatization schemes for the PTT, EGAT, the MEA, and the PEA were approved[179]. However, this flourish of privatizations was not NEPC's and the government's only intention at that time. It also was a response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis[180].

At that time, energy agendas emphasized liberalization and decentralization of state power and transfer of energy production and domestic supply (petrol stations) to the private sector by limiting state power over energy administration and curbing power of the state-owned energy enterprises, particularly the EGAT and PTT. Privatization via IPOs led the energy agenda but was focused more on economic agendas than environmental, security, technological, or efficiency concerns. How did government agencies create discourse that persuaded other agencies, ordinary people, or social movements to support energy policy proposals? Did social movements produce significant counter-discourse when discussing this policy shift? The next section discusses with the framing of discourse and counter-discourse to shape liberalization of state energy enterprises.

3.3 Framing Discourse

Formulating and implementing energy policy require framing discourse to legitimate proposals and mobilize support, but no proposal can avoid counter-discourse by its opponents. This section discusses how liberalization initiatives were driven or challenged by language. In other words, how and what kinds of ideas, concepts, and language framed discourse to promote or obstruct policy initiatives? The discussion reveals that the discourse driving liberalization initiatives relied on the theme of

[179] Cabinet Resolution, September 16, 1997; Cabinet Resolution, August 20, 2002.

[180] Manoon Siriwan, interview, October 19, 2017.

decentralizing energy supply. It included ideas and language from the realms of public finance, energy security, and market competition. Conversely, discourse to obstruct the government's policy initiatives drew upon themes of decentralized energy policy. This discourse invoked themes of social class, transparency of investigation, democracy, and urban economic development.

3.3.1 The discourse theme of decentralized energy supply

The discourse themes overarching energy liberalization policies were grounded in decentralizing energy supplies. This discourse emphasized increasing private entities and communities as agents and autonomous providers of energy[181]. However, the government's discourse of decentralized energy supply concentrated on private companies rather than communities. What ideas or concepts framed this discourse? The answer: public finance, security of energy supply, and competitive energy markets underpinned the discourse of decentralized energy supply.

3.3.3.1 Public finance

Public finance—specifically the fiscal burden of government—was the primary concept framing the discourse of decentralized energy supply. Reference to the NEPC resolution, reducing the fiscal burden was highlighted as a core necessity to increase private investment in the electricity industry:

> "The NEPC board recognized the role of private sector to more participate in electricity generation. In the near future, the fiscal burden of the government in producing and distributing electricity would be increased. The private investments

[181] See Ali M. Adil and Yekang Ko, "Socio-technical Evolution of Decentralized Energy System: A Critical Review and Implications for Urban Planning and Policy," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 57 (2016): 1025–1037.

in the electricity generation would help the government to reduce the fiscal burden…. By this reason, the NEPC board approved the rules and procedures for allowing private sector to produce and generate electricity"[182].

Reducing the fiscal burden was another essential reason for privatizing electricity enterprises. The government needed bigger budgets to investing in assuring sufficient supplies of electricity. For that reason it chose IPOs to reduce the fiscal burden:

"Owing to the rise of electricity demand over the expectation, the NEPC board needed to adjust EGAT's long-term investment plan for increasing electricity supply…. By doing that, the NEPC had a resolution to approve the privatization of EGAT shares in the stock market. The privatization plan would help EGAT to have enough budgets for more investments"[183].

Increasing private investment in electricity generation by IPPs and SPPs was another issue tied to fiscal burden. The NEPC's board argued that allowing private sector investment in electricity generation would diminish the burden on government budgets:

"The IPP was a policy that the NEPC board offered the cabinet in order to reduce the burden of government investment"[184]… "A result of the SPP policy was to reduce the budget burden of the government for the investment of electricity production and generation"[185].

[182] NEPC Resolution, April 20, 1989.

[183] NEPC Resolution, September 17, 1990.

[184] NEPC Resolution, May 31, 1994.

[185] NEPC Resolution, March 10, 1992.

Interestingly, government agencies invoked fiscal burden only in designing electricity policy. The next section addresses ideas that framed the discourse of decentralized supply in the petroleum industry.

3.3.3.2 Security of energy supply

Supply management—building stability and secure oil supply—was another frame for government's promoting private investment in petroleum refining. In the NEPC board's perspective, private investment would produce more oil and guarantee the stability and security of consumption: "The NEPC board approved the proposal to invite private companies for investing in the construction of new petroleum refineries…. This proposal would create more security and stability of oil supply"[186].

The NPEC used the same argument—security and stability of supply—to promote private oil and gas stations and small oil retailers. The NPEC insisted this policy would make more oil accessibility to ordinary consumers. In other words, increasing the number of private oil and gas stations and retailers would stabilize access to oil:

> "The NEPC board had a resolution to endorse the policy for increasing the competition in Thailand's oil market as the first priority. The government, relating government agencies, and public energy enterprises should cooperate together in order to support this policy… Promoting oil and gas stations and small retailers would be a great way to encourage private sector for increasing private investment in oil trading. This scheme would provide security and stability of oil supply to people"[187].

[186] NEPC Resolution, August 10, 1989.

[187] NEPC Resolution, January 8, 1990.

Parliamentary discussion of the draft of the Petroleum Act in 1987 also expressed concern over management of petroleum supply. The government proposed the draft to solve and improve petroleum regulation to "persuade and attract more private investors…. More private investment would lead to continuously greater petroleum supply and help to develop economic activities following the national economic plan"[188].

However, in the government's view private investment to stabilize energy supply would come from foreign capital or business. As seen in the response to the bill by one member of the drafting committee, "the intention of the draft was to solve regulatory obstacles to encourage foreign investors that had well technological knowledge and money for investing in the petroleum exploration industry."[189] Reference to the Ministry of Finance reflected the importance of foreign investment to a secure energy supply. The Minister of Finance at that time declared in the parliamentary debate: "the amendment of this act was to reduce severance tax in order to attract foreign businessmen for more investment, which could provide sufficient oil supply to people"[190].

3.3.3.3 Competition in energy market

Another idea framing the discourse of liberalization was competition in energy markets. The competition indicated was between public enterprises and private companies, both domestic and international, to develop and improve energy services and businesses. The NEPC endorsed government's SPP policy. Increasing numbers would create competition between private producers and public enterprises to provide better quality electric services: transmission, distribution, price, and maintenance of

[188] Parliamentary Meeting Report, November 19, 1987, 12.

[189] Ibid., p. 19.

[190] Ibid., p. 43.

infrastructures: “the main aim of the SPP policy was to support the competition in Thailand’s electricity market between private companies and electricity public enterprises for improving electric public services”[191].

Competition also emerged during parliamentary debate of the draft Petroleum Act in 1994. However, “competition” did not refer to improved services, as it did in the electricity sector. Competition in petroleum markets meant support PTT’s competitiveness versus foreign oil companies as Thailand’s national oil company. Controlling operating cost and selling oil cheaper were underscored as significant conditions for PTT’s competitiveness:

> “The government aimed to amend the petroleum act due to the reason of petroleum business competition. If the PTT could collaborate with private companies to construct its petroleum refineries, the PTT would be able to reduce the gross refining cost and decrease the selling price of oil in order to compete with the transnational oil companies in the domestic petroleum market”[192].

The discourse promoting government policy always meets with an opposing counter-discourse. The next section discusses how social movements countered the discourse of power-sharing between state and private sector enterprises during the era of liberalized policy.

3.3.2 The discourse theme of decentralized energy policy

The analysis shows that social movements countered arguments for decentralized energy policy by appealing to local empowerment. Such was the case with the Anti-Pak

[191] NEPC Resolution, March 10, 1992.

[192] Parliamentary Meeting Report, May 5, 1994, 30.

Mool Dam Movement, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement, the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement, and the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement to when they demonstrated against the construction of dams, coal plants, and natural gas pipelines. Their interpretation of liberalization and decentralization did not involve sharing power between the state and private sector; it involved granting local communities effective roles in developing and implementing local energy policies without national interference[193]. Social movements also evoked environmental and health problems as concepts paralleling those of social class, transparency of external investigations, democracy, and local socio-economic development.

3.3.2.1 Environment and health problems

The four social movements shared a concern with environment and health problems arising from energy projects. The Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement referenced them in resisting the dam project. It particularly communicated how changes in the aquatic ecosystem engendered an epidemic of parasites and a decline in fish species that would deprive local fishermen of their livelihood and threaten the collapse of rural society[194].

Environmental and health concerns underscored appeals of the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement. Sulfur dioxide emissions exceeding safety standards imperiled the health of local residents, a concern central to its arguments before the Administrative Court. The group cited the 106 persons who died from respiratory

[193] B. H. Raven, "Decentralized Energy Policy," *Policy Studies Review Annual* 4 (1980): 331– 350.

[194] Bangkok Biz News, "10 Years of Pak Mool Dam: Resentment Still Exists," December 22, 1999, 2; Bangkok Biz News, "Research Finding Points members of fishes decrease after the Dam Construction," December 31, 1999, 6; Khaosod, "Occupy the Pak Mool Dam and Return Fishes to the River," May 17, 2000, 10.

disorders and lung cancer in villages surrounding the plant site over 10 years. Gas pollution contaminated in soil and water in communities around the plant site when it was raining[195].

The Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement referenced effects on the marine environment, health, and local job loss to oppose the power plant project. It argued that the bridge to convey coal from the sea to the power plant would obstruct the local fishery and that air pollution from burning coal would create acid rain that affected the health of local residents and sea animals such as mackerel, plankton, coral reefs, whales, and Malayoo birds around the plant site[196].

The environmental, health, and social impacts were employed by the Anit-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement as well. In many statements, the movement noted that the natural gas pipeline would shift local occupations from agriculture, fishing, and tourism to polluting industries. The pipeline would harm the zebra dove that produced financial benefit to local framers of 100 million Baht a year (UD$3.1 million). An accident at the gas pipeline would damage life and property[197].

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[195] Manager, "Behind the Voice of Mae Moh People to Change the Safety Standard of Sulfur Dioxide Gas," November 26, 1998, 8; Siamrat, "The Victims of the Mae Moh Power Plant around 1,000 People Would Die Soon," June 14, 1997, 10; Manager, "The Victims of the Mae Moh Power Plant Sue the Administrative Court," August 30, 2003, 8.

[196] Naewna, "Leaders of Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement Announces the Denial of Public Hearing," June 23, 1999, 1; Manager Weekly, "The Environmentalists in Ban Krut Call the Researchers to Reveal the Results of Plankton Investigation to the Public," April 17, 1999, 9.

[197] Matichon, "Signing the Contract of Thai-Malay Natural Gas Pipeline Project: Student Groups Show Posters to Oppose the Project," April 23, 1998, 19; Khaosod, "Revealing the Thai-Malay Natural Gas Pipeline Project Demolishes the Big Dove Farm," March 17, 1999, 16; Matichon, "The Thai-Malay Natural Gas Pipeline Project Does Not Report the Upstream Petroleum Industry," November 2, 1999, 16.

Environmental and health impacts were consistent tropes when social movements discussed and negotiated energy policies during the wave of liberalization. However, they made this point in parallel with language expressing power relations between social movements and governments in collaboration with business groups.

3.3.2.2 Social class

Social class was heavily mentioned by the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement, often in language casting the rural poor as marginalized and government and urban populations as ruling groups. Its statements evoked the inequality of social stratification, particularly powerlessness of the rural poor people to bargain government and the urban rich favored by the government:

> "The government did not seem to understand rural poor who had no money, reputation, and power. The dam construction aimed to support the economic activities of rich people. Pak Mool Dam was a symbol of a government project which generated the widest and strongest negative impacts of aquatic ecosystem, local fishery, and agricultural lands of local people on rural poor people"[198].

The movement's discourse reflected the unequal power relation between the rural poor people and urban rich. In supporting the dam, the government rendered the rural poor "a marginalized group of people who sacrifice their lives to the energy development project which generated stable and cheap electricity supply for urban people rather than

[198] Manager, "Poor Assembly Occupies the Pak Mool Dam to Demonstrate PM continuously," March 24, 1999, 8.

rural poor people"[199]. Its discourse also indicated that the government had the power to portray the rural poor domestic enemies:

> "The Poor People Assembly begged the government and bureaucratic agencies to stop looking at poor people as an enemy. The government should not make urban people hate poor people. Participants in the movement did not have any support from political parties. We come here to share our problems"[200].

3.3.2.3 Transparency of external investigations

Transparency of external investigations was a central theme of the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement. It repeatedly referenced the unreliability of impact assessments that seemingly observed no clear standards. The movement criticized public hearings for disregarding the constitution and transparent standards. It used the appeal to transparency to delegitimize the coal plant project:

> "The government needed to cancel this public hearing process because it was not based on the articles within the constitution[201]. Moreover, the public hearing was started after the construction of the power plant. This process went against the normal standard of a public hearing being held before the power plant construction"[202].

In addition, the movement faulted the external investigation for disregarding concerns of local residents about the impact on the coral reef as a tourist attraction: "We

[199] Manager, "War of People Life in Pak Mool: The Pain of Sacrificer," May 26, 2000, 6.

[200] Khaosod, "Anand Request Bangkokians Understand the Poor Mob," August 8, 2000, 12.

[201] Naewna, "The Anti-Prachuap Power Plant's Leader Announce Do Not Accept the Public Hearing," June 23, 1999, 2.

[202] Matichon, "4 Electricities and Water Supply Unions Gather for Anti-EGAT Privatization," June 21, 2003, 6.

(the social movement—elaborated by the author) found that the report of impact assessment did not mention the effect on the coral reef near the port of the power plant. We could not trust the low quality of external investigation like this"[203].

The leader of the social movement also doubted the reliability of data in the report of the external investigation, which seemed incorrect from local residents' perspective:

> "The report of the impact assessment was unacceptable. We found that results in the report were not correct in reality. For example, the report did not mention the public area near the eastern part of the power plant project. This area was a big natural farm for many species of local births. Moreover, many sets of data were referred to in the report were the data in 10 years past. It was not updated to reflect reality…. The report mentioned there was no coral reef around the project site; however, local people always saw and travel the coral reef near the power plant site as a tourist attraction"[204].

3.3.2.4 Democracy

Democracy was another concept the social movements shared in framing counter-discourse. "Democracy" in this instance meant the decision-making and implementation of energy policies with fairness and compensation to those affected, rights to express opinions about energy projects, and wider participation by those directly affected[205]. The idea of democracy frequently encompassed the ideas of energy justice, particularly

[203] Manager Weekly, "The Anit-Bok Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement Changes Its Aim to Oppose the Public Hearing Process," April 19, 1999, 12.

[204] Khaosod, "The Leader of the Anit-Bok Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement Shows the Report of Impact Assessment Has Many Mistakes," September 25, 1999, 16.

[205] Bregje van Veelen and Dan van der Horst, "What is Energy Democracy? Connecting Social Science Energy Research and Political Theory," *Energy Research & Social Science* 46 (2018): 19-28.

procedural justice. Procedural justice raises the concern about how energy projects proceed with equitable procedurals that stakeholders have access to information and participation in decision-making[206].

In arguing that "Pak Mool Dam, as a governmental development project, attacked normal life and fairness in managing the community resources of poor people"[207]. To pressure the government, the movement appealed to energy democracy and energy justice in calling for the government to solve the problem:

> "The Poor People's Assembly called for the government to return justice compensation to poor people because Pak Mool Dam, as a symbol of the energy development project, generated the worst negative impacts of aquatic ecosystem, local fishery, and agricultural lands on poor people"[208].

The Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement also invoked the idea of democracy and procedural justice by criticizing the origin of the representative who had authority to investigate negative impacts. The movement argued that "the counter groups to the power plant construction could not participate in selecting members of the public hearing commission. All members of the commission were selected by the government. In this sense, how could the government hear the problems of the protesters?"[209]

The movement's discourse appealed to participation as a basic element of a democratic society to the reshaping of power between government and the movement in

[206] Benjamin K. Sovacool and Michael H. Dworkin, "Energy Justice: Conceptual Insights and Practical Application," *Applied Energy* 142 (2015): 435-444.

[207] Prapart Pintoptang, "4 Years of Poor Assembly and 10 Years of Pak Mool Dam: The Clear lesson Learnt for Society," *Khaosod*, December 12, 1999, 5–6.

[208] Khaosod, "Villagers Occupy the Pak Mool Dam for a long time," March 29, 1999, 12.

[209] Naewna, "The Anti-Prachuap Power Plant's Leader Announce Do Not Accept the Public Hearing," June 23, 1999, 2.

recruiting commission members to make a new decision: “The best solution was to cancel the public hearing. Then the government could listen to the voices of the movement’s representatives in the public hearing commission”[210].

The Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement heavily emphasized democracy and procedural justice, particularly the right to information. The movement noted that hiding information meant “people had no rights to access the project information”[211]. Limited access to information affected the quality of participation, the expression of opinion, and the public consensus regarding the energy project. In a statement, the movement claimed, “the government hid and distorted crucial information to obstruct people’s participation and expression of opinion regarding the project. The movement condemned the government for signing the project contract with Malaysia without the consensus of the people”[212]. This discourse centers upon the power of information. Government’s ability to control information equates to the power to stifle dissent. The movement’s discourse aims to reconstitute access to information, leading to a better quality of participation.

3.3.2.5 Changing of local socio-economic development

The trope of altering local socio-economic development was mainly articulated by the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement to indicate how the project reshaped local economic development. In other words, the movement portrayed the project as creating a polluted city that would suffer capital outflows. The Lampang Provincial Chamber of Commerce argued that:

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[210] Ibid.

[211] Khaosod, “Seven Student Organizations oppose the Thai-Malay Natural Gas Pipeline,” September 3, 1999, 9.

[212] Ibid.

> "The Mae Moh power plant generated a negative attitude to outsiders, tourists, and businessmen who would like to come to Lampang Province. The power plant created the image of the polluted city which resulted in the decline of local investments and numbers of tourists. In this sense, we (the provincial chamber) begged for suspending the power plant operation"[213].

The altering of local socio-economic also was a theme in the discourse of the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Project. The movement pointed out "the gas pipeline project would change the existing industry in the southern region of Thailand, which is based mainly on agriculture, fishery, tourism, and commerce, to polluting industries"[214].

This section illustrated the opposing language used by government and social movements in framing discourse to pursue policy goals. Which participants control the choice of ideas and language for framing discourse?

3.4 Actor network creation

This section categorizes members of the energy policy board and of social movements to identify who or which groups determine the language and concepts used to frame discourse. NEPC board is the central framer of energy policy proposals and the dominant group behind the discourse of energy liberalization. On the other hand, social

[213] Mathichon, "The Lampang Provincial Chamber Opposes the Operation of the Mae Moh Power Plant," September 1, 2000, 23.

[214] Matichon, "Signing the Contract of Thai-Malay Natural Gas Pipeline Project: Student Groups Show Posters to Oppose the Project," April 23, 1998, 19.

movements are populated largely by people in communities near the site of energy projects. They are the central figures who frame their movement's discourse.

3.4.1 Dominance of economic agency

During the first wave of Thailand's shift in energy policy from 1987 to 2006, NEPC's board was composed of six groups: agencies responsible for economic affairs, security affairs, energy affairs, social, environmental, and natural resource affairs, the Prime Minister's Office, and the judiciary. Members of economic agencies occupied the majority on seats NEPC's board.

NEPC's board should be considered during two periods: 1987–1992 and 1992–2006 because its restructuring in 1992 eliminated some incumbents and added new members. During 1987–1992 the board was 16 persons indicated on the list below[215]:

Prime Minister	Chairman
Minister of Science, Technology, and Energy	Vice-chairman
Minister of Interior	Committee
Minister of Industry	Committee
Director-General, Irrigation Department	Committee
Director-General, Mineral Resources Department	Committee
Director-General, Forestry Department	Committee
Director-General, Public Work Department	Committee
Minister to Prime Minister's Office	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy	Committee

[215] Royal Gazette on Appointment of National Energy Committee, April 3, 1986 and September 19, 1990; The Act of Energy Authority of Thailand (Third Amendment), 1979.

General Secretary, National Economic and Social Development Board	Committee
Director, Bureau of the Budget	Committee
Director, Fiscal Policy Office	Committee
Director-General, Defense Energy Department	Committee
Secretary, Council of State	Committee
Secretary, National Energy Policy Office	Committee and Secretary

Restructuring of NEPC's board in 1992 [216] increased its numbers to 19 positions. Many incumbents, particularly at the director-general level, were removed from the board. New members were ministers responsible for economic, foreign, transportation, and agricultural affairs, and several deputy prime ministers as indicated below[217]:

Prime Minister	Chairman
Deputy Prime Minister (assigned by the Prime Minister)	Vice-chairman
Deputy Prime Minister	Committee
Minister to the Prime Minister's Office	Committee
Minister of Defense	Committee
Minister of Finance	Committee
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Committee
Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Committee
Minister of Transportation	Committee
Minister of Commerce	Committee
Minister of Interior	Committee

[216] NEPC board was upgraded by Cabinet Resolution of August 20, 1991, to become a permanent department under the Prime Minister's Office in 1992.

