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Otsu, Takahiro
九州大学大学院言語文化研究院

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In Other Words and I Mean/ You Mean:

Reformulation and Metarepresentation¹

Takahiro Otsu

1. Introduction

It has been commonly asserted that discourse markers *in other words* and *I mean/ you mean* contribute to the discourse relation with the preceding utterance by way of restatement. The meaning of these two expressions has not been clearly differentiated. They contribute to similar discourse functions including replacement repairs (Schiffrin 1987: 302). Considering the written and spoken corpus data, the co-occurrence of these two discourse markers is rare: 2 occurrences of *I mean in other words*, 3 occurrences of *in other words I mean*, 2 occurrences of *you mean in other words* and no occurrence of *in other words you mean* (BNC); 7 occurrences of *I mean in other words*, 3 occurrences of *in other words I mean*, 1 occurrence of *in other words you mean* and no occurrence of *you mean in other words* (Wordbanks). The low frequency of the combination also suggests that these two discourse markers serve a similar function in conversation. Consider examples (1) and (2), in which both discourse markers are acceptable.

- (1) I think this is a carefully balanced proposal. I think it's high-minded but I think it's fair-minded. **In other words/I mean**, it's got something in it to offend everyone.²
- (2) A: So I don't have to worry about getting beat by another car.
B: **In other words/ You mean**, all you have to worry about is get-

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2 Example (1) is taken from a movie *The Firm* and *I mean* is added to it.

ting beat by other drivers.³

In (1), both *in other words* and *I mean* occurring in a monologic context indicate that the following utterance is a restatement for the clarification of the preceding utterance. On the other hand, in (2), *in other words* and *you mean* occur in a dialogic context, which indicates that the following utterance is regarded as a restatement confirming the preceding utterance. As these pairs indicate, *in other words* seems interchangeable with *I mean/ you mean*.

Fraser (1990) excludes *I mean* from the group of discourse markers because it signals a speaker attitude of solidarity, not a sequential discourse relationship that genuine discourse markers contribute to making (p. 392). In this respect, *I mean* is commonly classified not as a discourse marker but as a filler, which is flexibly inserted in any sentential position (sentence-initial, -middle and -final) depending on the interaction between speaker and addressee in the flow of discourse, manifesting different discourse functions according to the type of interaction. *I mean* can be clearly distinguished from the pure discourse marker *in other words*, which has definite discourse functions.

In Relevance Theory, discourse markers are indicators that constrain the inferential phase