[217] Act of National Energy Policy Committee, 1992.

Minister of Science, Technology and Energy	Committee
Minister of Industry	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry	Committee
Secretary-General, Council of State	Committee
Secretary-General, National Economic and Social Development Board	Committee
Director, Bureau of the Budget	Committee
Director-General, Department of Energy Development	Committee
Director, National Energy Policy and Planning Office	Committee and Secretary

Considering the proportion of government agencies represented on NEPC's board from 1987 to 2006, only economic agencies and the members from the Prime Minister's Office had a significant change (Figure 3.1). The group of economic agencies, Minister of Industry, Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, Director of Fiscal Policy Office, Director of Budget of the Bureau, General Secretary of National Economic and Social Development Board, held four board seats before 1992 and six after 1992. The group of Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister to the Prime Minister's Office, increased their representation on the board from two seats to four seats. Economic agencies held the majority of seats during both periods.

Figure 3.1: NEPC board members from 1987 to 2006



Source: Collected by the author from the Government Gazette on the Appointment of Energy Authority Commission from 1987 to 2006.

By percentage, the economic agencies were the dominant shapers of discourse on NEPC's board. Their economic backgrounds would influence the board's choice of ideas and language. That was apparent in the discourse promoting liberalization of state energy enterprises: it concentrated heavily on economic issues such as budget deficits, recovering economic growth through private investment, and helping public enterprise compete with foreign companies to generate more revenue for the government. But which groups controlled the counter-discourse of social movements? The next section addresses that issue.

3.4.2 Prominence of local residents

The members who controlled discourse in the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movements, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement, the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement, and the Anit-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement lived in rural areas or communities surrounding project sites. However, their networks extended beyond the community scale. National and international groups supported these movements, echoing their chosen discourse when communicating with the public and

governments. Movements whose members came from the rural poor or local communities created their discourse in alliance with business, environmental, academic, and non-governmental organizations locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally.

The principal organization behind the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement was the Poor People's Assembly composed of locals affected by the construction of the Sirindhorn Huai Ra Ha, Lam Kan Chu, and Lam Dome Yai dams[218]. But it also was supported by many advocacy networks, including academic groups like the Scholar Assembly for Poor People; environmentalist groups like the Esan Environmental Resource Network and the Club of Song Kram River Basin Restoration; activist groups like the Political Reform Monitoring Network, the October Network, and the People Right Protection Group; and international organizations like the World Commission on Dam, the International River Network, and the International Environmental Protection Group[219].

The primary network supporting the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement was the Association for Local Environment Protection in the Mae Moh District and the Mae Moh Patient's Right Network of local residents living around the power plant site. This movement also was supported by advocacy networks such as Greenpeace Southeast Asia and other environmental NGO groups in northern Thailand[220]. Bureaucratic entities such as the governor, public school teacher groups, provincial public health officers, local

[218] Montrira Pupaknum, "A Survey of Happy Lifestyle: Mae Moon Meun Yeun, Being An Ad hoc Community Due to the Dam Construction," *Matichon*, December 17, 1999, 12.

[219] Manager, "NGOs around the World Support the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement," May 20, 2000, 3; Khaosod, "University Lecturers Sign the Name for Sending a Letter to Condemn the Government," May 22, 2000, 12.

[220] Manager, "Northern NGOs Go to the Mae Moh Power Plant Site to Convince Villagers for Joining the Movement," April 1, 1999, 8; Bangkok Biz News, "Greenpeace Points the State Cancel Coal Power Plants," August 22, 2002, 9.

business groups such as the Chamber of Provincial Commerce, and local political groups were advocacy networks for the movement as well[221]. This phenomenon differs from the general case in Thailand because bureaucratic, business, and local political networks ordinarily support energy projects or take no action in their communities. In the case of the Antai-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement, the governor's participation made this case different. The province's senior administrative authority connected the movement to provincial administrative groups, local politicians, and local businesses who joined the movement's protest[222].

The Group of Prachuap Lovers and the Group of Bor Nok Lovers were the primary networks supporting the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement[223]. The Student Federation of Thailand, the Commission for Natural Resources and Environmental Preservation, the Campaign for Popular Democracy, the Group of Alternative Energy Study, the Group of Writers and Artists,[224]and the senator's group[225] also supported this movement. The international network Greenpeace supported the movement by sending an open letter to the Thai government opposing construction of the power plant[226].

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[221] Prachachat, "Mae Moh People Prepare the Demonstration on November 24," November 19, 1998, 26.

[222] Siamrat, "Mae-Moh Power Plant Emits Pollution, the Governor Asks EGAT How to Evacuate People to a Safety Zone," September 1, 1998, 3.

[223] Khaosod, "Opening Another Anti-Prachuap Power Plant," December 19, 2000, 9.

[224] Khaosod, "Poets and Writers Join the Demonstration in Bor Nok-Hin Krut," March 1, 2002, 12; Bangkok Biz News, "NGOs Join the Big Demonstration for Anti-Prachuap Power Plant," February 27, 1999, 11–12.

[225] Bangkok Biz New, "Forty Senators Oppose the Power Plant," October 10, 2000, 17–18.

[226] Bangkok Biz News, "Greenpeace Suggests Thailand Should Cancel Prachuap Power Plant," October 7, 2000, 8.

The main network supporting the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement was affected local residents and communities[227]. Environmental groups, NGOs, academic groups, and international networks such as the Commission of Sixteen Institutes for Natural, Resource, and Environmental Preservation, the Study Group for Sustainable Natural Resources, the Non-Governmental Organizations of Southern Thailand, student federations of seven universities, the Federation of Southern Fisherfolk, and networks of fishermen in 12 Asian countries were among the movement's advocacy networks[228].

Affected local residents and communities constituted the core networks of these movements, and their discourse reflected their thought and expression. That is evident in their portrayal of the rural poor as marginalized populations, their concern with excluding local residents from decisions about construction projects, their aversion to limiting access by local residents to project information, and their refusal to let government stifle dissenting opinions.

Conclusion

This chapter clarifies how the Thai government formulated the privatization policy and what factors shaped discourse about it. Privatization policy was formulated during periods of the global energy crisis and influenced by international financial bodies that advocated liberalization and privatization. Three kinds of initiatives embodied the policy shift toward liberalization and privatization: deregulation to create public-private

[227] Khaosod, "Songkhla People Gather for Anti-Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline," July 1, 2001, 11.

[228] Bangkok Biz News, "Joint Resolution by 12 Asian Countries for Anti-Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline," January 30, 2002, 10; Matichon, "700 Scholars Announce They Do Not Want the Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline," November 24, 2002, 2; Khaosod, "7 Student Organizations Oppose the Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline," November 3, 1999, 9.

partnerships, increasing private investment, and IPOs. Government's discourse in advocating those initiatives emphasized such principles as the concerns over public finance, energy security, and market competition. The network that selected these discourse tropes was comprised composed of economic agencies such as the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Social and Economic Development.

However, social movements presented a counter-discourse to these policies and initiatives. Their opposing discourses emphasized environmental and health concerns, social class, transparency, informational access, and rights to disagree with and participate in policy decision. The rural poor or residents of communities surrounding energy project sites formed the network that controlled this counter-discourse.

This chapter elevated understanding of the thinking that compelled privatizing Thailand's state energy enterprises and the influences motivating those who advocated it. Second, the chapter extended the relevance of Sukkumnoed's research into the four groups who produced four discourse tropes that guided energy policy discourse. This chapter refined these observations for the period 1987–2006, establishing how economic agencies shaped discourse in the energy policy arena. It also extended Sukkumnoed by ascertaining that affected residents and local communities constructed counter-policy discourse centered upon social class, democracy, and transparency.

The initial shift of Thailand's energy policy—from state-centric to liberalization—began in 1987, but in 2006 a military government recentralized policy. The second shift occurred on what kinds of global factor, policy option, and discourse, and actor network creation. The next chapter takes up those issues.

Chapter 4

Politics of Recentralization and Resource Nationalism:

The Rise of Energy Bureaucracy and Anti-government Movements (2006–2014)

This chapter investigates the reversal of Thailand's energy policy from liberalization to recentralization during 2006–2014. This recentralization coincided with a revival of bureaucratic power, especially energy bureaucrats and policies that sought to control not merely energy policy state energy enterprises generally. What global energy incidents energized this recentralization? How did government-designed energy initiatives push this policy shift? What discourse characterized discussion under this policy shift? Who or which agencies and groups within social movements shaped the discourse? These puzzles are the subject of this chapter.

Insights into the above questions are offered by Nopanun Wannathepsakul's investigation of bureaucratic networks within the NEPC, the Energy Policy Management Committee (EPMC), and the Power Development Plan Committee (PDPC)[229]. In sum, Wannathepsakul found they were controlled by high-level officials from the Ministries of Energy, Finance, Industry, Environment, Agriculture, Transportation, and the Council of State. After Thailand's 2006 coup, these parties developed new energy regulations, master plans, and production standards that added positions to those policy units and based decisions on royalties from petroleum concessions to these agencies. Wannathesakul concludes that these commissions sought hegemony over Thai energy policy, in particular that bureaucrats from the Ministry of Energy accrued significant power over energy policy boards after the 2006 coup.

[229]Noppanun Wannathepsakul, "Network Bureaucracy and Public-private Firms in Thailand's Energy Sector," 97– 115.

A graduate thesis by Thawatchai Pongsri adds additional insights concerning networks among social movements during Thailand's shift from liberalization to recentralization of state energy enterprise policy[230]. This thesis noted that the lead network within the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement was EGAT's labor union. Further, networks within EGAT's union included unions of other public enterprises (Waterworks Authority, State Railway of Thailand, and Telecommunication State-owned Enterprise), civil society groups (Federation of Consumers and Four Regions Slum Network), political activists (Campaign for Popular Democracy and the PAD), and professionals (Lawyers Council, and academic networks). Pongsri also explained tactics the movement employed to halt privatization such as campaigns to create a mass movement, protests, petition courts, and prosecutions.

However, there are puzzles that Wannathesakul and Pongsri do not solve. For example, under what global conditions could the Ministry of Energy establish hegemony over energy policy boards? How did intra-ministry networks design initiatives to establish hegemony, and what discourse tropes did they adopt to advance them? During collaboration among EGAT's labor union and allied unions, what portion of anti-privatization discourse did those allies create? Within the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement, who selected a discourse to popularize it?

This chapter answers those puzzles. Recentralization of Thailand's state energy enterprises occurred during the 2000s oil price shock. This global phenomenon influenced energy policy everywhere. Under price pressures, Thailand's government designed its recentralization policies to regulate and monitor public energy enterprises

[230] Pongsri, "The Dynamic of Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement after the 1997 Economic Crisis," 24.

and energy policy units. The theme that legitimated these recentralization policies was restructuring power relations among key energy players, and it was framed by the energy agencies' dominant power of energy agenda setting. However, it is important to consider the counter-discourse by social movements, as it is significant counter-voices for government policy. Movements frame the discourse surrounding the energy nationalism. It was created by the urban middle-class's group in the social movements.

To elaborate upon these arguments, the first section of this chapter presents the oil price shock in the 2000s as the external factor that pressured on the energy policy process of Thailand. The policy package designed by the government is described in the second section. Ideas and languages in framing the government's and the movements' discourse to legitimize the policy makings and popularize the movements' claims are illustrated in the third section. The final section identifies the creation of networks in the discourse.

4.1 Global energy trend: The second wave of energy crisis (Oil Price Shock in the 2000s)

Energy prices, particularly oil prices, reached new highs during the 2000s. This global circumstance was driven by sharply increasing of oil consumption and gradually decreasing oil production. Moreover, the dramatic fluctuation of the 2000s oil prices affected business, which led to storing future petroleum production via the stock market. The 2000s oil price shock would be a global condition that produced a serious concern of oil supply to the governments in energy-scarce countries.

The oil price shock in the 2000s was described by James D. Hamilton. The cause of the 2000s high price of oil was unlike the crisis in oil price during the 1970s. The 2000s oil crisis arose through growing of oil demand and stagnant supply; the 1970s oil

crisis was motivated by political pricing disagreements in the Middle East. Hamilton pointed that the second energy crisis in the 2000s was motivated by petroleum demand from the newly industrialized economies, particularly China. China's oil imports rose 870,000 barrels per day in 2007, an increase above half that from 2004–2005. While oil consumption in China rose, Saudia Arabia, the world's leading oil exporter, could produce 850,000 barrels a day in 2007[231]. Rising oil consumption brought higher oil prices during the 2000s. As mentioned, due to the Mideast conflicts in the1970s OPEC cut petroleum production and that affected oil prices. During the 2000s oil crisis, OPEC did not significantly reduce oil production. Moreover, oil-exporting Indonesia became an oil importer in the 2000s. These circumstances drove oil prices from US$55 in 2005 to US$142 per barrel in 2008[232].

In Hamilton's view, the 2000s oil crisis was not based solely on lack of oil production. Investors fearing production shortages bought oil futures as a financial asset, not a commodity for consuming. When oil prices made a new high, investors sold them for a profit. Hamilton called this behavior the financialization of oil production, and it was important in driving oil prices to historical highs in the 2000s[233].

During that same period, Thailand's government was implementing its policy of energy recentralization that emphasized controlling public energy enterprises. The next section discusses how Thailand's government-designed policy initiatives under the effects of the 2000s oil price shock.

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[231] James D. Hamilton, *Historical Oil Shocks* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011), 11–23.

[232] Ibid.

[233] James D. Hamilton, *Causes and Consequences of the Oil Schock of 2007–2008* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009), pp. 16–17.

4.2 Energy policy package: Recentralization of energy policy planning and decision-making

To response to sharply increasing global oil prices in the 2000s, Thailand's government announced its intent to control domestic oil prices to reduce cost of living, industrial production cost, and energy cost. The government also created a new set of bureaucratic commissions and reshaped authority within incumbent energy agencies to monitor and regulate electricity and petroleum enterprises alongside energy policy agencies. This policy combination constituted a bureaucratic recentralization of energy policy, planning, and decision-making.

4.2.1 Government policy statements: An effort to control energy costs

The 2000s oil price crisis was mentioned in statements by three governments during 2006–2008. Their statements highlighted the economic impact of oil prices, such as deflection, less private investment, higher cost of for households, and higher production costs for business. Each of the three governments saw controlling oil prices as their solution (Table 4.1).

General Surayuth Chulanont's government declared that "before the government entered power, Thailand's economy faced deflation and lack of economic investments due to the effect of oil price…. Due to the effect of the new high of oil price, private investment would continuously drop"[234]. However, the economic impact of the oil price crisis was most clearly evident in statements by Samak Sundaravej's and Somchai Wongsawat's governments. The former declared the 2000s oil price crisis an urgent

[234] Prime Minister's Office, *Performance Report Following the Policy Statement by General Surayuth Chulanont's Government*, 20.

problem requiring an immediate policy response[235]. The latter cited it in two sections of its policy statement. The introduction of Somchai's statement insisted the "Thai economy is faced with a hard external negative factor. That is the sharply rising price of oil in global markets. This factor affected the inflation problem and living cost of poor people"[236]. The policy portion of the statement announced that "the government considered the crisis of oil price as an urgent problem that the government needed to formulate a policy to create a stable price for oil even as price in the global market fluctuated"[237].

To address the impact of the 2000s oil price crisis, the three governments agreed with controlling or subsidizing domestic oil prices to motivate private investments and reduce the cost of living for consumers and the poor. Surayuth's statement, for example, mentioned: "the government needed to control the level of oil price and spend more public investment for increasing capital volume in the economic system"[238]. Both Samak's and Somchai's governments intended to subsidize domestic oil prices to reduce the energy expenditures of people: "The government had to control the energy price at the appropriate level in order to solve the living cost of consumers, entrepreneurs, and the Thai people"[239]. The next section investigates how these governments design initiatives to control or subsidize oil prices.

[235] The Government Policy Statement of Samak Sundaravej's government, February, 18, 2008.

[236] The Government Policy Statement of Somchai Wongsawat's government, October 7, 2008.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Prime Minister's Office, *Performance Report Following the Policy Statement by General Surayuth Chulanont's Government,* 20.

[239] The Government Policy Statement of Samak Sundaravej's government, February 18, 2008; The Government Policy Statement of Somchai Wongsawat's government, October 7, 2008.

Table 4.1: Government policy statements in response to global energy phenomena in the 2000s

Global Energy Phenomena	Prime Ministers	Government Policy Statements
The 2000s oil crisis	General Surayud Chulanont (2006–2008)	"Before the government entered to the power, Thailand's economic faced with deflation and lack of economic investments due to the effect of oil price…Due to the effect of the new high of oil price, the private investment would continuously drop. To address this problem, the government needed to control the level of oil price and spend more public investment for increasing capital volume in the economic system" (November 3, 2006).
	Samak Sundaravej (2008–2008)	"The problem of oil price shock tended to grow up and affect the inflation problem in Thailand…The government had to control the energy price at the appropriate level in order to solve the living cost of consumers and entrepreneurs" (February 18, 2008).
		"Thai economy faced with the hard external negative factor. That was the sharp rising

Global Phenomena	Energy	Prime Ministers	Government Policy Statements
		Somchai Wongsawat (2008–2008)	of oil price in the global market. This factor affected the inflation problem and the living cost of poor people… The government considered this problem as an urgent problem that the government needed to formulate the policy to create a stable price of oil, even the oil price in the global market fluctuated. The government intended to control the energy price at the level that had no impact on Thai people and entrepreneurs" (October 7, 2008).

Source: collected and summarized by the author from the digital collection of government policy statements in Legislative Institutional Repository of Thailand (available access: http://dl.parliament.go.th/, January 1, 2019).

4.2.2 Designing energy policy initiatives

Under the global influence of 2000s oil prices and governments' intention to control the domestic oil price, NEPC's board and Thailand's governments, particularly the 2006 military government, designed the two policy initiatives: creation of a new bureaucratic commission and reshaping power relations among incumbent energy agencies. They were intended to readjust Thailand's tripartite energy structure: state-owned electricity enterprises, state-owned petroleum enterprises, and the energy policy apparatus. These initiatives sought to restore close bureaucratic monitoring and regulation of decisions among the three.

These policy packages during this period reflected the reverse of energy liberalization because the policy packages resulted giving power to energy bureaucrats, and removing power from the Prime Minister and the private sector. There was no a clear linkage between any specific global ideology and this policy formulation. Looking into domestic politics would illustrate an agenda behind the design of energy policy packages in this period. These policy packages were formulated and implemented after two important political events in Thailand, namely the wider demonstration of urban middle-class groups during 2005–2006 and the 2006 military coup to topple the Thaksin government. Opposition to privatization of energy public enterprises was a core link between these two political events. The opposition to EGAT and PTT privatization was articulated as a key campaign by the PAD and its coalition groups, of which urban middle-class people were the majority. The anti-Thaksin movement claimed that the privatization of EGAT and PTT was, essentially, one big "corruption project" whereby the Thaksin government tried to distribute the properties of EGAT and PTT as national assets to Thaksin's cabinet members and foreign investors.

To mobilize more participants and build a bigger resistance movement, the PAD often reiterated its opposition to EGAT and PTT privatization. When the anti-Thaksin movement was expanding in power, the military decided to perform a coup: simply put, the 2006 junta claimed that they needed to end the political turmoil. After the 2006 military government came to power, they set up an ad hoc committee in response to the request of PAD's leaders to investigate possible illegalities in the administration of EGAT privatization under Thaksin's government[240]. To maintain support from the urban middle-class groups, the 2006 military government used the rhetoric of anti-energy privatization in setting up a new bureaucratic commission to regulate the private electricity enterprises[241].

4.2.2.1 Creation of the new bureaucratic commission

Tasking a new commission to deal with urgent problems is normal for governments. However, Thailand's government created a new commission to exercise power over public electricity enterprises and privatized petroleum companies. That seems paradoxical juxtaposed against previous policy to liberalize and privatize. The Energy Industry Act of 2007 and the Royal Decree on Determining Authority, Rights, and Advantages for PTT of 2007 relied on this package.

The Energy Industry Act of 2007 recentralized the electricity industry. The NEPC supported the Act to establish the new Energy Regulatory Commission to monitor that industry, issue licenses, and permissions, and suspend or revoking them[242]. Under Section

[240] Bangkok Biz News, "Appointing Klanarong as the Chair to Investigate Criminal Offense of EGAT Privatization under Thaksin Government" November 22, 2006, 1.

[241] Parliamentary Meeting Report, September 19, 2007.

[242] NEPC Resolution, March 2, 2007

11 of the Act,[243] the commission had the authority to regulate, monitor and punish state electricity enterprises and private electricity companies. That authority included:

- Regulating energy industry operations for compliance with objectives of the Act under the government's policy framework;

- Licensing energy industry operation, and proposing issuance of a Royal Decree to determine the categories, capacities, and characteristics of energy industries that are exempt from license requirement;

- Inspecting the operation of licensees to ensure efficiency and transparency;

- Issuing regulations or announcements and supervising customer service standards and quality, including measures to protect consumers against adverse impacts from energy industry operations;

- Imposing regulations and criteria for procuring electricity procurement and issuing of requests for proposals to purchase electricity and monitoring selection procedures to ensure fairness for all.

Moreover, the commission had authority to provide its opinions for approving electricity policies:

- To provide opinions on the power development plan, the investment plan of the electricity industry, the natural gas procurement plan, and the energy network system expansion plan for submission to the Minister of Energy;

- To provide opinions or recommendations about energy industry operation to the Minister of Energy and the Cabinet.

[243] Energy Industry Act, 2007.

However, since its establishment, the Energy Regulatory Commission's board had been occupied by retired bureaucrats, particularly former officers from the Ministry of Energy[244] (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Backgrounds of Energy Regulatory Commission' board members 2008–2019



Source: Collected by the author from the annual reports of the Energy Regulatory Commission from 2008 to 2017.

From 2008 until 2019, board members of the Energy Regulatory Commission were retirees from:

- The Ministry of Finance (note the ex-director of State Enterprise Policy Office and the deputy secretary of the National Social and Economic Development Board);

- The Ministry of Industry (note the permanent secretary and deputy permanent secretary of Ministry of Industry);

- The Ministry of Commerce (note the director-general of Department of Intellectual Property);

- The Ministry of Interior (note the vice governor);

[244] Energy Regulatory Commission, *The Annual Report of the Energy Regulatory Commission* (Bangkok: The Energy Regulatory Commission Office, 2008– 2017).

- Academic group (note -professors of engineering and accounting).

Bureaucrats from the Ministry of Energy constituted the biggest group to occupy the board continuously. Their numbers included the governor and vice governor of EGAT and PTT, the director-general of Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency, the director-general of the Department of Energy Business, and the director of the Energy Policy and Planning Office.

The Royal Decree on Determining Authority, Rights, and Advantages for PTT of 2007 (No.2) was another package of policies to establish a new commission to regulate the privatized petroleum company[245]. The Committee for Controlling the Exercise of Power over the PTT Public Company Limited was established by this Royal Decree. Members of this committee included the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy as chairman, a representative of the Ministry of Interior, a representative of the Council of State, and three experts appointed by the Minister of Energy. This committee has authority and duties to monitor and oversee the exercise of PTT's power in land expropriation and control of gas pipelines[246]. To oversee PTT's performance in controlling gas pipelines, the committee set up a Sub-commission for Monitoring and Investigating the PTT's Business Performance. This sub-committee included the director of Energy Policy and Planning Office as chairman, a representative of the Ministry of Energy, a representative of the Ministry of Interior, a representative of the Royal Thai Police, and three experts appointed by the director of Energy Policy and Planning

[245] The Royal Decree Determining Authority, Rights, and Advantages for the PTT Public Company Limited, 2007 (No. 2).

[246] Piyasawat Amranand, the Energy Minister at that time, described on this topic that the Royal Decree on Determining Authority, Rights, and Advantages of PTT, 2007 was enforced because the government wanted to establish a public organization to control and monitor the public properties of PTT. (Piyasawat Amranand, interview, October 11, 2017).

Office[247]. The members of the sub-committee could call a representative of the PTT for investigating its business performances regarding the gas pipelines and also provide recommendations regarding the using of gas pipelines to the PTT[248].

Such close regulation and control reflect the rollback of liberalization. Energy bureaucrats and the NEPC did merely create commissions; they tried to reshape power relations among NEPC board members as part of energy recentralization.

4.2.2.2 Reshaping power relations among incumbent energy agencies

The third amendment to the National Energy Policy Commission Act of 2008 returned hegemonic oversight to the energy administration. This amendment was directed toward sound governance of administrative agencies. Its main element was a restriction that NEPC board members and spouses could not own shares in an energy company, except for government officers appointed by the government as board members of energy companies. The Council of State more explained the main result of the Act amendment that only the government officers have been allowed by this Act to be a board member of the NEPC and simultaneously they can hold a share of energy companies[249]. The main detail of this amendment noted in the section 3 that "the members of the NEPC's board and their spouses may not be shareholders or board members in any energy companies or

[247] The Announcement of the Commission for Determining Authority of PTT Public Company Limited on Rules and Conditions for Constructing and Maintaining Petroleum Pipeline System, August 27, 2007.

[248] Ibid.

[249] The Council of State, The Official Record of the Council of State on the Bill of National Energy Policy Committee (No. 699/2550), October 2007.

state-owned energy enterprises, except for the case that the Member of the National Energy Policy Council is a civil servant, who has been assigned by the government"[250].

Parliamentary discussion of this Act was a controversial debate over bureaucratic power. A minority committee said:

> "The National Energy Policy Commission Bill gave more power to the five government officers in the NEPC board, permanent secretary of the Energy Ministry, secretary general of the Juridical Council, director of the Energy Policy and Plan Office, director of Bureau of the Budget, and secretary general of the National Economic and Social Development Board. Drafting the Bill in this way was to officially allow the bureaucrats to have authority to regulate both public energy agency and energy companies which would lead to a conflict of interest"[251].

The sixth amendment to the Petroleum Act of 2007 also reflects the rebalancing of power among energy policy organizations. It transferred authority to grant petroleum concessions, extend their terms, revoke concessions, and prohibit exporting petroleum products abroad from the cabinet to the petroleum commission, all members of which were government officers[252]. Moreover, the director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels gained authority to extend the term of petroleum production and approve

[250] National Energy Policy Commission Act (No.3), 2008.

[251] Parliamentary Meeting Report, June 7, 2007.

[252] The petroleum commission consists of the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, the directors-general of the Departments of Land, Fisheries, Forestry, and Revenue, the secretary of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning Office, the director of the Energy Policy and Planning Office, and representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Finance, and Industry.

areas for exploration and production. This authority previously stood with the Minister of Energy[253].

In sum, Thailand's governments, especially during 2006–2008, confronted a dramatic increase in global oil prices and sought to address this problem by controlling domestic oil prices. However, the policy package designed by the NEPC and approved by the government mainly reasserted bureaucratic oversight of public electricity and petroleum enterprises and energy policy organizations and realigned authority among energy policy units. The next section analyzes how groups of government officers framed the discourse of this recentralization and how social movements framed their counter-discourse.

4.3 Framing discourse

The energy bureaucratic agency legitimated its recentralization efforts by appealing to restructuring power relations among key energy players. This appeal entailed three principles: separation of power between policymakers and regulators, avoiding conflicts of interest, and creating fair competition in the petroleum business. The counter-discourse of social movements emphasized concern of energy prices, idea regarding public energy enterprises as national assets and corruption.

4.3.1 The discourse theme of restructuring power relations among energy agencies

The main trope utilized by the NEPC and the energy bureaucratic agency to communicate recentralization was the restructuring of power among energy agencies. The NEPC and the energy bureaucrats defined power relations in two contexts. First, when

[253] Petroleum Act (No.6), 2007.

and over what issues do the cabinet, Minister of Energy, and energy agencies have authority to make decisions? Second, how can policy reduce or withdraw public authority from PTT, a state-owned enterprise listed on the stock market, to create fair competition in the petroleum industry?

4.3.1.1 Separation of power between policymakers and regulators

Transferring authority and duties from the Minister of Energy to the Energy Regulatory Commission and director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels was the key feature of discourse advocating recentralization. The separation of power, the NEPC explained, would foster long-term transparency, ensure effective energy regulation, and curtail the illegal monopoly held by some energy companies[254]. These ideas appeared in the Energy Industry Act of 2007 and the Petroleum Act of 2007 (Sixth Amendment). In explaining the need for the Energy Regulatory Commission, the NEPC said:

> "Since the energy industry was vital to the country, it was essential to restructure the energy industry administration by distantly separating the policy-making, regulation, and operation function of the energy industry from each other…. It was deemed necessary that the Energy Regulatory Commission be established to regulate the energy industry. To this effect, the Energy Regulatory Commission shall be designated to prevent abusive use of monopoly power and to protect energy consumers"[255].

The government appealed to separation of powers when it presented the Energy Industry Bill to Parliament in the name of protecting consumers. The Minister of Energy declared:

[254] NEPC Resolution, March 2, 2007.

[255] The remark section of the Energy Industry Act, 2007.

"Setting the Energy Regulatory Commission was to establish an independent organization to regulate electricity and natural gas industries. The Minister of Energy would have responsibility to regulate policy-making. This separation would lead to clearly divide authority and duties between administrative officers (politicians—elaborated by the author) and government officers (bureaucrats—elaborated by the author). The Energy Regulatory Commission would execute their authority and duties efficiently to protect energy consumers' right"[256].

The NEPC argued for amending the Petroleum Act in 2007 to assure separation of power between the Minister of Energy and the director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels:

"The amendment … aimed to restructure authority and duties between the Minister of Energy and the director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels. The Minister of Energy shall regulate specifically on policy-making regarding the national interests. The responsibility in approving or giving permissions about petroleum contracts should be transferred to the director-general of the Department of the Mineral Fuels in collaboration with the petroleum commission" [*staffed by bureaucrats*—the author's aside] [257].

The government employed this argument with Parliament, insisting that separating power between administrative and government officers would accelerate decision-making. The parliamentary meeting report indicates the Ministry of Energy said:

"The government had to amend this Act in order to reshape authority between the Minister of Energy and the director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels in

[256] Parliamentary Meeting Report, September 19, 2007.

[257] NEPC resolution, September 6, 2006.

order to reduce the approving and allowing processes of petroleum concession contracts. In doing so, the Minister of Energy had authority to regulate only policy-making. For technical issue to manage the petroleum resources, the director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels would take responsibility of this issue by the guiding of the petroleum commission"[258].

This idea of separating power between policymakers and regulators was the basis for recentralization and the primary trope for advocating it. However, recentralization had a second trope: abolishing conflict of interest.

4.3.1.2 Conflict of interest

The energy bureaucratic agency argued that recentralization promoted good governance and transparency by reducing conflicts of interest between policymakers and business. The NEPC proposed amending the National Energy Policy Committee Act in 2008 by explaining:

"The rationale underlying amendment of the National Energy Policy Committee Act of 2008 was that there was no provision in the National Energy Policy Council Act of 1992, prohibiting a member of the National Energy Policy Council from holding shares in a state-owned enterprise or assuming any post in a juristic entity operating an energy-related business. In order that a person who assumes such office could execute the duties in the manner that will not constitute a conflict of interest with the operation of energy-related business, the stipulation as

[258] Parliamentary Meeting Report, July 18, 2007.

regards such prohibition is required, and hence it is deemed essential to enact this Act"[259].

The government also cited reducing conflicts of interest when it presented the National Energy Policy Committee Bill to Parliament. A member of the bill drafting commission connected fewer conflicts of interest to moral improvement of Thailand's energy policy organizations:

> "The National Energy Policy Committee should not be a shareholder in an energy company because if a committee who had duties to formulate energy policies, determine energy prices, and enact energy regulation holds a stake in an energy company, that committee would make a decision to support that energy company for gaining more benefit from that energy company…. Prohibiting the committee' spouses to be a shareholder in an energy company would create a confidence that the energy policy would be formulated without any conflict of interest and corruption. This Bill would help to develop moral and ethical thought of the energy policy makers for promoting the good governance principle in public administration"[260].

The government also argued that reducing conflicts of interest promoted free and fair competition in the petroleum industry.

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[259] The remarks section of the Act of National Energy Policy Committee (No.3), 2008.

[260] Parliamentary Meeting Report, June 7, 2007; The Secretariat of the Senate, *The Document for Considering the Bill of the National Energy Policy Committee* (Bangkok: Secretariat of the Senate, 2007), 15.

4.3.1.3 Fair competition

The NEPC used the fair competition argument to advocate creating a commission to oversee PTT. Its version of fair competition required ending PTT's expense-free use of gas pipelines and its authority to expropriate land. The NEPC argued that returning PTT privileges on gas pipelines and expropriation of lands to the state would reduce its advantage over private petroleum companies[261]. The NEPC stated its rationale for an oversight commission as follows:

> "Recently, PTT had the potential and ability to do its business as equal as other petroleum companies. It was essential to set up the Committee for the Controlling of Exercising Power of the PTT Public Company Limited in order to create a fair competition in petroleum business and promote the liberal economic system"[262].

One might raise a question that if the government agencies tried to recentralize the administrative power over the energy state enterprises, why did they use the idea of fair competition which seems to resist the recentralization? It should be clearly noted that the idea of fair competition was articulated by the energy agencies as a claim to intervene in the PTT business performance, not promoting fair and equal competition between private companies in the petroleum market. Moreover, even if the government agencies intend to recentralize power over the administration of energy state enterprises, they still need the business competition, to some extent, in energy market to guarantee stability of energy supply. In this sense, the idea of fair completion does not seem to be a paradox in creating recentralization of energy state enterprises.

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[261] NEPC Resolution, November 6, 2006.

[262] The remarks section of The Royal Decree Determining Authority, Rights, and Advantages for the PTT Public Company Limited (No. 2), 2007.

NEPC discourse promoted recentralization by advocating empowerment of national energy agencies. Presumably, creating an agency to oversee public energy enterprises was a way to control domestic energy prices and ameliorate the global oil crisis. The next section explores the discourse that social movements employed in response.

4.3.2 The discourse theme of energy nationalism

Energy nationalism emerged from resource nationalism[263]. It advocates increased state power over energy management and resources by amending energy contracts, amending energy regulations, changing energy policies, and restoring privatized energy companies to state control[264]. Energy nationalism is the main objection social movements raised against privatizing the EGAT and the PTT. They raised others—higher energy prices, the status of public enterprises as national assets—that the next section examines.

4.3.2.1 Concerns over energy prices

Both the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement and Anti-PTT Privatization Movement were concerned that the energy prices would rise when public energy enterprises were administrated by the private sector. The social movements emphasized that investors seek maximum profits and raising prices is an immediate way to distribute more profit to the investors: "Listing the EGAT in the stock market would create a chance for domestic and international investors to seek a benefit from the electricity

[263] The main idea of resource nationalism is trying of the state to increase its direct role on natural resource sectors through political and economic mechanisms (see Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston, "The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism," *Survival* 51, no. 2 (2009): 149– 158.

[264] David R. Mares, *Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America: Implications for Global Oil Supplies* (Texas: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2010); Reid W. Click and Robert J. Weiner, "Resource Nationalism Meets the Market: Political Risk and the Value of Petroleum Reserves," *Journal of International Business Studies* 41 (2010): 783– 803.

enterprise. The EGAT had to increase the electricity price in order to gain more profit for distributing benefit to the shareholders"[265].

The social movements presented evidence supporting their concerns. The research examined by EGAT's labor union showed that privatizing the EGAT would raise electricity prices 200%[266]. Consumer groups claimed that privatizing the EGAT would reduce access to electricity. Reference to the Federation for Consumer announcement, they stated: "the electricity price would be higher after privatization, and the higher price would obstruct access to electricity supply"[267].

The social movements claimed that rising oil and natural gas prices would engender adverse impacts after privatizing the PTT. Movement leaders mentioned that the "The Thai people were forced to buy expensive oil and natural gas because after privatization, the PTT sold its oil and natural gas production at the highest profit without any responsibility for taking care of Thai consumers"[268].

However, social movements did not rely exclusively on price discourse. They supplemented it with arguments concerning nationalism and anti-democratic governmental practices.

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[265] Matichon, "The EGAT's and Waterwork's Labor Unions Protest EGAT Privatization," June 21, 2003, 6.

[266] Naewna, "Public Enterprises' Labor Unions Set up Mobs for Anti-privatization," June 22, 2003, 10.

[267] Bangkok Biznews, "The EGAT Labor Union Opposes the Privatization of EGAT," March 1, 2004, 4.

[268] Naewna, "PTT Is Afraid of Rosana's Petition of the PTT Privatization to the Court," March 26, 2006, 2; Manager, "The Green Movement Announces Recalling the PTT Back Due to the Expensive Oil Price," January 30, 2012, 15.

4.3.2.2 Public energy enterprise as a national asset

The anti-privatization movements regard state energy enterprises as a national asset. They ask who should own or regulate the energy enterprises and who can share in the energy enterprises' profits. The movements' participants believe the nation and the Thai people—not the private sector—should regulate the energy enterprises because they were on public authority, taxes, and public lands that should remain under the people's control.

One leader of the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement's leader said "we thought EGAT was a national asset and the public property of all Thai people because the EGAT had been constructed through taxes on the Thai people and by expropriating the lands of the Thai people. In this sense, privatizing EGAT equated to selling a national asset"[269]. The Anti-PTT Privatization Movement argued that "PTT should belong to the nation, not the private sector because it was constructed under public authority"[270].

These arguments were echoed in social movements' activities and demonstrations. The head of EGAT's labor union stated "All participants in this demonstration shared the same idea, and that was canceling EGAT's privatization. The EGAT was the property of the Thai people. If the EGAT would be privatized, Thai citizens would lose power to regulate energy enterprises like in Argentina"[271]. In a press interview after prosecuting PTT's privatization, movement leader Rosana Tositakul repeated this idea: "We tried to protect public interest by bringing our national property that was illegally privatized back

[269] Panthep Phuaphongphan, *interview*, September 19, 2017.

[270] Naewna, "Jermsak Points Government Need to Recall the National Asset and Investigate the PTT Privatization," December 17, 2007, 10.

[271] Prachachat, "Understanding the Leaders of EGAT Labor Union: We Would Take Our Children to Fight Against the Privatization Plan," March 8, 2004, 10.

to the nation"[272]. This idea appears in the blueprint for energy reform offered by the PDRC Movement. It proposed restoring PTT to the state control in order to reduce hegemony of private companies in determining the price of oil and natural gas[273].

The anti-energy privatization movements gave voice to a second concept: who should benefit from state energy enterprises? The movement's leaders and members awarded Thai citizens first priority. They endorsed such advantages as buying shares of state energy enterprises or subsidizing energy bills with profits public energy enterprises. Business, government coalitions, and foreign investors should gain no such advantages and should not participate in administering state energy enterprises.

The Federation for Consumers emphasized that "the government was privatizing EGAT in the stock market. This policy delivers a national asset to a business group. The government should not sell this public asset because business would take this chance to exploit profit from ordinary people"[274]. The court decision rejecting EGAT privatization declared:

> "According to the Civil and Commercial Code and the Ratchchaphatsadu Land Act 1975, EGAT properties for which EGAT had employed state power to expropriate lands for constructing power plants, dams, transmission lines, and transmission systems were public property. Because EGAT ought to be employed

[272] Manager, "Rosana Points If She Wins the Prosecution of the PTT Privatization, She Would Continuously Sue the other Seven Public Enterprises," September 18, 2006, A 6.

[273] Manager, "Discussing the Blueprint of Energy Reform," February 24, 2014, 7–8.

[274] Post Today, "The Anti-EGAT Privatization Mob Actively Marches to Request People Reject Purchasing EGAT's Shares," October 5, 2005, A3.

for public and national interests, transferring its ownership from the public to the private sphere through privatization was illegal"[275].

Speeches by leaders of the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement and Anti-PTT Privatization Movement called for denying government and foreign business any role in administering state energy enterprises. As movement leader Rosana Tositakul told an interviewer, "the EGAT was set up by the taxes from Thai people. The government expropriated lands from people at a cheap price. The EGAT should return profit to those people. The EGAT was neither the government's asset nor the Prime Minister's property. The EGAT belonged to the nation"[276]. The PAD Movement leader Sondhi Limthongkul, who filed suit against PTT's privatization, said:

> "We wanted to revoke the privatization of PTT and bring the PTT back to the nation. Selling the PTT's shares to foreign juristic persons created a chance to steal a national asset to abroad. The PTT's shares were a Thai people's asset. If the government wanted to sell the PTT's shares, Thai people should have the first priority to purchase the shares, not foreign investors. This was the time to recall the national asset to belong to the nation and Thai people"[277].

The PDRC leaders attacked monopolization by business and foreign investors and suggested repurchasing PTT shares back to state ownership for reducing energy prices:

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[275] Bangkok Biz News, "Court Sentences Conflict of Interests as the main reason for Cancelling EGAT Privatization," March 24, 2006, 2; Matichon, "The Supreme Court Sentences Cancelling EGAT Privatization," March 24, 2006, 2.

[276] Post Today, "The Federation For Consumer Informs the Rationale to Oppose EGAT Privatization," November 12, 2005, A6.

[277] Manager, "The Foundation of Nation's Guard Sues the PTT Privatization," August 1, 2011, 13; Manager, "This Is the Time to Recall the PTT Back to the Nation," September 24, 2011, 16.

"We created the blueprint of energy reform in order to recall the PTT back to all Thai people. The petroleum industry of Thailand was monopolized by private companies and foreigners. Nowadays, Thai people had to buy expensive oil and natural gas. We should bring the petroleum resources in the business companies' and foreigners' hand back to Thai people"[278].

One movement leaders combined the two arguments above to press their anti-privatization agenda. Kornkasiwat Kasemsri said:

"PTT privatization involved illegally selling the national energy asset at a cheap price abroad. The method for protecting the national interest was the state repurchasing the privatized shares of PTT from private investors in order to guarantee energy security in Thailand"[279].

Rosana Tositakul also highlighted this claim during the personal communication: "EGAT privatization under the administration of Thai Rak Thai party (a ruling party in Thaksin government) was a selling national asset to investors without any embarrassment. We should not allow any government to privatize the EGAT"[280]. Movement leaders and members cited corruption as a reason not to privatizing state energy enterprises.

4.3.2.3 Corruption

The idea of state energy enterprises as national assets is inseparable from the question of corruption. The anti-energy privatization movements generally discuss corruption as a matter of who may buy shares of state energy enterprises, but they

[278] Thairat, "The PDRC Movement: Recalling Energy," February 25, 2014, 13.

[279] Kornkasiwat Kasemsri, interview, September 19, 2017.

[280] Rosana Tositakul, interview, September 19, 2017.

frequently criticize business's cozy relationships with cabinet members or senior government officers and foreign businessmen who became major shareholders of state energy enterprises.

One movement leader pointed out that "privatizing state-owned energy enterprises was not selling off a national asset to Thai people or foreigners. It was selling of a national asset to groups of Thaksin cabinet's members such as Shinawatra's, Juangroongruangkit's, Bodharamik's, Maleenont's, and Mahagitsiri's families"[281]. Sondhi Limthongkul, leader of the PAD Movement, spoke along similar lines to its members: the "49% of PTT shares would be distributed to private investors who were the nominees of Thaksin's cabinet. The PTT was privatized to transfer the national asset to the Thaksin's nominees. This was a huge corruption in the country"[282].

Criticisms of corruption extended to high-ranking government officials who own shares in state energy enterprise. The PAD Movement's leaders explained why they sued to halt PTT's privatization:

> "Thaksin's government in collaboration with the energy policy-making agencies corrupted the public property in the petroleum industry through the PTT privatization policy. This policy corruption was an abuse of power by the government and energy government officers. They collaborated to transfer the

[281] Komchadluek, "The Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement Reveals the Privatization Plan Is a Corruption of Ten Groups of Money Politics," February 26, 2004, 17.

[282] Manager, "Sondhi Reveals the Finland Declaration," May 22, 2006, 11.

PTT's properties from the nation to the government's coalitions and high-ranking government officers"[283].

The anti-energy privatization movements criticize ownership of state energy enterprises by foreign investors as suspicion of corruption. Leaders of the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement told members after the court canceled EGAT's privatization "we would not allow the politicians to sell a national property to foreigners"[284]. Leaders of the PAD Movement said "the 320 million shares of PTT that had been sold to foreign investors were an opportunity for foreign businesspersons to occupy and steal the national energy asset. The PTT privatization was deemed national robbery through the stock market"[285].

Movement leaders cultivated corruption as a tool to oust governments, particularly the Thaksin government that implemented privatization. One hundred members of the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement protested outside Government House bore signs reading: "The privatization of EGAT was an integrated corruption. Thaksin's government should not administrate the country. Thanksin should step out of power. This was a bad government because it did not listen to people voice"[286]. The leader of the Federation of Consumers told journalists:

"It was clear that the PTT privatization process reflected the corruption of the business groups who had a close relationship with the government. Investigating

[283] Manager, "Please Come with Us to Make the PTT Privatization Becomes Invalid," August 3, 2011, 11.

[284] Thai Post, "Rescuing the Nation, Cancelling the Privatization," March 4, 2006, 10.

[285] Manager Weekly, "Finding the New Evidence of PTT Privatization: Conflict of Interests," August 8, 2011, A15.

[286] Manager, "Petition to the King for Resisting EGAT Privatization before Suspending the Demonstration," May 11, 2004, 4.

the PTT privatization by the court would help to open the information of corruption under the Thaksin's government that continuously ruled Thai society for five years"[287].

Many of PAD's demonstrations raise the corruption issue to popularize its movement and mobilize its members against privatization of state energy enterprises. PAD's leaders who speak at protests normally point that "the privatization of EGAT was internal corruption. The elected government of Thaksin that implemented this policy should not govern the country because he wanted to sell the EGAT, which was a national asset of the people, abroad. Thaksin government should step out of power"[288].

This section discussed discourse tropes that government uses to endorse energy policy initiatives and social movements use to framing opposition to them. It also showed that the discourses of both during 2006–2014 differed from the period of privatization. The next section discusses how they construct networks to frame their discourse? It also examines the backgrounds of the energy policy agency and groups in the anti-privatization movements EGAT and PTT.

4.4 Actor network creation

This section discusses network creation and levels of discourse. It shows that the group of energy agency controlled the agenda for the NEPC board's making-decision. By this hegemonic power, the energy agency group could select concepts to frame the discourse and design the policy package. On the other hand, the background of the

[287] Post Today, "The PTT Privatization Was Illegal Since Starting of the Process," March 31, 2006, A2.

[288] Manager, "Massive Protesters Are in the National Police Office for Suing Thaksin," March 28, 2006, 10.

movements' network indicated the prominent role of urban middle-class in selecting ideas and languages to frame the movements' discourse.

4.4.1 Rise of energy agency group

Figure 4.2 shows little change in the numbers and positions of NEPC's board in 2007. The number of members from the Prime Minister's Office slipped from four seats to three, as did those from economic agencies (six seats to five). On the other hand, members from social agencies held two seats during 1992–2006 and four in 2007. The number of members from energy, security, and judicial agencies, remained unchanged at three seats, three seats, and one seat respectively. One deputy prime minister and the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry were excluded from NEPC's board in 2007 because their responsibilities overlapped other agencies on the board. However, the Ministries of Natural Resources and Environment and Science and Technology were included on the board. One board member explained that energy policy-making is tied to the extraction of natural resources, environmental protection, and development of energy technologies. Representatives from those agencies would help in making comprehensive energy decisions[289].

[289] The Secretariat of the Senate, *The Document for Considering the Bill of the National Energy Policy Committee*, 10.

Figure 4.2: Comparing NEPC board's members from the six groups of government agencies (2007—2014)



Source: Analyzed by the author

The decrease in the network of members from economic agencies and the Prime Minister's Office signal significant change on NEPC's board in 2007. Amendment of the 2007 National Energy Policy Committee Act increased the authority of the director of Office of Energy Policy and Planning, who the NEPC board's secretary. The director of the Office of Energy Policy and Planning had authority to propose guidelines for policy decisions and regulate and monitor implementation of policy by public energy enterprises such as the EGAT, PTT, MEA, PEA, and Energy Fund Administration Institute[290]. The former director of the Energy Policy and Planning Office explained that the board's secretary could present policy guidelines to the NEPC board, and the director of Energy Policy and Planning Office as the secretary of the board could negotiate with the group from the Prime Minister's Office and economic agencies to prioritize or deny some of the board's agenda[291]. Therefore, the restructuring of the Energy Policy and Planning Office'

[290] Ibid, p.3.

[291] Twarath Sutabut, interview, October 24, 2017.

authority could create a hegemony which the energy agency group could control the agenda setting.

Even if the economic agency group was a majority on the NEPC board, it could not adjust power relations among other board members to control energy agenda. The shift of control over the agenda would facilitate the rise of power of the energy agency group. In this sense, the number of voters on NEPC's board might be important if a controversial agenda affects members' networks. However, a group who can control agenda setting might create policy without voting.

4.4.2 Leading role of urban middle-class movement

Energy nationalism tended to be dominated by the urban middle-class. Concepts and language in framing the discourse reflected the urban middle-class's thinking (e.g., energy enterprises are national assets, petroleum enterprises belong under state control). To confirm this assumption, we should examine background of the Anti-EGAT Privatization Movement and the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement, the social movements in this shift of state energy enterprise policy. These two movements composed of four core civil society groups: labor unions, the PAD Movement, the consumer group, and the PDRC Movement.

The labor unions of state-owned enterprises played a pivotal role during the first round of anti-EGAT privatization. The Electricity and Water Prevention for Nation and People was the network that opposed privatizing the EGAT. It was composed of labor unions of state enterprises such as the EGAT, the Rural Electricity Authority, the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority, the Rural Waterworks Authority, and the White Flower Group—EGAT's white-collar workers, including lawyers, engineers, and the

Federation of Southern State Enterprises[292]. They were the representatives of the middle class that had a regular income, had worked in state enterprises, need professional skills for their job.

The PAD Movement mobilized opposition to the privatization of EGAT and PTT. During the second round of privatization, The PAD reconstituted a large-scale movement to protest privatizing EGAT[293]. During the second round of anti-PTT privatization, the PAD and the Green Politics Group, whose leader had been PAD's leader, tried to sue to protest the government revoking PTT's privatization[294]. The PAD was formed in February 2006 by anti-Thaksin government groups led by Sondhi Limthongkul, the millionaire owner of Manager Media Group, and four others[295].

Previous studies identify the urban middle-class was the major participants in the PAD movement. Asama Wangkulam investigated the careers of the movement's participants and showed that most were middle class businessmen in small and midsized enterprises in Bangkok and vicinity, CEOs or managers of private companies, university scholars, students, writers, artists, government officers, and skilled labors such as doctors,

[292] Matichon, "The 4 Electricity and Water Supply Unions June Gather for Anti-EGAT Privatization," June 21, 2003, 6; Matichon, "EGAT Union Sets up the White Flower Group for Anti-Privatization," February 14, 2004, 6; Khaosod, "Active Anti-EGAT Privatization Mob: Bringing Kids to the Mob," February 28, 2004, 13.

[293] Manager, "Massive Protesters Are in the National Police Office for Suing Thaksin," March 28, 2006, 10; Manager, "The Anti-EGAT Privatization Mob Invades the House of Government on March 30 to Protest the Government," March 28, 2006, 5.

[294] The Nation Weekly, "Tracing the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement: The Network of Anti-Thaksin," April 1, 2013, 17.

[295] They comprised Major-General Chamlong Srimuang, former mentor and ally of Thaksin, ex-governor of Bangkok, leader of the May 1992 uprising against military rule and head layman of the ascetic Santi Asoke sect; Phiphob Thongchai, a senior NGO activist and education reformer; Somsak Kosaisuk, a veteran public-sector labor leader; and Somkiat Phongpaiboon, a university lecturer and protest movement leader (see Kasian Tejapira, "Toppling Thaksin," *New Left Review* 39 (2006): 5–37).

nurses, lawyers, engineers, architects, and journalists[296]. Apichat Satitniramai and his research team examined their lifestyles and found they reflected the economic status of urban middle-class. The majority had credit cards, could read English newspapers, frequented luxury shopping malls, dined at luxury restaurants, and frequently traveled abroad[297].

The consumer group led in petitioning the court concerning the privatization of EGAT and PTT. Rosana Tositakul, a senior NGO and former senator, collaborated with the Foundation for Consumers, the Commission of Campaign for Democracy, and the Lawyer Council to cancel plans to privatize the EGAT and PTT[298]. Leaders of these associations had closes relationships with leaders of the PAD Movement and participated in its activities[299]. This NGO groups also were urban middle-class. Rosana Tositakul started her career as a nurse and became an NGO who monitors national energy issues[300]. She was elected senator in 2008 by the votes of the people in Bangkok. Her advocacy network is professional organizations that are knowledgeable about legal, public health, technological, and policy issues.

The PDRC Movement was prominent in the last anti-PTT privatization demonstration. The senior Democratic Party politician, Suthep Thaugsuban, formed

[296] Asama Wangkulam, "Political Roles of Thai Middle Classes in People's Alliance for Democracy under Thaksin regime" (A Master Thesis of Government Program, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 2010), 149–158.

[297] Apichat Satitniramai and Anusorn Auno, Good Man's Politics: Political Thoughts, Practices and Identities of the "Change Thailand Movement" Supporters (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2017), 68.

[298] The Nation, "Consumer Groups to Petition Court," March 30, 2006, 5B; Bangkok Biz News, "Social Movements Find a Way to Recall PTT Back to State," November 16, 2005, 4.

[299] The Nation Weekly, "Tracing the Anti-PTT Privatization Movement: The Network of Anti-Thaksin," April 1, 2013, 17.

[300] Rosana Tositakul, interview, September 19, 2017.

PDRC in early 2014 to oust Yingluck's government. A group within the PDRC Movement proposed restoring PTT to state control and used this issue to mobilize participants[301]. Previous studies found that urban middle-class groups lead the PDRC Movement's activities, ideologies, and agenda[302]. Sarttarin Tansoon found that most of the surveyed members of the PDRC Movement lived in Bangkok and joined the movement after finishing works or while on vacation[303]. Prajak Kongkirati identified that the advocacy network of the PRDC Movement is the urban wealthy, aristocrats, technocrats, presidents of university councils, judges, civil society leaders, and businesspeople. Prajak also indicated that PDRC attracts the affluent and educated Bangkok middle class[304].

In sum, the urban middle-class drives the agenda of the Anti-EGAT and PTT Privatization Movements. Members are skilled and knowledgeable professionals, businesspeople, government officers, and NGOs. Categorized by lifestyle, participants are urban rather than rural. Given the background of the movement's leaders and members, the ideas and tropes that frame the movement's discourse reflect the urban middle-class.

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[301] Manager, "PDRC Calls Reforming PTT by Bringing Back to People," January 27, 2013, 7–8.

[302] Yuttaporn Issarachai, "The Change in Political Movement in Thai Politics: A Case Study of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) (B.C. 2005–2014)," *Journal of Local Administration* 11, no.1 (2017): 144–162.

[303] Sarttarin Tansoon, "The Study of Social Movement in the Case Study of PDRC in Thailand: On Concept of Public Sphere and Civil Society," *Political Science Review of Kasetsart University* 2, no.1 (2015): 82–96.

[304] The Bangkok urban middle class was not only main supporters of PDRC. People from southern Thailand who were the loyal supporters of the Democrat Party (opposition party at that time) was another main advocacy network of the movement (see Prajak Kongkirati, "Thailand's Failed 2014 Election: The Anti-Election Movement, Violence, and Democratic Breakdown," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 46, no.3 (2016): 467–485).

Conclusion

This chapter depicts how Thailand's shift in energy policy from liberalization to recentralization occurred during 2006–2014 and under what conditions. Findings reveal that the shift occurred through the operation of four combinations. First, lack of petroleum supply elevated the price oil in the 2000s, pressuring the national government for decision. Second, governmental energy agencies designed policies for state enterprises that concentrated on creating new government agencies and restructuring power relations. Third, energy agencies framed the discourse to promote separation of power between policymakers and regulators, eliminating conflicts of interests, and establishing fair competition. However, dialog from social movements to discuss with the government discourse and policy focused basically on energy prices, public energy enterprises as a national asset, and corruption. The network controlling discourse and policy choices was the energy agency group that had a hegemonic power to control the energy agenda and decisions process. Movements that prominently demonstrated and actively proposed a counter-discourse the government's discourse and energy were anti-government movements drawn from Bangkok's urban middle-class.

This chapter has discussed and extended previous studies of energy politics in three aspects. First, energy agencies exerted hegemony over policy. Second, the ideas and language that legitimated that hegemony concerned separation of power, conflict of interest, and economic competition. Third, demonstrations, continuing protests, or petitions to the court could not mobilize mass support to change the government's energy policy. The movements' leaders need ideas and language to create ideational power to ally different groups and connect their agendas with the bureaucratic networks. Those

used to shift the energy liberalization to recentralization in Thailand, for example, were tied to energy prices, state energy enterprise as a national asset, and corruption.

Energy policy shifted from recentralization to renationalization in 2014 under a military government. The next chapter examines how this policy was formulated, guided by analyses of global energy phenomena, designing policy, framing discourse, and creating networks.

Chapter 5

Politics of Renationalization and Maldeveloped Energy Policy: Extension of the Prime Minister's Office Network and Collaboration between the Urban middle-class and the Locally Affected (2014–2018)

The two previous chapters described the first and second shifts of state energy policy during 1987–2006 and 2006–2014. This chapter analyzes the 2014 policy shift toward renationalization. This term refers to efforts by the Prime Minister Office to establish hegemony over energy enterprises through sub-committees and government-centric energy policy. What were global energy conditions when the Thai government tried to renationalize state energy enterprises? How did the government formulate policy to establish renationalization? What concepts were selected to legitimize the decision to renationalize, and which government agencies chose this framing discourse? What concepts were chosen and by which civil society groups to create counter-discourse to the government's discourse?

Journalists and scholars explained the renationalization of state energy enterprises by focusing on interactions between social movements and the military. Praipol Koomsup, an economics professor and former member of Energy Reform Commission, mentioned that the claim to renationalize energy enterprises arose during the Energy Reform Movement. Three years later, this movement prepared a bill for empowering the government to control energy enterprises[305]. Jirapong Tempeiym, a senior columnist, further explained the movement's ideas for supporting renationalization of public energy enterprises. Jirapong mentioned that the movement set its goal as establishing the NOC,

[305] Praipol Koomsup, "Undesirable National Oil Company," *Post Today*, April 5, 2017, 11.

believing government it could be a mechanism for subsidizing energy prices[306]. However, the military also desired to set the NOC. Atukkit Sawangsuk, a senior journalist, described how six retired generals, members of the Parliamentary Energy Committee, tried to convince the deputy prime minister to establish the NOC. The deputy prime minister declined their proposal and revealed the conversation to the mass media[307].

However, these explanations do not explain why the generals collaborated with the push toward renationalization? Why could not the deputy prime minister and military members of the Parliamentary Energy Commission agree on renationalization proposals? One way to understand these puzzles is to investigate these actors' ideas through framing discourse to negotiate and debate this agenda. Moreover, global conditions surrounding renationalization should be considered as external pressures on policy. Policy design is another factor in understanding how government formulated policy to renationalize energy enterprises. Finally, identifying who occupied the communities of discourse would advance understanding how participants create their networks in the level of discourse.

This chapter explains that renationalization was not only an incident inside Thailand but part of a global phenomenon in Latin America, Russia, and Western Europe. Under this global trend, the 2014 military government relied on restructuring energy organizations and suspending regulations to establish the hegemonic role of Prime Minister over state energy enterprises. Re-directing power to the Prime Minister Office to regulate state energy enterprises for improved performance was the presiding theme of

[306] Jirapong Tempeiym, "Setting the National Oil Company as a New Front Line of Political Terrain," *Naewna*, July 13, 2018, 2.

[307] Atukkit Sawangsuk, "National (Boxing) Oil Company," *Kaohoon*, March 29, 2017, 2.

government agencies. This theme coexisted with delay in bureaucratic performance, energy security, national interests, economics, and garbage.

On the other hand, social movements centered their discourse on maldeveloped policies concerning energy prices, the environment, health concerns, democracy, criticizing energy capitalists, and public energy enterprises as national resources. The group of Prime Minister Office in collaboration with economic and energy agencies controls the government discourse, however, the urban middle-class and the affected local residents controls creating the discourse of social movements.

This chapter has four sections. The first describes the global trend of renationalization in Latin American, Russia, and Western Europe. The second discusses policies proposed for re-nationalizing Thailand's energy enterprises. The third section illustrates the discourse employed to legitimate and discredit renationalization policies. The fourth section maps the network of people who participated in setting the discourse.

5.1 Global energy trend: Energy renationalization in the 2010s

The global trend in renationalizing arguably started with electricity and petroleum state enterprises in Latin America, Russia, and Western Europe during the late 2000s. Florian Baumann proposed that the first renationalization in the energy sector occurred in Bolivia when President Evo Morales came to power[308]. The renationalization involves bringing energy industries back under state ownership, and government frequently employed five mechanisms to do so: purchasing back shares of public energy enterprises, renegotiating or cancelling energy contracts between host governments and foreign

[308] Florian Baumann, *Energy Security as Multi-dimensional Concept* (Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research, 2008), 8.

companies, forcing expropriation of energy industries, amending regulation to intervene in the management of public energy enterprises, and creating government-centric energy policy planning in order to regulate public energy enterprises[309].

Previous studies surveyed renationalization of state petroleum enterprises and found the five prominent examples: Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, Russia, and Kazakhstan. President Evo Morales of Bolivia was elected in December 2005 after a campaign promising sovereignty over oil and gas resources. Morales promised voters that re-nationalizing the national oil company that would raise government revenues that would be used to relieve poverty. Morales decreed on May 1, 2006, to reestablish state-owned YPFB by repurchasing a majority its shares in the privatized enterprises and claiming public ownership over the country's gas and oil resources. Foreign companies have turned over extracted resources to the state, which fully controlled sale, transportation, and distribution as well as key decisions regarding the refining of raw materials. The decree forced foreign oil companies to renegotiate contracts with the new administration[310].

In Argentina, declining energy production led to diminishing energy exports and government revenues placed renationalization on the government's agenda. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner decreed that government was taking temporary control of YPF, the country's biggest oil enterprise, and would expropriate a 51% share held by

[309] Anna Klimbovskaia and Jonathan Diab, "Populist Movements: A Driving Force behind Recent Renationalization Trends," *CIGI Graduate Felloes Policy Brief Series* 9 (2015): 1– 7; Bremmer and Johnson, "The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism," 149–158.

[310] Robert Mabro, Oil Nationalism: The Oil Industry and Energy Security Concerns, 2007, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido/!ut/p/a1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOKNQ1zcA73dDQ0MDBzNDBwtLEMd_S0tDFz9zPQLsh0VAfVd-Ro!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI114-2007 (accessed December 27, 2018).

Spanish oil company Repsol. Fernandez justified Argentina's renationalization of YPF after accusing Repsol of responsibility for declining production that affected net energy export for the first time in 17 years[311]. The Venezuelan government stripped international oil companies of operational control in the Orinoco Belt crude oil project and took control of this project by PDVSA, the national oil company, in 2007. International oil companies such as Conoco-Phillips and ExxonMobil decided to abandon the project and sought international arbitration to request compensation[312].

Russian Premier Putin, according to his economic policy statement, noted it is necessary for the state to control the strategic energy sector in order to make Russia a superpower. Government strategy was "to use the oil and gas as a tool for rebuilding Russia as a great power in relation to the West and neighboring states, the state as a necessity should be able to control oil and gas sectors"[313]. Putin's government employed Gazprom, the powerful oil and gas public enterprise, to repurchase stakes of private energy companies and return them to state control. For example, Gazprom regained independent gas producer, North Gas, by purchasing 51% of the company. Putin's

[311] David R. Mares, *Resource nationalism and energy security in Latin America: Implications for global oil supplies* (Texas: Baker Institute Scholar for Latin American Energy Studies, Rice University, 2010), 1– 13.

[312] Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi, "The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela," in *The Natural Resources Trap: Private Investment without Public Commitment,* ed. William Hogan and Federico Struzenegger (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), 443.

[313] Jeong Sarang, "The Political Dynamics behind the Renationalization of Russia's Energy Sector," (A Master Thesis of Department of Political Science and International Relations, Graduate School of Seoul National University, South Korea, 2015), 26– 27.

government through Gazprom continuously renationalized large oil companies like Yukos in 2004 and Sibneft in 2005 by repurchasing their shares[314].

In 2007 the government of Kazakhstan amended petroleum law and gave 50% ownership of KMG, the biggest monopoly petroleum enterprise, to the government. Government has the right to cancel contracts unilaterally if a company's actions could pose a threat to Kazakhstan's national security[315].

David Hall and his research team surveyed the renationalization of electricity enterprises around the world and found the three prominent cases[316]. In Japan, the electricity company was renationalized after the 2011 nuclear crisis in Fukushima. The Japanese government employed government funds to buy a majority share (50.1%) of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Holdings Inc. (Tepco), a big nuclear electricity generating company, to avoid collapse of the company[317]. In Argentina, governments in 2009 and 2013 took control of electricity distribution companies, Edecat and Edelar, to solve investment problems, labor disputes, and low electricity prices[318]. Bolivia also has systematically renationalized electricity generation, distribution, and transmission since 2010. All were privatized in the 1990s as part of global energy liberalization promoted by the World Bank. Bolivia started to amend Articles 20 and 378 in the energy section of its

[314] Ibid, 49–50.

[315] Ryan Kennedy, "Privatization and Nationalization in Oil and Gas: Foreign Policy and Oil Contracts in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan," in Proceeding of the 2011 Annual Conference of the Association for Slavic, East European and Slavic Studies, 2011.

[316] David Hall et al., *Energy Liberalization, Privatization, and Public Ownership* (London: Public Service International Research Unit, 2013), 6–7.

[317] Japan Times, "Tokyo Says Tepco May Stay Nationalized to Deal with Massive Cost of Nuclear Disaster," December 5, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/12/05/national/ tokyo-says-tepco-may-stay-nationalized-deal-massive-cost-nuclear-disaster/#.XHdlRYgzZPY (accessed February 28, 2019).

[318] Hall et al., *Energy Liberalization, Privatization, and Public Ownership*, 6.

constitution to enact "energy production chain in the stages of generation, transmission and distribution may not be restricted solely to private interests"[319]. After the constitutional amendment, the government in 2010 expropriated four electricity generation companies from their private companies. Bolivia in 2012 continuously expropriated the electricity transmission company Transportadora de Electricidad (TDE), which had been owned by the Spanish electrical transmission company. In January 2013, the Bolivian government expropriated Electropaz and Elfeo, two major electricity distributors, and associated service companies Compañía Administradora de Empresas Boliviana and Empresa de Servicios Edeser. The Bolivia government still plans to establish 100% state ownership of electricity enterprises such as Empresa Electrica Valle Hermoso, Empresa Guaracachi, Transportadora de Electricidad (TDE), and Empresa de Distribucion Larecaja SAM[320].

The World Bank had a concern about the renationalization of energy enterprises in the 2010s. Its research team surveyed the experience of reforming power markets in developing and transitioning economies. The subsequent report illustrated that liberalization of the electricity sector faced difficulty in improving service quality needed to gain public acceptance for tariff increases needed for reform and vice versa. Opponents of energy liberalization have blamed private investors for tariff increases needed for financial viability and have generated a backlash against private power supply in some countries that raises the prospect of renationalization[321]. Anna Klimbovskaia and Jonathan Diab described opponents of energy liberalization or hardcore supporters of

[319] Ibid.

[320] Ibid, p. 7.

[321] Besant-Jones, *Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned?*, 109.

energy renationalization were populist movements[322]. They often call for re-nationalizing state energy enterprises to criticize failures of the government administration or problems with public services that ordinary people face such as poor quality services, corruption, and high energy prices[323].

The previous studies show the renationalization of state energy enterprises occurs in energy-exporting countries rather than energy-scarce countries. The rationale for re-nationalizing relied mostly on economic reasons such as increasing government revenue and protecting energy enterprises from bankruptcy. However, the renationalization of electricity and petroleum enterprises also was shaped in Thailand, as an energy-importing country. The next section explains the designing of government policy to renationalize Thailand's energy enterprises.

5.2 Energy policy package

Under the global trend of re-nationalizing energy enterprises, the Thai government expressed its intention to reform the energy sector by adding an energy issue to the 2014 Interim Constitution, an unprecedented move. Prime Minister Office guiding the reform agenda formulated two energy policy initiatives: restructuring energy organizations and suspending some existing regulations. These two initiatives shape the renationalization of Thailand's electricity and petroleum enterprises.

[322] The term "populist movement" in this research refers to movements that promote nationalist policies to blame foreign trade (see Klimbovskaia and Diab, "Populist Movements: A Driving Force behind Recent Renationalization Trends," 1– 7.)

[323] Ibid.

5.2.1 Government policy statement: energy reform agenda and renationalization policy

Energy reform was a blueprint for energy policy formulation. Energy reform appeared both in the government's policy statement and Section 27 of the 2014 Interim Constitution of Thailand. The government considered energy an urgent problem that it must tackle:

> "The government set eleven serious agendas: politics, administration of state affairs, law and judicial process, local administration, education, economy, energy, public health and environment, mass communication, society, and other areas as the framework for reform of the nation. These eleven agendas were the top priority that the government should pay attention on for changing the nation"[324].

To transform the idea of energy reform into implementation, the government assigned the National Reform Council the duty to study and make recommendations for reform in the eleven fields[325] mentioned above. The serious energy problems government listed in its policy statement included reforming prices of energy fuels following the global energy costs, increasing energy efficiency, exploring new petroleum and natural gas fields on land and sea, increasing numbers of fossil and renewable power plants, and collaborating with neighboring countries for energy development[326].

The next section discusses how Thailand's government formulated initiatives to reform state energy enterprises under the dominant idea of energy reform.

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[324] Government Policy Statement of Prayuth Chan-ocha's Government, September 12, 2014.

[325] The 2014 Constitution of Thailand (Interim) in the section 27.

[326] Government Policy Statement of Prayuth Chan-ocha's Government, September 12, 2014.

5.2.2 Designing energy policy initiatives

Both global ideology and domestic politics operated as key forces behind the design of policy packages during this period. Examples of energy renationalization in other countries, in which energy companies which used to be state-owned enterprises were brought back under government ownership, acted as key reference points for the Prime Minister's Office in collaboration with the Parliamentary Committee on Energy Affairs. This led to the proposal to establish the NOC in Thailand[327]. According to the report by the Parliamentary Committee on Energy Affairs regarding the enforcement of the Petroleum Act of 1971, the committee mentioned that:

> "The government needed to set up the NOC to take responsibility in exploring and producing petroleum in Thailand. The NOC would help to manage petroleum interests for the nation and guarantee the stability of petroleum supplies…The committee researched NOCs in many countries by focusing mainly on fully state-owned NOCs, e.g., the Oman Oil Company in Oman, PETRONASZ in Malaysia, Gazprom and Rosneft in Russia, Songtrach in Algeria, KUFPEC in Kuwait, and Petrobras in Brazil. The committee found that when the governments in those countries renationalized their oil companies, people in those countries had trust in the operation of the oil companies. People believed that the NOC would do the energy business for the nation and people" [328].

The connection between foreign examples of energy renationalization and domestic politics could be seen when urban middle-class people constructed a second

[327] Parliamentary Meeting Report, March 30, 2017.

[328] Parliamentary Committee on Energy Affairs, *Report on Studying the Enforcement of the Petroleum Act of 1971* (Bangkok: Secretariat of the Senate, 2015), 15-18.

anti-government movement, the so-called PDRC, in order to topple the Yingluck government, which the movement claimed was a continuation of the previous Thaksin government. A key element of the PDRC movement's campaign to oust the Yingluck government was their attempt to re-purchase PTT shares on the stock market on behalf of the government, since the Yingluck government was the descendent of the Thaksin government which had privatized PTT shares in the first place. A sub-group within PDRC, led by Buddha Isara, frequently used the anti-PTT privatization campaign to mobilize people and delegitimize Yingluck's administration. Finally, the demonstration could mobilize massive participants to protest against the Yingluck government. The 2014 junta claimed that they needed to maintain peace and order in Thai society. But to do so, they had to oust the Yingluck government. After General Prayut Chan-ocha, the head of the 2014 junta, became Prime Minister in 2014, he declared an energy policy statement at a session of the parliament. The reform of energy state enterprises was to be a key agenda of the government[329]. To gain support from the mass of participants in the anti-Yingluck movement, and to and retain power for governing the country, the Prayut government adopted an energy proposal of the movement and proposed setting up a fully state-owned NOC for doing petroleum business in place of PTT[330]. The key content of this policy proposal was to centralize power over the petroleum enterprises under the office of Prime Minister through the National Oil Company Management Committee, governed by the Prime Minister as the de facto chair[331].

[329] Parliamentary Meeting Report, June 24, 2016.

[330] Cabinet Resolution, February 28, 2017.

[331] Parliamentary Committee on Energy Affairs, *Report on Studying the Enforcement of the Petroleum Act of 1971*, 19.

Under the influences of global idea and domestic politics, the government agencies led by Prime Minister Office formulated two policy initiatives to manage public energy enterprises. The first concerned amending energy regulations to retain Prime Minister Office's power over state energy enterprises such as setting the NOC and the State Enterprise Policy Committee. The second policy concerned suspending some existing regulation that obstructed implementation of energy policy such as the Comprehensive Land Use Law.

5.2.2.1 Restructuring energy organizations

This policy package reflected restructuring both administrative energy organization and energy policy units. Two policy models were designed. First, the effort to set up the NOC, a fully state-owned enterprise, revealed the creation of a new petroleum organization to compete with the existing partly state-owned enterprise, PTT. The petroleum enterprise also was restructured it organization when the government approved the proposal to set up the NOC, the fully state-owned enterprise, to control and manage the country's energy resources and especially petroleum and natural gas resources. Prime Minister Office's effort to set up the NOC began by amending the Petroleum Act in 2017. Through amendment, the proposal to set the NOC was added into the Petroleum Bill that the NEPC previously had refused. NEPC's board made a resolution expressing disagreement with setting the NOC, as there was no clear indication of authority, responsibilities, and structure for regulating the petroleum sector[332]. However, the Prime Minister Office kept pushing this agenda. The government resolution approved the Parliamentary Energy Commission's proposal to study the feasibility of the

[332] NEPC Resolution, September 26, 2016.

NOC. It also gave the Prime Minister's Office responsibility for this issue[333]. That same month, the cabinet approved the proposal to set up the NOC when all processes were in place. The cabinet also assigned the Prime Minister Office, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Finance, and related agencies to study and propose models and process for setting the NOC[334].

A few days before submitting the Petroleum Bill to the parliamentary discussion, Pridiyathorn Devakula, the former economic deputy prime minister of the 2014 military government, gave a press interview disagreeing with the setting of NOC. Devakul's message created a controversial debate that led to the government revising its decision on this agenda. Devakula criticized the setting of NOC:

> "There are irregularities in the NOC plan, which would take over existing responsibilities in the management and bidding process for lucrative petroleum concessions…There is no feasibility study on the pros and cons of setting up a NOC, so it was inappropriate and premature to push for it being set up…The powers of NOC responsible for managing oil and gas concessions could be abused by the cabinet members who would be appointed to be the NOC board's members"[335].

The government decided to submit the bill without mentioning the establishment of the NOC to the National Assembly; in the end, the National Assembly passed the bill by inserting the section about establishing the NOC into the Act annex as a remark[336].

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[333] Cabinet Resolution, February 7, 2017.

[334] Cabinet Resolution, February 28, 2017.

[335] The Nation, "National Oil Company Would Be a Risky Move", March 28, 2017, 1.

[336] Post Today, "The National Assembly Deletes the Section of Setting the NOC and Put it in the Act Remark," March 30, 2017, 3.

However, the Prime Minister Office still persisted with efforts to set up the NOC. Three months later, the government designated the National Social and Economic Development Board to study and search models and procedures for setting the NOC[337].

Second, creating the State Enterprise Policy Committee would add a new organization to the administrative structure of energy policy. A new unit had been added to regulate and control policy and performance of state energy enterprises. Thailand's 2014 junta constructed the State Enterprise Policy Committee—a "Super Board"—to determine strategic and operational plans and monitor business performances of all state enterprises in Thailand, including electricity and petroleum[338]. Members of the Super board included[339]:

Head of the National Council for Peace and Order	Chairman
Deputy Head of the National Council for Peace and Order	Vice-chair
Deputy Head of Economic Consultant	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Transportation	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy	Committee
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior	Committee

[337] Cabinet Resolution, June 20, 2017.

[338] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of National Council for Peace and Order No. 75/2557 on Appointment of the State Enterprise Policy Committee, June 26, 2014.

[339] It is crucial to inform that the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order, the Deputy Head of the National Council for Peace and Order, and the Deputy Head of Economic Consultant have a position in the 2014 cabinet as the Prime Minister and deputy prime ministers.

Secretary, Juridical Council of State	Committee
Secretary, National Social and Economic Development Board	Committee
Thaweesak Koanantakool (Director, National Science and Technology Center)	Committee
Banthoon Lamsam (Chief Executive Officer of Kasikorn Bank)	Committee
Banyong Pongpanich (President, Phatra Capital Public Company Limited)	Committee
PrasarnTrairatvorakul (Former Governor, Bank of Thailand)	Committee
Rapee Sucharitakul (Secretary-General, Securities and Exchange Commission)	Committee
Veerathai Santiprabhob (Governor, Bank of Thailand)	Committee
Director, State Enterprise Policy Committee Office	Committee and Secretary

The State Enterprise Policy Committee had authority to supervise the operation of state enterprises and to propose administrative plans. In addition, this committee regulates, monitors, and evaluates business performances of the state enterprises to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The 2014 junta government adjusted the Super Board's authority to include providing recommendations to the Prime Minister for suspending, reviewing, or canceling the projects and operations of state enterprises that are corrupt or opaque[340].

[340] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of National Council for Peace and Order No. 97/2557 on Readjustment of Duties and Authority of the State Enterprise Policy Committee, July 21, 2014.

5.2.2.2 Suspending selected regulations

Another policy initiative allowed the Prime Minister Office to suspend selected regulations to facilitate implementation of energy policies and projects. The Prime Minister order to suspend enforcement of the Comprehensive Land Use Law reflected Prime Minister-centric policy planning. The element of this order was the suspension of the Comprehensive Land Use Law to facilitate the developments of energy projects: power plants, waste to energy power plants, and oil storage tanks wherever energy project developers have a plan to construct without any Comprehensive Land Use Law prohibitions against using residential areas, agricultural areas, conservation areas, or natural areas[341]. In short, approved energy projects could be constructed in any of these controversial areas in Thailand. This order raised concerns about the negative consequences of energy development projects. It reflected renewed focus on centralized administrative energy planning and removed any chance for participation by diverse stakeholders in energy development projects.

Moreover, this order exposed a change in agenda setting characteristics, with the NEPC losing power to the Prime Minister. Suspending the law was not initiated by the NEPC following the regular process of energy policy. After the announcement of the order on January 29, 2016, the NEPC brought this order to its meeting on March 11, 2016, to acknowledge it[342].

The two policy package of state energy enterprises as mentioned above reflected, to some extent, the idea of renationalization. The Prime Minister Office brings back

[341] National Council for Peace and Order. Order of the Leader of National Council for Peace and Order No. 4/2559 on Suspending the Comprehensive Land Use Law for Business Operations, January 20, 2016.

[342] NEPC Resolution, March 11, 2016.

control of electricity and petroleum enterprises through a restructured energy organization and creates Prime Minsiter-centric energy policy planning in order to regulate public energy enterprises. This shift of power is not a change of official positions; it is a re-demarcation of power between the existing ruling groups: energy agency, economic agency, and Prime Minister Office. What concept did the Prime Minister Office employ to make that demarcation? The next section explains.

5.3 Framing discourse

The government discourse theme to promote the energy policy package emphasized renationalization to improve performance of energy enterprises. The government agencies believed that re-nationalizing state energy enterprises under the Prime Minister's control would improve performance of energy enterprises such as public energy service, business activities, and decision-making. Improvements from renationalization would secure energy supplies and increase government revenues. This administrative model would help government control energy costs and support infrastructure for economic development. Finally, increasing the Prime Minister's power to regulate policy processes would eliminate regulatory obstacles to power plant construction and solve the garbage problem.

On the other hand, social movement discourse called the policy maldeveloped and claimed it created serious concerns about energy prices, environmental problems, and health effects. In addition, some processes to formulate and implement the policies reflected anti-democratic practice granted privilege to energy capitalists. Recreating the

fully state energy enterprises would be a better way to oppose the maldevelopment of the energy policy.

5.3.1 The discourse theme of renationalization to improve performance of energy public enterprises

To formulate the renationalization policy of state energy enterprises, the Prime Minister Office framed the discourse on the five key concepts: problem of bureaucratic agencies' operation, energy security, national interests, economic issue, and garbage management. The Prime Minister Office employed these five ideas to legitimize the policy initiatives of setting the Super Board and the NOC and suspending Comprehensive Land Use Law. These sets of government's discourse pointed to the necessity of the renationalization policy package in order to solve the delay of bureaucratic system in providing the public energy service, prevent the energy interests of the nation, promote economic development, and create sanitary garbage management.

5.3.1.1 Delay of bureaucratic operation

The problem of bureaucratic agencies' operation referred to the performances of state energy enterprises in providing public energy service and coping with energy crisis. The government agencies under the dominance of the Prime Minister Office often used this idea to criticize the delaying public services of state energy enterprises and the late response to the energy crisis such as blackout. These concepts legitimize the setting of the Super Board and the NOC and transferring the administrative authority and ownership of the electricity enterprises to the Ministry of Energy.

The 2014 junta government articulated the reason to set up the Super Board to determine and regulate the policies and performances of the state energy enterprises that:

> "The government had to set the State Enterprise Policy Committee in order to systematically and effectively regulate and monitor the state enterprises' performances. The committee would create the unity of state enterprises' operations and solve the overlapping performances among the state enterprises[343]…The State Enterprise Policy Committee had a duty to regulate the state enterprise's activities for solving the delaying operations of the state enterprises"[344].

A part of rationale to support the setting of the NOC also associated with the idea of the delay in the bureaucratic agency's performance. Reference to the statement of the chair of Parliamentary Energy Commission in the parliament discussion, he criticized the poor performance of the existing bureaucratic agency to promote setting the NOC. General Sakol Sajjanit stated a remark to persuade the parliamentary members that:

> "Currently, the government had the producing sharing contract system to deal with the petroleum concession. If the government wanted to use this system to make a petroleum contract with private companies, the government needed to set up the NOC. The existing agency, the Department of Natural Fuels, previously dealt with only paperwork or administrative works for making a petroleum contract. This organization did not have enough capacity to negotiate with private companies under the new system for making the petroleum concession. Setting the NOC and recruiting specialists to this organization would support the government to work with private companies for seeking the most benefit. We did

[343] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of National Council for Peace and Order No. 75/2557 on Appointment of the State Enterprise Policy Committee, June 26, 2014.

[344] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of National Council for Peace and Order No. 97/2557 on Readjustment of Duties and Authority of the State Enterprise Policy Committee, July 21, 2014.

not allow the existing agency to do this job because it was not flexible. Setting the NOC would provide a better tool to the government"[345].

5.3.1.2 Security of energy supply

This concept based on the idea of security of energy supply. The concern of how to produce electricity to respond to the continuous rising of electricity demand was the main language used of the government for suspending the Comprehensive Land Use Law. One reason that the 2014 government highlighted for allowing the construction of waste to power plants was the concern of security of electricity supply. The government explained that "nowadays, Thailand faced with the problem of security of energy supply. Constructing waste to power plants would create the security of electricity supply"[346].

5.3.1.3 National interests

Another key concept that the Prime Minister Office employed for formulating the renationalization policy of state energy enterprises was the idea of national interests, particular petroleum interests. The term of national interests related to setting a fully state-owned enterprise to do the petroleum business instead of private companies. The 2014 government hoped and believed that the full state enterprise would be a good mechanism for the government to bring the profit that private companies gained in doing petroleum business back to the government.

The discourse for the establishment of the NOC by the NERC included mention of providing another choice for the government to gain more benefit from petroleum. The

[345] Parliamentary Meeting Report, March 30, 2017.

[346] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of the Leader of National Council for Peace and Order No. 4/2559 on Suspending the Comprehensive Land Use Law for Business Operations, January 20, 2016.

NERC's members articulated that "the NOC was a representative of the government which held monopoly power for managing petroleum exploration and concession. Through this system, the NOC was able to seek better petroleum interests and closely monitor private companies as contract partners"[347]. The group of military advisors to the Prime Minister, who tried to propose this proposal, gave a reason that "the NOC was a mechanism to make the state had authority for managing and making benefit from energy resources in Thailand instead of private companies"[348]. The members of the Parliamentary Energy Commission and some parliament members also repeated this idea in the parliamentary discussion to support the setting of the NOC as can be seen from the list below:

General Amphol Chuprathum discussed that "the NOC would be a government agency to prevent the national interests and manage the petroleum concessions that the government makes with private companies. The NOC would be the best organization to manage the national interests and petroleum resources for consuming in a long period of time"[349].

Chet Siratharanon explained his idea to support the NOC that "energy, fuels, and oil issue was the real national interest. Setting the NOC which was a fully state enterprise was a representative of the government to manage the national interest"[350].

[347] NEPC Resolution, 26 September 2016.

[348] Manager Weekly, "National Pol Company: When the Deputy Prime Minister Wants to Cancel but the Military Wants to Set up," April 1, 2017, https://mgronline.com/daily/detail/9600000032661 (accessed December 22, 2017).

[349] Parliamentary Meeting Report, June 24, 2016.

[350] Ibid.

General Singsuk Singpai described his argument to promote the setting of the NOC that "I thought setting the NOC would create a national interest of Thailand because if someday private companies cancel the petroleum concessions and stop petroleum production, the NOC would be able to operate instead of those private companies"[351].

Police Lieutenant General Bunruang Phonpanich strongly agreed with the setting of the NOC and claimed "I absolutely agreed with setting the NOC. This organization would be a useful organization for the nation and people. Petroleum interests would be a great interest of the nation and should belong to Thai citizens. Hence, the NOC should be established as soon as possible"[352].

5.3.1.4 Economic development

The 2014 government used the economic concept to legitimize the suspending the Comprehensive Land Use. The policy emphasized on the construction of power plants and petroleum storage tanks, as an energy infrastructure that led to economic growth. The 2014 junta government legitimized its order to suspend the law that:

> "The electricity demand has continuously risen up because the electricity was a crucial factor to drive economic activities. In the past, the development of energy projects was confronted with many legal obstacles. Therefore, the government had to suspend some legal barriers to facilitate building waste to power plants and petroleum storage tanks for economic development"[353].

[351] Parliamentary Meeting Report, March 30, 2017.

[352] Ibid.

[353] Final Remark of The Order of the Leader of the National Council for Peace and Order No. 4/2559 on January 20, 2016.

5.3.1.5 Garbage management

Interestingly the concept of garbage management was articulated by the Prime Minister Office to suspend the Land Use Law for allowing the construction of power plants. Prime Minister Office's view believed that the incinerator power plant was a sanitary choice to manage garbage and protect environment and people health. To reduce the negative impacts of garbage on the environment and people health, the government had to announce this policy as can be seen from the remark of the Prime Minister order below:

> "The increasing of garbage and solid waste led to a serious environmental and health concerns. Building waste to power plants would create sanitary garbage management and reduce negative effect of garbage. The government determined the problem of garbage as a national agenda. The government suspended some regulations which obstructed building waste to power plants would help to solve the environmental and health problems from the garbage and waste solid"[354].

The Prime Minister Office and the Ministry of Interior at that time also articulated the same idea to legitimize the order for suspending the Comprehensive Land Use Law. They gave a press interview that "the incinerator power plant construction was done to reduce garbage and unsafe garbage management"[355].

This part provides the five key concepts or ideas which were used by the government agencies under the dominance of Prime Minister Office to frame the

[354] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of the Leader of National Council for Peace and Order No. 4/2559 on Suspending the Comprehensive Land Use Law for Business Operations, January 20, 2016.

[355] Bangkok Biz News, "Anupong Pointed to Using Article 44 to Suspend the Land Use Law in order to Construct Incinerator Power Plants," January 28, 2016, 2.

discourse for legitimizing their energy policy initiatives. The economic idea was not the domain in framing government discourse because it operated together with the concept of delay in bureaucratic agencies' operation, energy security, national interests, and also garbage management. Under these government ideas, how the social movements framed their discourses to discuss with the domain concepts? The next part analyzes this topic.

5.3.2 The discourse theme of maldevelopment of energy policy

The Energy Reform Movement and the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement framed their discourse to create a parallel dialog which focused mainly on the four concepts: basic concept of energy price and environmental and health concerns, democracy, criticizing energy capitalists, public energy enterprises as belonging to the nation. These four sets of concept reflected the concern of short-term effects to the local people, energy consumers or ordinary people in the country after implementation of the energy policies and projects. However, the movement also shared some idea, state energy enterprise as belonging to the nation, with government agencies.

5.3.2.1 Basic concept of energy price and environmental and health concerns

Concerns over high energy price and the negative impacts of environment and health were also the basic discourse of the two movements. The Energy Reform Movement with the proposal of renationalization of petroleum enterprise raised the problem of high energy price to legitimize its proposal. The movement launched a campaign during their march to explain that "Thai energy should belong to Thai people

and have a fair price. The petroleum business companies should stop exploitation from the Thai people"[356].

Due to the popular marine tourist attraction in Krabi province, the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement cited the classic problems of environmental and health concern—environmental effects, changing of marine ecosystem, and health impacts for campaigning against the power plant project. The movement leader made a statement in the protest that "Krabi was to an emerald of Andaman Sea. Krabi was threatened by the coal power plant. We needed to call people's help to save Krabi from the coal. Krabi had abundant natural resources and well marine ecosystem. We needed to develop Krabi to be a sustainable local community"[357]. Movement leaders expressed their statement in the public hearing process that "the movement, participants, and local people did not need to consume electricity produced by the coal because the effect of the coal would threaten local people's health, environment, air quality, and local farming. Furthermore, the route for delivering coal to the power plant also unavoidably affected the marine ecosystem"[358]. Moreover, the movement created cutout-signs surrounding the power plant site to post the messages that "do not bring the coal to threaten the marine system which was the life of local people"[359]. The international non-governmental organization, Green Peace, recalled

[356] Daily News, "The Energy Reform Movement Moves to Bangkok for Recalling the Government to deal with the Energy Problem for People," August 21, 2014, 12.

[357] Prachachat, "Recalling EGAT for Cancelling the Krabi Coal Power Plant Because Environment and Tourism Effects," March 20, 2014, 25.

[358] Komchadluek, "The Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement Opposes the Power Plant," April 21, 2014, 8.

[359] Matichon, "Posting Cutout-Signs to Protest the Krabi Coal Power Plant," September 29, 2016, 9.

"the government for canceling the power plant project in order to protect the abundant wetland and ecology which millions of people relied on it"[360].

The energy price concern and environmental and health impact functioned as the basic concept that the movements relied on; however, the movement combined this basic idea with the concept of democracy, criticizing energy capitalist, and state energy enterprises as belonging to the nation to popularize their movement activities and agendas.

5.3.2.2 Democracy

The movements used the concepts of democratic principle to politicize their agenda for delegitimizing government policy. The idea of disrespect of majority rule, rights, freedom of expression, and participation was selected as the component of democratic concept. The Energy Reform Movement's leaders gave a press interview after the Petroleum Bill without the section of setting the NOC was approved by the National Assembly. They mentioned that "the state agencies for the enactment of the Petroleum Act did not listen to people's voices and majority desires. People allowed the military government to step in power because people gave a chance to this government for reforming the country. However, this government would take over the national asset to be a personal asset"[361].

The Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement also used the concept of democracy with energy justice that refers to equitable processes for engagement of those directly

[360] Khaosod, "Green Peace Opposes the Krabi Coal Power Plant," August 1, 2016, 13.

[361] Matichon, "The Energy Reform Movement Collects People Signs to Propose the Law Initiation,. June 26, 2016, 12.

affected in a non-discriminatory policy process[362] to criticize the government exercising power for conducting the public hearing process. The movement leader and participants described their disappointment to the public hearing process. In the media reports, the movement's leader criticized the government that "the movement totally disagreed with using military troops to control the public hearing process because the military government violated and obstructed rights, freedom of expression, and the participation of people in the decision-making process"[363].

5.3.2.3 Criticizing energy capitalist

This concept discussed the unequal power relations whereby the government exercised its power to help the business elite rather than the ordinary people. This concept also looks at forming a power coalition between the state and the capitalist to control the construction of power plants and exclude the local people from the decision-making process. The leader of the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement articulated this concept for criticizing the public hearing process of the power plant project: "The energy policy statement by the 2014 military government raised the question of whether the government intended to create energy security for people or businessmen. Ordering military troops to monitor and control the public hearing process was an exercise of power to protect business elites rather than ordinary people"[364].

[362] Kirsten Jenkins et al, "Energy Justice: A Conceptual Review," *Energy Research & Social Science* 11 (2016): 174-182.

[363] Komchadluek, "The Krabi Protection Network Do Not Want the Coal Power Plant," April 21, 2014, 8.

[364] Khaosod, "Krabi People Resist the Coal Power Plant," October 13, 2014, 14.

The movement leader also repeated this concept through a press interview and pointed to creating a power network between government agencies and energy business groups in promoting the power plant construction:

> "In a big picture, the Krabi power plant related to the energy monopoly capitalism. The coal power plant industry composed of the three key components: coal delivery, power plant, and port for conveying coal to the power plant. If the government could push the construction of the power plant successfully, many interest groups would share benefit from the three components of the coal power plant industry. This was a game that the government and business interest groups tried to play with local people. The collaboration between the state and capital power was a real power to control the power plant industry"[365].

5.3.2.4 Energy public enterprises as belonging to the nation

The Energy Reform Movement underlined this concept to exclude the private companies from regulating state energy enterprises. The movement articulated this idea on the concern of losing administrative control over the energy enterprises to the foreign investors; moreover, this concept created a xenophobia sentiment in the state energy enterprises. This concept was used by the Energy Reform Movement when they protested the government that passed the Petroleum Bill without the section of setting the NOC. The movement's participants sent an open letter to the parliamentary members and press. The message in the letter mentioned that:

> "The Petroleum Bill affected the national security; economic security, energy security, and military security. Thailand would lose energy sovereignty to foreign

[365] Prasitchai Nunuan, interview, September 14, 2017.

investors if this Bill would be approved by the parliament. The regulation by this Bill to recruit petroleum concessionaire still would be controlled by the bureaucrats' discretionary power. It would lead to giving some privilege to foreign investors[366].

The movement also proposed reestablishing the fully petroleum state-owned enterprise in order to keep the ownership of the state energy enterprises for Thai people and protect the private companies dominance over the business performances of the energy enterprises. Reference to the public seminars held by the movement's leaders[367], the idea of state energy enterprises as belonging to the nation was repeated and sent to audiences. For instance, Panthep Phuaphongphan, a key movement leader, proposed the idea to prevent the energy enterprise from the influence of foreign business companies that "the Energy Reform Movement proposed setting the NOC to create the fully state enterprise and bring all of state energy enterprises back to the nation. Bringing the PTT back to fully state control would be a prevention of national asset"[368]. Another key leader of the movement, Rosana Tositrakul, gave a supporting idea to the Phuaphongphan's talk that:

"The privatization of state energy enterprises would be a worst public administration because this process was selling the ownership of national property

[366] Manager, "The Energy Reform Movement Opposes the Petroleum Bill and Points This Process Is the Selling of National Asset," June 23, 2016, 11.

[367] Seminar on the title of "Energy Reform for National Reconciliation" held by the Petroleum Institute of Thailand, August 27, 2014.; The Seminar on the title of "Energy Reform for Sustainability in Future" held by the Ministry of Energy, September 24, 2014, and the Seminar on the title of "A Model in Reforming Public Enterprises for Sustainability and Fairness" held by the Network of Energy Reform, September 19, 2017.

[368] Seminar on the title of "A Model in Reforming Public Enterprises for Sustainability and Fairness" held by the Network of Energy Reform, September 19, 2017.

to private companies. Private companies could seek a huge benefit from the state energy enterprises but the country could gain a little bit money from the selling of the national property"[369].

In summary, government agencies selected more variety concepts and ideas than the previous governments such as the bad performance of bureaucratic system, energy security, national interests, economic development, and garbage management to frame its discourse for promoting and legitimizing the energy policy packages. The social movements also shared some concepts and ideas from the previous movements such as the concern of energy price, environmental and health problems, democracy and energy enterprise as a national asset. However, the social movement in this period of renationalization selected the idea of anti-energy capitalist to set its discourse for popularizing the movements' demonstrations. The new concepts and ideas were promoted and selected by whom or which groups of government agencies and social movements. The next section is to display the actor network creation in the level of discourse framing.

5.4 Actor network

This section presents the creation of actor network in the level of discourse framing. To frame government discourse for designing the renationalization policy package of the state energy enterprises, the Prime Minister's Office extended its network to increase its voice in the NEPC. Moreover, the group of the Prime Minister's Office also established its network by collaboration with the groups of economic and energy

[369] Ibid.

agency to control the energy agendas in the NERC. For the social movements' side, framing discourses were controlled by the two groups of civil society: the urban middle-class group in the Energy Reform Movement and the local affected people in the Anti-Krabi-Coal Power Plant Movement. However, these two actor groups of the social movements had collaboration between each other, especially movements' demonstrations.

5.4.1 Extension of Prime Minister's Office's network

After the 2014 coup, the military government developed energy policy networks not only within the NEPC board but also outside by establishing the NERC. These two parallel networks created the energy agendas for the renationalization policy package of the state energy enterprises, which led to increased Prime Minister Office's control over the energy enterprises in Thailand.

NEPC members in this period of time had the two major changes. The first change occurred in the period of June 2014–March 2015 when the junta government made the reshuffle of the NEPC board's members. The 2014 junta government replaced the position of ministers by appointing the permanent secretaries to be the NEPC board's members[370]. This reshuffle decreased the representatives from the Prime Minister's Office and energy agency from tree seats to two seats; on the other hand, the representatives from the economic agency increased from five seats to six seats (Figure 5.1).

[370] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of the National Council for Peace and Order No. 54/2557 on the Appointment of the National Energy Policy Committee, June 6, 2014.

Figure 5.1: Comparing NEPC's board members from the six groups of government agency (2014–2015)



Source: Analyzed by the author

However, this structure of the NEPC board existed in eight months. The 2014 junta government made the reshuffle again in March 2015 by appointing the ministers from relating ministries to become the members of the NEPC board[371]. The second reshuffle under the 2014 military government led to the significant change of the three groups of government agencies. The board members from the economic agency dropped from six to five seats. However, the energy agency could retake its seat in the NEPC board at three seats as well as the Prime Minister's Office which could more occupy the NEPC board at four seats (Figure 5.2).

[371] National Council for Peace and Order, Order of the National Council for Peace and Order No. 2/2558 on the Appointment of the National Energy Policy Committee, March 16, 2015.

Figure 5.2: Comparing the NEPC board's members from the six groups of government agency (2015—2019)



Source: Analyzed by author

The increasing of the NEPC board's members from the Prime Minister's Office group was a trace to reflect the extension of the network of Prime Minister's Office in the level of discourse framing. The clear evidence of the Prime Minister's Office's dominance was revealed in the NERC. The members of NERC were selected by the deputy prime ministers and the group of advisors to the prime minister and appointed by the prime minister. In the first term of NERC, so-called the ERC, the deputy prime ministers and the group of Prime Minister's advisors set up the committee to search and make the lists of appropriate candidates for the appointment of the junta government. In the second and third terms of NERC, so-called the ERSC, and the NERC, the deputy prime ministers and the Prime Minister advisory team made the lists of candidates by themselves for the Prime Minister's appointment[372]. In this sense, it was clear the members of NERC were recruited by the Prime Minister's Office. Even if the Prime Minister's Office had the full power in selecting and appointing the representatives from

[372] Dusit Kreangam, interview, October 23, 2017.

other networks to be a member of NERC, the Prime Minister's Office still need an advocacy coalition to framed the discourse and articulate the same discourse for legitimizing its agenda. Which groups of actor did the Prime Minister's Office collaborate with in order to create the network in the discourse framing?

Looking into the ERC, the 26 members were selected from varied occupations such as an energy professor, energy officer, politician, NGO representative, private sector energy representative, director of a state energy company, member of a commercial chamber, and soldier. However, if one looks into the statistic information of ERC board's members, the data showed the four key groups of actor were selected to be ERC's members: the economic agency, energy agency, business companies, and NGOs[373] (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3: Categorizing the work background of ERC board members (2014–2016)



Source: Analyzed by the author

[373] Secretariat of the House of Representatives, *The Name List of the National Reform Council's Members*, 1.

The representatives of the economic agency were mostly recruited to be ERC members at six seats. ERC members from the economic agency group were the governor of the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry, the president of the Federation of Thai Industries, the representatives of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and the representative of some local chambers of commerce. The representatives of the energy agency and the business companies were equally recruited into the ERC at five seats. The governors of PTT and PEA, the director-general of the Department of Mineral Fuels, and the director of the Petroleum Institute were the representative of the energy agency in ERC. For the group of business companies, the energy companies such as the CEOs of Bangchak Petroleum Company Limited and the owner of a solar power company were selected. The last key group was the NGOs. They were the important activists from the energy group, Rosana Tositrakul, the environmentalist group, Hannarong Yaowalert, and the political group, Kasidetthanadet Sekkhunthod. Beyond these big four groups, the Prime Minister's Office built its network with the group of university scholars, military agencies, and politician as well.

When the ERC was changed to the ERSC in 2016, the member of ERSC was reduced from 26 to 15 seats[374]. This shift also resulted in the reshaping of the actor network within the committee. The representatives of the energy agency became the biggest group in the ERSC (Figure 5.4). They were the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, the high-ranking officers of the PTT, and the governor of EGAT. The economic agency as the biggest group in ERC was decreased from six to two seats as equal as the group of business companies, and NGOs. However, the Prime Minister's

[374] Members of the National Reform Steering Assembly, https://hris.parliament.go.th/ ss_th.php (accessed February 7, 2019).

Office tried to create its network to connect to the group of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labor, and police.

Figure 5.4: Work background of ERSC's board members (2016–2017)



Source: Analyzed by author

When the ERSC was changed into the third phase in 2017, so-called the NERC, the seats in the NERC remained at 10 seats and the energy agency became the majority group in the committee (Figure 5.5)[375]. The representatives of the energy agency were the high-ranking persons in the energy agencies: former permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, the president of PTT, the board member of PTT, the former governor of EGAT, deputy permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, and the secretary of the Energy Regulatory Commission. The two seats of NERC belonged to the same representatives of the business groups that used to be ERC member. Interestingly, the economic agency which used to be the majority members in ERC became the minority member in the NERC.

[375] Prime Minister's Office, Announcement of the Prime Minister's Office on the Appointment of National Reform Committee, August 15, 2017.

Figure 5.5: Work background of NERC's board members (2017–2019)



Source: Analyzed by author

The increasing of the representative of the Prime Minister's Office in the NEPC along with the dominant power in recruiting and appointing the members of NERC, this combination would create the hegemonic power of the Prime Minister's Office in framing the discourse and designing the energy policy package to establish the hegemonic power of the Prime Minister Office over the state energy enterprises. However, the NERC case, the Prime Minister's Office collaborated with various networks such as the group of economic agency, energy agency, business companies and NGOs. The change of actor network in the level of discourse framing in this period reflected the extension of the Prime Minister's Office and the collaboration between the Prime Minister's Office and the energy agency. Under this kind of government actor network, the movement discourse was framed by which groups of civil society to convey their agendas to the public and government. The next part discusses on this issue.

5.4.2 The existing of two movements' network: Urban middle-class group and local affected people

The discourse theme of maldevelopment of energy policy was framed under the existing of the two social movements: the Energy Reform Movement and the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement. The concept of energy price, environment, and health concerns was the basic idea that these two networks shared together. Moreover, these two networks also adopted the idea of democracy and criticizing energy capitalist to popularize their agendas for canceling the energy policies. Nevertheless, the concept of state energy enterprises as the national asset was employed by only the Energy Reform Movement. These concepts reflected the ideas of the local affected people as well as the urban middle-class group. Looking into both social movements' background, these two social movements also were led by the urban middle-class group and the local affected people.

The Energy Reform Movement was formed by the group of urban middle-class who used to be leaders of the Anti-EGAT and PTT Privatization Movements. A column by Pichit Likitkijsomboon in a newspaper pointed that the network of the Energy Reform Movement composed of NGOs, political activists, and some members of the opposition party. Most of them had the experiences to actively participate in the PAD and PDRC movements led by the urban middle-class group. The leaders of the Energy Reform Movement raised the energy issues such as opposing the privatization of public energy enterprises, canceling PTT privatization, and energy price as a key movement's strategy to topple governments that were the nominee of Ex-Prime Minister Thaksin[376].

[376] Pichit Likitkijsomboon, "Energy Politics of Thailand's Energy: The Movement of People Alliance for Democracy," Daily World Today, March 15, 2013, 12.

Considering the background of the Energy Reform Movement's leaders, they came from the three groups. The first group was the ex-leaders of the PAD movement such as Veera Somkwamkid, Panthep Phuaphongphan, Rosana Tositakul, Somkiat Pongpaiboon, and Kamolpan Cheewapansri. The second group was the ex-leader of the PDRC movement such as Buddha Issara. The last group of the movement's leaders was the consumer group and energy activist groups such as Itthaboon Onwongsa, Boonyuen Siritum, Kornkasiwat Kasemsri, and Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala[377]. The advocacy groups consisted of the vice president of the Rural Doctor Forum, Doctor Supat Hasuwanakit, and a group of Chulalongkorn University engineering alumni[378]. Both two groups had joined the PDRC movement and frequently made their statement in the PDRC demonstration to articulate the similar discourse to participants in the demonstrations[379].

The core network of the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement was the local affected movement. The local people in Krabi province who were affected formed the core network that became the Network for Preventing Krabi from Coal. The affected people in Krabi then expanded their network to gather people from the four provinces in southern Thailand to set up the Network for Preventing Andaman from Coal as a regional network using Facebook as an important tool for communication[380]. International organizations such as Greenpeace Southeast Asia, private sector organizations such as the Association of Lanta Island Tourism and the Krabi Chamber of Commerce and Ten Tourism Business Organizations in Krabi Province, and local NGOs such as the Group of

[377] Khaosod, "Role and Regulation Under the Military Martial," August 27, 2014, p. 6.; Post Today, "The Court Orders the 4 Networks of the PAD to pay 9.7 Million Baht for Compensation of the PTT," September 2, 2017, B5.

[378] Thai Post, "Reforming Energy for the Nation Would Not Be a Hidden Agenda," August 27, 2014, 4.

[379] The Nation, "Rift over Energy Reform," August 27, 2014, 1A.

[380] Matichon, "Posting Posters of Anti-Krabi Power Plant," November 29, 2016, 9.

Lanta Island People for Andaman Preservation became the advocacy networks for the movement[381]. However, the leader of the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement, Prasitchai Nunuan, used to be a key leader of the Energy Reform Movement[382]. Some key leaders of the Energy Reform Movement, Panthep Phuaphongphan and Doctor Supat Hasuwanakit, became a key leader who led the Anti-Krabi Coal Power Plant Movement to protest the government in Bangkok and Krabi province[383].

Considering the background of the social movements through the background of the movements' leaders, the pivotal actors and advocacy groups who played an active role to form the movements, the finding showed that the urban middle-class group and the local affected people were the core group in controlling the sets of discourses to discuss with government. However, the leaders of the movements had collaboration, to some extent, such as being a co-founder of the movement and becoming a leader in the protests.

Conclusion

The findings in the chapter illustrated how the shift of state energy enterprise policy from recentralization to renationalization in the period of 2014–2018 occurred and under what kinds of global condition, set of language used in framing discourse, and actor network creation in framing discourse. The research findings revealed the renationalization policy of public energy enterprises was not the policy stream in Thailand. The renationalization of energy privatized companies which used to be a state-

[381] Kom Chand Luek, "10 Organizations Oppose Krabi Power Plant Due to Effect of Tourism and Environment," June 26, 2014, 8.

[382] Post Today, "Marching from Hat Yai to Bangkok for Energy Reform," August 20, 2014, A7.

[383] Prasitchai Nunuan, interview, September 14, 2017.

owned enterprise was a widespread trend in Latin America, Russia, and Eastern Europe. Under this global event, the Thai government designed the policy of state energy enterprises into two initiatives.

First, the 2014 government restructured the existing energy organization in order to create a chance for the Prime Minister Office to regulate the state energy enterprises such as establishing the State Enterprise Policy Committee to design the policy and business plans for all of state enterprises and setting the NOC to control the petroleum enterprise. Another policy package was the creation of Prime Minister centric-role in energy policy and planning. The order of the 2014 junta government to suspend some existing regulation, the Comprehensive Land Use Law, to facilitate the construction of power plants and petroleum storage tanks was the example of this policy package. In order to legitimize these policy initiatives, the government agencies led by the Prime Minister Office framed the discourse by using the concepts of the problem of bureaucratic system's performance, national interests, economic development, energy security, and garbage management. These discourse concepts were controlled by the group of Prime Minister's Office in collaboration with the economic and energy agencies. On the other hand, a key dialog by the social movements based on the ideas of energy price, environment and health concern, democracy, criticizing energy capitalist, and energy enterprises as belonging to the nation. The core group to frame the movement discourses was the urban middle-class group and the local affected people.

To discuss with the previous studies, the finding in the chapter further explained the politics of renationalization policy in state energy enterprises which were not only controlled by the military group in government agencies and the group of urban middle-class. This chapter argues the former studies in three aspects. First, building the coalition

to formulate the renationalization policy of state energy enterprises in Thailand, for example, needs at least three groups of government actor: the Prime Minister's Office, the economic agency, and the energy agency. Second, the concern of energy price as mentioned by the previous article is not enough to popularize and legitimize the renationalization policy of state energy enterprises. It needs diverse sets of discourse such as the concepts of national interests, energy enterprise as the national asset, energy security, and poor performance of energy enterprises. Finally, bureaucrats' and the movements' discourses are not always the opposite idea. The movement's idea of energy enterprises as the national asset could well operate together with the Prime Minister Office's logic of renationalization. The logic of energy enterprises as the national asset creates ideational power to connect the urban middle-class movement's with the Prime Minister Office's agenda in making an alliance to shift the energy state enterprise policy from recentralization to renationalization.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: The Politics on the Transitions of Thailand's Energy Policies (1987—2018)

This chapter summarizes the major findings of this research to present a comprehensive picture of the transitions of state energy enterprise policy in Thailand and the basic conditions in shaping the policy shifts. The first part of the chapter wraps up the findings from the three periods of policy shifts to answer the research questions. An additional part of this section presents the ideational power as another powerful factor in making coalition between political leaders and urban middle-class movements in shifting Thailand's energy policy. The second part of the chapter discusses the broader context and existing research on energy politics. The final part discusses the research limitations and proposed future areas of energy politics study.

6.1 Changes of energy regime and policy in Thailand, 1987 to 2018

State energy enterprise policies in Thailand shifted from liberalization to recentralization and renationalization from 1987 to 2018. The dissertation questions why and how did this policy shift occurred? The research findings, in the broader picture, showed the characters of global energy phenomena, patterns of energy policy packages, sets of ideas or languages in framing discourse, and composition of actor groups which are the significant condition in the shifts of energy policy (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Transitions of state energy-enterprise policy in Thailand and the formations of policy package, government and movement discourses, and actor network

	Liberalization (1987–2006)	**Recentralization (2006–2014)**	**Renationalization (2014–2018)**
Global energy phenomena and financial crises	- The 1970s Energy Crisis - The 1980s Privatization trend of energy public utilities - The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis	- The 2000s Oil Crisis	- The 2010s Renationalization trend of energy public utilities
Designing policy packages	- Deregulation to create public-private partnership - Increasing private investment - IPOs	- Creation of the new bureaucratic commission - Reshaping power relations among incumbent energy agencies	- Restructuring energy administrative and policy organizations - Suspending selected regulations
Framing discourses	**Government discourse**—Decentralized energy supply: - Public finance - Security of energy supply - Competition in energy market	**Government discourse**—Restructuring power relation among energy agencies: - Separation of power between policy makers and regulators - Conflict of interests - Fair competition	**Government discourse**—Renationalization to improve performance of energy enterprises: - Problem of bureaucratic operation - Security of energy supply - National interests - Economic development - Garbage management

	Liberalization (1987–2006)	Recentralization (2006–2014)	Renationalization (2014–2018)
Compositions of coalitions	**Movement discourse**—Decentralized energy policy: - Environment and health problems; - Social class; - Transparency of external investigations; - Democracy; - Changing of local socio-economic development	**Movement discourse**—Energy nationalism: - Concerns over energy prices - Public energy enterprises as a national asset - Corruption	**Movement discourse**—Maldevelopment of energy policy: - Energy prices and environmental and health concerns - Democracy - Criticizing energy capitalist -Public energy enterprises as belonging to the nation
	Government coalition—Economic agencies, Prime Minister's Office, energy agencies, security agencies	**Government coalition**—Energy agencies, economic agencies, Prime Minister's Office, security agencies, social agencies, environmental agencies	**Government coalition**—Prime Minister's Office, economic agencies, energy agencies, business companies, security agencies, NGOs, academics
	Movement coalition—Local affected people, environmentalist groups, local business groups, local political groups, activist groups, academic groups, artist groups, international organizations	**Movement coalition—**Urban middle-class groups, labor unions, consumer groups, political activist groups	**Movement coalition—**Urban middle-class groups, local affected people, local business groups, environmentalists, international organizations, consumer groups, academics, political activists

Source: Summarized by the author

Previous studies identified key elements of policy shift as changes in decision makers, energy cost, fiscal burden, international market price, and bureaucratic structure. The previous explanations on the shifts of Thailand's energy policies relied on two opposite perspectives, namely bureaucratic-centric perspective and civil society-centric perspective. Based on the above scholarship, this dissertation questions the most important remaining question; how did the political leaders, both bureaucrats and civil society movements, initiate the change? Powerful interest groups and actors are often structured around energy policies. A de-facto energy regime is established that cuts across government, market, and society. Thus, to shift policies, the key question would be how to transform the existing energy regime. In other words, what political tools and strategies did bureaucrats and civil society movements utilize in making a coalition for changing the existing energy regime, and then the energy policies? This dissertation analyses this political process.

By investigating the Thai case, this dissertation suggests that the bureaucrats and civil society movements use ideational power to connect their agendas and create a partnership for shifting Thailand's energy policies from liberalization to renationalization. Which sets of logic did those political leaders choose to create ideational power in making a coalition to shift the state energy enterprise policies in Thailand? To further understand the ideational power, this dissertation addresses the question in the following manner:

1) The economic agency and local community movements employed the logics of decentralized energy supply and decentralized energy policy to discuss the problems of insecurity of energy supply and the insufficiency of stakeholder participation in energy policymaking. These concepts created the ideational power to connect economic bureaucrats' and local community movements' agendas in making an alliance for shifting

state-centric policy dominated by security bureaucratic regime to liberalization policy controlled by the economic agency in collaboration with private sector;

2) The energy agency and urban middle-class movements used the logic of separation of power and energy nationalism to criticize the conflict of interests among energy policymakers and oppose privatizing the ownership of public energy enterprises. These concepts created the ideational power to make a coalition between energy bureaucrats and urban middle-class movements to transfer the energy liberalization policy dominated by the economic regime to recentralization policy ruled by the energy bureaucratic agency;

3) The Prime Minister's Office and urban middle-class movements used the logics of improving energy enterprise performances and maldevelopment of energy policies to effectively problematize the bureaucratic malfunctioning and underperforming energy policy outcomes. These concepts created the ideational power to ally the Prime Minister Office and urban middle-class movements for shifting the energy recentralization policy ruled by the energy bureaucratic regime to renationalization policy controlled by the Prime Minister Office.

Moreover, ideational power also serves as another effective factor for political leaderships to delegitimize existing policies, popularize alternatives or new energy proposals, and also prioritize actors in the decision-making arena.

Looking into the Thai case, the ideational power regarding energy nationalism (energy state enterprises as national property or as belonging to the nation) delegitimizes the PTT and EGAT privatization policies to become an illegal process. This can be clearly seen from the court sentences given and urban middle-class people's perspectives. The ideational power regarding energy renationalization and maldevelopment of energy policies popularizes the new policy agenda such as setting up the NOC and State

Enterprise Policy Committee, and the suspension of the Comprehensive Land Use Law to solve bureaucratic malfunctioning and underperforming problems in the performances of energy public enterprises. The ideational power regarding decentralized energy supply and policy, separation of power, and energy renationalization differently prioritizes actor groups in the policy arena. For example, the ideational power of decentralized energy supply promotes private actors' participation as the core energy regime to create security of energy supply. On the other hand, the ideational power of decentralized energy policy empowers local people's participation as key regime to justify proper energy policy and production method for local communities. The discourse of separation of power creates the ideational power to promote the energy bureaucratic regime to foster transparency in the energy policymaking process. On the other hand, the ideational power regarding energy renationalization supports the Prime Minister-centric regime in the energy policy arena to solve bureaucratic malfunctioning and underperforming problems of state energy enterprises.

6.2 Contributions to knowledge and discussion

This section synthesizes the research finding within the broader context to find out the contributions to the research field of energy policy and politics. This dissertation explores at least four contributions.

Firstly, the conventional concept for energy politics studies has relied mostly on one or two analytical framework(s) influencing energy policy decision-making. The alternative framework in this study advances the conventional concepts of previous studies by providing multi-analytical frameworks: global energy phenomena and financial crises, policy design, discourse analysis, and composition of the network. This alternative further develops the explanation from previous concepts and studies that the

actor interactions and ideas in influencing policy decision-making would be shaped under what kinds of global conditions, what are the policy outcomes from those actor interaction and idea, what are the languages, concepts, and logics that are contained within those actor ideas, and how those actor compose their network for conveying their ideas to others.

Secondly, this dissertation uses the situation in Thailand to illuminate the shifts of state energy enterprise policy from the liberalization to renationalization. This energy policy incident is not only the internal event of Thailand but also the contemporary trend of state energy-enterprise policy at the global level. The Thai case would be an empirical case to advance the understanding of the global trend of renationalization policy of energy state enterprise. The main finding of the dissertation shows the ideational power in making a coalition between political leaders and civil society movements to change Thailand's energy regime and shift the state energy enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization. The research finding would be an initial point to advance a comparative study of ideational power between Thailand and other countries to understand how political leaders and civil society movements in those countries utilize ideational power in making a coalition to change existing energy regime and formulate the energy renationalization.

Thirdly, this dissertation provides a practical contribution by modeling the policy packages, patterns of ideas, and concepts for framing discourse and composition of actors to achieve the transition of state energy-enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization. This study demonstrates two models of policy design: deregulation and reshaping institutional structures of energy policy organizations, as a basic policy package to shift the policy of energy state enterprises from liberalization to renationalization. The deregulation would be a fundamental policy package to reduce the

state power and increase the participation of private sector in liberalizing energy state enterprises. The creation of a new energy bureaucratic organization and reshaping the power relation between politicians and bureaucrats would be an essential policy package for recentralizing state energy enterprises. The policy package of restructuring energy administrative and policy organization and suspending some regulation would be a necessary basis for renationalization of energy state enterprises.

The discourse analysis in chapters 3–5 also demonstrates patterns of ideas and concepts for creating support for the transitions of the state energy policy. The economic concepts such as deficit of government budget and free competition in energy market as well as the idea of energy security such as stability of energy supply would be an ideational power for formulating the liberalization policy. However, ideas regarding power allocation such as the separation of power between policymakers and regulators and ideas of governance such as conflict of interests would be necessary concepts for setting a recentralization policy. For the renationalization policy, it needs various concepts that connect to the problems of bureaucratic operation, security of energy supply, national interests, economic development, and trash management.

This study shows the composition of the coalition. To formulate the liberalization policy, the economic agencies could control discourse in collaboration with the Prime Minister's Office, energy agencies, and security agencies. If the government aims to create a recentralization policy, the energy agencies could be central to selecting the ideas for framing the discourse. These offices and agencies and social and environmental agencies would become the advocacy groups for framing and articulating discourse. In order to create the renationalization policy, the Prime Minister's Office would play a leading role in framing discourse along with the collaboration of various advocacy groups

such as economic agencies, energy agencies, energy business companies, security agencies, NGOs, and scholars

The research findings present lessons learnt for civil society groups with at least two perspectives: how to compose civil society groups in forming the social movements and what kinds of ideas and concepts were selected to frame a discourse for creating wide support from ordinary people and setting a powerful discussion to the policymakers. This dissertation illustrates that under the liberalization policy stream, the affected local people would be a prominent civil society group who plays a leading role in discussing the government discourse and the policy package of liberalization. These discourses cover environmental and health problems, social class, transparency of external investigations, democracy, and local socio-economic development. The advocacy groups who articulate these ideas include environmentalist groups, local business groups, political groups, activist groups, academics, artist, and international organizations.

Under the recentralization policy stream, the urban middle-class groups would become the center of ideas for framing the discourse. The labor unions, consumer groups, and political activist groups would become the advocacy group who shares the same ideas and concepts with the urban middle-class groups. The ideas that were selected based on the concerns over energy prices, the concept of energy public enterprises as a national asset, and the problem of corruption.

Under the renationalization policy stream, both local people and urban middle-class groups would share the leading role. Moreover, the composition of advocacy groups would extend to include various civil society groups. When the various civil society groups are included into the network, the discourse to discuss with the government discourse and the policy package would combine variety sets of ideas and concepts such

as energy prices, environmental and health concerns, democracy, criticizing energy capitalist, public energy enterprises as belonging to the nation.

Finally, another finding of the study contributes to Thai political studies. This dissertation identifies how the civil society movement directly shifted energy policies. Previous explanations could only show the correlation between civil society movements and the shifts of energy policies. For example, the demonstrations of local community movements such as the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement, the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plan Movement, or the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Gas Pipeline Movement could put a pressure on the government to change the energy policies[384]. However, the current study further identifies when the social movements exactly affect energy policies, who are participants in those movements, and what is the effect on the energy policies.

The research finding illustrates that civil society movements directly affected energy policy processes in 2014. Because, the representatives of urban middle-class movements who formed the Anti-EGAT and PTT Privatization Movement and the Energy Reform Movement became a decision maker in the official government institutions. In 2014, Rosana Tositakul, a key leader of the Anti-EGAT and PTT Privatization Movement was appointed by the Prayuth government to be a member of National Energy Reform Committee. Moreover, Kornkasiwat Kasemsri, a key leader of the Energy Reform Movement also was appointed by the Prayuth government to become a member of the Committee for Study of Setting National Oil Company. Rosana and Kornkasiwat frequently proposed the renationalization of the electricity and petroleum energy enterprises in the public. After Rosana and Kornkasiwat became a member of those committees, the proposal of setting National Oil Company (NOC), a full petroleum

[384] Sukkumnoed and Nantaworakhan, *An Analysis of Energy Public Policy Process*, 2016.

state-owned enterprise was proposed by the committees to create the renationalization of petroleum enterprises.

6.3 Recommendation for the future area of research

To address the research limitations, the guiding questions and suggestions for future researches are provided in response to each limitation.

The author of this dissertation was not able to access the full meeting proceedings of the government agencies such as the NEPC, NERC, and cabinet which recorded the full conversation of all relating government agencies on the state energy-enterprise policy. By the limitation of data accessibility, this research cannot identify the specific ideas and concepts that the government agency uses to discuss between each other for the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy. In this sense, this dissertation would not clearly categorize the actor networks along with the concept networks, what is a specific idea that each actor network relies on, and which groups of government agencies share that specific idea. If there is a chance to access the data sources that describe the full discussion of each government agencies, it would be useful for future researches to thoroughly interpret ideas, interests, and preferences of each government agencies in framing discourse for the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy. This interpretation would lead to construct an in-depth explanation regarding the networks of government agencies and idea or concept networks in Thailand's energy policy arena.

This dissertation concentrates heavily on a single unit of analysis, which could not provide comparative analyses across space for comparing the characteristics of the Thai case to other countries. In this sense, future studies should select Thailand case to compare with other countries that face with the transitions of state energy-enterprise policy from liberalization to renationalization for finding the various policy models, sets

of ideas and concepts in energy policy discourses, and characters of actor network composition. The results from the comparative study would generalize the basic condition in designing the politics of energy policy transition. For example, future research should compare Thailand's state energy-enterprise policy with that of other members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that have faced the renationalization of public utilities (e.g., Indonesia)[385]. This comparison will elaborate on the conditions needed for designing an energy policy transition transnationally.

This dissertation mainly uses qualitative discourse analysis. The research findings will be used to provide patterns of ideas and concepts for an energy policy transition. However, because of the natural limitations of the qualitative analytical approach, the research results cannot specifically generalize the findings to the population of texts on the state energy-enterprise policy: what is the most popular language, idea, and concept that is used in the energy policy documents. This type of finding would further discuss which set of ideas should be put forward as a basic set of idea to ally the advocacy groups. Future studies should combine the qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis to provide a better understanding of the number of repetitions and the exploratory patterns of idea and concept in the framing of discourses.

[385] Jessica Jaganathan and Wilda Asmarini, "Indonesia's Push to Nationalize Energy Assets Could Chill Foreign Investment," *Reuters*, August 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-oil-upstream-analysis/indonesias-push-to-nationalize-energy-assets-could-chill-foreign-investment-idUSKCN1LE0TE (accessed March 16, 2019).

Appendix 1: Using Thai case by scholars in the three international journals of energy policy and politics

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
Energy Policy (1992-March 2019)			
20, 1992	Sanga Sabhasri and Prida Wibulswas (Engineering)	Thai energy sources and related environmental issues	Energy resources: Thailand; Environment
22, 1994	Giap van Dang, Le Binh Minh and Suvit Yodmani (Energy& Technology)	Key challenges facing Thailand in the context of global CO2 emission abatement	CO~ emissions; Emission abatement strategies; Thailand
32, 2004	T. Limpasuwan, J.W. Bialek, W. Ongsakul, B. Limmeechokchai (Energy technology and engineering)	A proposal for transmission pricing methodology in Thailand based on electricity tracing and long-run average incremental cost	Electricity transmission pricing; Thailand
32, 2004	Donna Green (Energy& Environment)	Thailand's solar white elephants: an analysis of 15 years of solar battery charging programmers in northern Thailand	Photovoltaics; Thailand; Rural development

Journal/ Issue/ Year	**Author(s)/ background**	**Title of article**	**Key words**
32, 2004	Somporn Tanatvanit, Bundit Limmeechokchai, Ram M. Shrestha (Engineering)	CO2 mitigation and power generation implications of clean supply side and demand-side technologies in Thailand	Clean supply-side option; Demand-side management; Integrated resource planning
33, 2005	Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Arjaree Ussanarassamee (Energy& Economy)	Changes in energy intensities of Thai industry between 1981 and 2000: A decomposition analysis	Energy intensity; Industrial energy; Thailand; Divisia decomposition
24, 2006	N. Yamtraipat, J. Khedari, J. Hirunlabh, J. Kunchornrat (Engineering)	Assessment of Thailand indoor set-point impact on energy consumption and environment	Air conditioning; Electrical energy saving; GHGs emissions
34, 2006	Surapong Chirarattananon, Supattana Nirukkanaporn (Engineering)	Deregulation of ESI and privatization of state electric utilities in Thailand	Electric supply industry; Deregulation; Privatization
35, 2007	Martin Goedeckeb, Supaporn Therdthianwong, Shabbir H.	Life cycle cost analysis of alternative vehicles and fuels in Thailand	Alternative vehicles and fuels; Life cycle cost; Thailand

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
	Gheewala (Engineering)		
35, 2007	Ram M. Shrestha, Sunil Malla, Migara H. Liyanage (Energy& Environment)	Scenario-based analyses of energy system development and its environmental implications in Thailand	Scenarios; Thailand energy system development; CO2 emission
35, 2007	Thanawat Nakawiro, Subhes C. Bhattacharyya (Energy& Economy)	High gas dependence for power generation in Thailand: The vulnerability analysis	Natural gas dependence; Vulnerability; Thailand
35, 2007	Yacob Mulugetta, Nathinee Mantajit, Tim Jackson (Energy & Environment)	Power sector scenarios for Thailand: An exploratory analysis 2002–2022	Thailand; Energy scenarios; Energy policy
35, 2007	Thu Lan Thi Nguyen, Shabbir H. Gheewala, Savitri Garivait (Energy & Environment)	Energy balance and GHG-abatement cost of cassava utilization for fuel ethanol in Thailand	Cassava ethanol (CE); GHG abatement cost; Life cycle assessment (LCA)
35, 2007	Thu Lan T. Nguyen, Shabbir H. Gheewala, Savitri Garivait (Energy &	Fossil energy savings and GHG mitigation potentials of ethanol as a gasoline substitute in	Molasses-based ethanol; Energy balance; GHG abatement cost

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
	Environment)	Thailand	
36, 2008	Philipp Weiss, Thierry Lefevre, Dominik Most (Energy &Environment)	Modelling the impacts of CDM incentives for the Thai electricity sector	Sectoral CDM; Renewable energies; Modelling
36, 2008	Thu Lan T. Nguyen, Shabbir H. Gheewala (Energy &Environment)	Fuel ethanol from cane molasses in Thailand: Environmental and cost performance	Molasses-based gasohol; Environmental performance; Cost performance
36, 2008	Thanawat Nakawiro, Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Bundit Limmeechokchai (Energy& Economy)	Expanding electricity capacity in Thailand to meet the twin challenges of supply security and environmental protection	Electricity capacity expansion; Natural gas dependence; Vulnerability
36, 2008	Tritib Suramaythangkoor, Shabbir H. Gheewala (Energy &Environment)	Potential of practical implementation of rice straw-based power generation in Thailand	Rice straw power plant; Global warming potential; Thailand

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
37, 2009	Manjula Siriwardhana, G.K.C. Opathella, M.K. Jha (Energy & Environment)	Bio-diesel: Initiatives, potential and prospects in Thailand: A review	Bio-diesel; Thailand; Energy policy
37, 2009	Mayurachat Watcharejyothin, Ram M. Shrestha (Energy & Environment)	Effects of cross-border power trade between Laos and Thailand: Energy security and environmental implications	Cross-border energy trade; Hydropower resource development; Integrated energy system model of Laos and Thailand
38, 2010	Thapat Silalertruksa, Shabbir H. Gheewala (Energy& Technology)	Security of feedstocks supply for future bio-ethanol production in Thailand	Bio-ethanol; Feedstocks security; Thailand
38, 2010	Seksan Papong, Tassaneewan Chom-In, Soottiwan Noksa-nga, Pomthong Malakul (Engineering)	Life cycle energy efficiency and potentials of biodiesel production from palm oil in Thailand	PME; Crude palm oil; Net energy value

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
38, 2010	Ali Hasanbeigi, Christoph Menke, Apichit Therdyothin (Energy & Environment)	The use of conservation supply curves in energy policy and economic analysis: The case study of Thai cement industry	Energy-efficiency policy; Conservation supply curve; Cement industry
39, 2011	David R. Bell, Thapat Silalertruksa, Shabbir H. Gheewala, Richard Kamens (Energy& Economy)	The net cost of biofuels in Thailand—An economic analysis	Economic analysis; Biofuels; Thailand
39, 2011	Thirayoot Limanond, Sajjakaj Jomnonkwao, Artit Srikaew (Engineering)	Projection of future transport energy demand of Thailand	Transportation energy consumption; Neural network; Log-linear model
39, 2011	Piya Parnphumeesup, Sandy A. Kerr (Engineering)	Stakeholder preferences towards the sustainable development of CDM projects: Lessons from biomass (rice husk) CDM project in Thailand	Clean Development Mechanism; Stakeholder preferences; Sustainable development

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
55. 2013	Suthin Wianwiwat, John Asafu-Adjaye (Energy & Economy)	Is there a role for biofuels in promoting energy self-sufficiency and security?: A CGE analysis of biofuel policy in Thailand	CGE model; Energy policy; Biofuels
62, 2013	Panida Thepkhun, Bundit Limmeechokchai, Shinichiro Fujimori, Toshihiko Masui, Ram M. Shrestha (Energy& Technology)	Thailand's Low-Carbon Scenario 2050: The AIM/CGE analyses of CO2 mitigation measures	Thailand low carbon scenarios; GHG mitigation co-benefits; AIM/CGE model
91, 2016	Anuman Chanthawong, Shobhakar Dhakal (Energy& Technology)	Stakeholders' perceptions on challenges and opportunities for biodiesel and bioethanol policy development in Thailand	Stakeholders' perceptions; Biodiesel; Bioethanol; Thailand
94, 2016	Warathida Chaiyapaa, Miguel Esteban, Yasuko Kameyama (Social Science)	Sectoral approaches establishment for climate change mitigation in Thailand upstream oil and gas industry	Sectoral approaches; Upstream O&G industry; Climate change mitigation; Thailand

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
95, 2016	Sopitsuda Tongsopit, Sunee Moungchareon, Apinya Aksornkij, Tanai Potisat (Engineering)	Business models andfinancing options for a rapid scale-up of rooftop solar power systems in Thailand	Business models; Solar PV; Thai PV market; Solar financing
98, 2016	Tharinya Supasa, Shu-San Hsiau, Shih-Mo Lin, Wongkot Wongsapai, Jiunn-Chi Wu (Engineering)	Has energy conservation been an effective policy for Thailand? An input–output structural decomposition analysis from 1995 to 2010	Hybrid input-output; Embodied energy decomposition; Energy efficiency; Structural decomposition analysis
109, 2017	Thanapol Tantisattayakul, Premrudee Kanchanapiya (Energy& Technology)	Financial measures for promoting residential rooftop photovoltaics under a feed-in tariff framework in Thailand	Grid connected rooftop photovoltaics; Feed-in tariff Financial measures; Residential sector
120, 2018	Warathida Chaiyapaa, Miguel Esteban, Yasuko Kameyama (Social	Why go green? Discourse analysis of motivations for Thailand's oil and gas	Thailand; Oil and Gas companies Discourse analysis; Company

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
	science)	companies to invest in renewable energy	annual reports; Renewable energy investment
120, 2018	Chumphol Aunphattanasilp (Social science)	From decentralization to renationalization: Energy policy networks and energy agenda setting in Thailand (1987–2017)	Energy politics in Thailand; Energy agenda setting network; Energy decentralization policy; Energy centralization policy; Energy renationalization policy
127, 2019	Shirley S. Ho, Tsuyoshi Oshita, Jiemin Looi, Alisius D. Leong, Agnes S.F. Chuah (Energy & Communication)	Exploring public perceptions of benefits and risks, trust, and acceptance of nuclear energy in Thailand and Vietnam: A qualitative approach	Nuclear energy; Public perception; Thailand; Vietnam; Focus group; Trust
127, 2019	Piyanon Kaenchan, Nattapong Puttanapong, Thongchart	Macroeconomic modeling for assessing sustainability of bioethanol production in	Bioethanol; Computable general equilibrium; Socio-economic

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
	Bowonthumrongchai ,Kitti Limskul, Shabbir H. Gheewala (Energy Technology & Economy)	Thailand	impacts; Air emissions; Irrigation water
129, 2019	Shengwen Tang, Jingtao Chen, Peigui Sun, Yang Li, Peng Yu, E. Chen (Engineering)	Current and future hydropower development in Southeast Asia countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar)	Hydropower; Southeast Asia; Renewable energy; Energy demand
129, 2019	Onicha Meangbua, Shobhakar Dhakal, John K.M. Kuwornu (Energy& Environment)	Factors influencing energy requirements and CO2emissions of households in Thailand: A panel data analysis	Energy requirements; CO2emissions; Panel data analysis; Thailand
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews (1997-March 2019)			
7, 2003	Somporn Tanatvanit, Bundit Limmeechokchai, Supachart Chungpaibulpatana (Energy&	Sustainable energy development strategies: Implications of energy demand management and renewable energy in Thailand	Energy conservation; CO2 mitigation; Energy demand analysis; Least-cost electricity

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
	Technology)		generation expansion planning
11, 2007	Bundit Limmeechokchai, Pawinee Suksuntornsiri (Engineering)	Embedded energy and total greenhouse gas emissions in final consumptions within Thailand	GHG emissions; Energy intensity; Input–output analysis; Full-energy-chains-analysis; Clean electricity generating technology
11, 2007	Bundit Limmeechokchai, Pawinee Suksuntornsiri (Engineering)	Assessment of cleaner electricity generation technologies for net CO2mitigation in Thailand	Full-energy-chains analysis; CO2emission; Cleaner power plant technology; Input–output analysis
11, 2007	Bundit Limmeechokchai, Saichit Chawana (Engineering)	Sustainable energy development strategies in the rural Thailand: The case of the improved cooking stove and the small biogas digester	Improved cooking stove; Traditional cooking stove; Biogas digester; The residential sector;

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
			CO2 emissions; Ranking of barriers; Sustainable energy triangle strategy; Biogas pool project
11, 2007	N. Phuangpornpitak, S. Kumar (Energy& Environment)	PV hybrid systems for rural electrification in Thailand	PV hybrid system; Rural electrification; Technical performance; Financial analysis; Prospects
12, 2008	Janthana Kunchornrat, Rattanachai Pairintra, Pichai Namprakai (Energy& Technology)	Sustainable energy management in urban transport: The public's response of road congestion pricing in Thailand	Road congestion pricing; Traffic management; Public's response survey; Fuel saving
14, 2010	Tawatchai Jaruwongwittaya, Guangming Chen (Engineering)	A review: Renewable energy with absorption chillers in Thailand	Solar energy; Absorption chiller; Thailand

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
14, 2010	Jakapong Pongthanaisawan, Chumnong Sorapipatana (Energy& Environment)	Relationship between level of economic development and motorcycle and car ownerships and their impacts on fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emission in Thailand	Vehicle ownership; Fuel consumption; Greenhouse gas emission; Economic development; Thailand
15, 2011	Narumitr Sawangphol, Chanathip Pharino (Energy& Environment)	Status and outlook for Thailand's low carbon electricity development	Low carbon electricity; Renewable energy expansion; Fuel diversification
15, 2011	Chumnong Sorapipatana, Suthamma Yoosin (Energy& Environment)	Life cycle cost of ethanol production from cassava in Thailand	Thailand; Cassava; Ethanol cost; Competitive price
15, 2011	Songsak Sakulniyomporn, Kuskana Kubaha, Chullapong Chullabodhi (Energy& Environment)	External costs of fossil electricity generation: Health-based assessment in Thailand	External cost; Electricity externality; Impact pathway approach; Health impact; Air

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
			pollution
16, 2012	Ghaffar Ali, Vilas Nitivattananon, Sawaid Abbas, Muazzam Sabir (Energy& Environment)	Green waste to biogas: Renewable energy possibilities for Thailand's green markets	Green waste; Biogas; Benefit–cost ratio; Talaad Thai; Renewable energy; Solid waste management
16, 2012	Jutamanee Martchamadol, S. Kumar (Energy& Environment)	Thailand's energy security indicators	Energy security indicator; Energy policy; Thailand
16, 2012	Tritib Suramaythangkoor, Zhengguo Li (Energy& Environment)	Energy policy tools for agricultural residues utilization for heat and power generation: A case study of sugarcane trash in Thailand	Policy tools; Agricultural residues; Cane trash; Heat and power; Thailand
24, 2013	Parinya Pongsoi, Somchai Wongwises (Engineering)	A review on nuclear power plant scenario in Thailand	Nuclear energy; Nuclear power plant; Thailand

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
24, 2013	Aumnad Phdungsilp, Teeradej Wuttipornpun (Engineering)	Analyses of the decarbonizing Thailand's energy system toward low-carbon futures	Carbon emissions; Decarbonization; Energy scenarios; Low-carbon energy systems
24, 2013	Aumnad Phdungsilp, Teeradej Wuttipornpun (Engineering)	Analyses of the decarbonizing Thailand's energy system toward low-carbon futures	Carbon emissions; Decarbonization; Energy scenarios; Low-carbon energy systems
31, 2014	Sakkarin Chingulpitak, Somchai Wongwises (Engineering)	Critical review of the current status of wind energy in Thailand	Wind energy; Wind energy potential; Wind farm; Electricity; Renewable energy; Thailand
37, 2014	Ishani Mukherjee, Benjamin K. Sovacool (Policy Studies)	Palm oil-based biofuels and sustainability in southeast Asia: A review of Indonesia,	Palm oil; Biodiesel; Southeast Asia; Sustainability

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
		Malaysia, and Thailand	
43, 2015	Sujeetha Selvakkumaran, Bundit Limmeechokchai, Toshihiko Masui, Tatsuya Hanaoka, Yuzuru Matsuoka (Engineering)	A quantitative analysis of Low Carbon Society (LCS) measures in Thai industrial sector	Low carbon society; Counter-measures; AIM/Enduse; Energy security; CO2mitigation co-benefits
46, 2015	Phouphet Kyophilavong, Muhammad Shahbaz, Sabeen Anwar, Sameen Masood (Energy& Economy)	The energy-growth nexus in Thailand: Does trade openness boost up energy consumption?	Energy; Trade; Growth; Thailand
46, 2015	Kanit Aroonrat, Somchai Wongwises (Engineering)	Current status and potential of hydro energy in Thailand: a review	Review; Current status; Hydro energy
48, 2015	Aksornchan Chaianong, Chanathip Pharino (Engineering)	Outlook and challenges for promoting solar photovoltaic rooftops in Thailand	Solar rooftop energy; Solar PV policy; Renewable energy; Energy security; Low carbon

Journal/ Issue/ Year	Author(s)/ background	Title of article	Key words
			electricity; Thailand
58, 2016	Nares Chimres, Somchai Wongwises (Engineering)	Critical review of the current status of solar energy in Thailand	Solar energy; Current status; Thailand; Adder; PV
Energy Research & Social Science (2014-March 2019)			
34, 2017	Britta Rennkamp, Sebastian Haunss, Kridtiyaporn Wongsa, Araceli Ortega ,Erika Casamadrid (Social Science)	Competing coalitions: The politics of renewable energy and fossil fuels in Mexico, South Africa and Thailand	Renewable energy; Middle income countries; Public policy
35, 2018	Laurence L. Delina (Social Science)	Whose and what futures? Navigating the contested coproduction of Thailand's energy sociotechnical imaginaries	Sociotechnical imaginary; Energy transitions; Thailand; Energy policy
42, 2018	Laurence L. Delina (Social Science)	Energy democracy in a continuum: Remaking public engagement on energy transitions in	Energy democracy; Thailand; Energy transitions; Community

Journal/ Issue/ Year	**Author(s)/ background**	**Title of article**	**Key words**
		Thailand	energy
49, 2019	Jens Marquardt, Laurence L. Delina (Social Science)	Reimagining energy futures: Contributions from community sustainable energy transitions in Thailand and the Philippines	Prefigurative activism; Sociotechnical imaginaries; Social mobilization; Southeast Asia

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9. A former member of NERC, a former energy professor from Chulalongkorn University, and an owner of solar energy company, October 23, 2017.

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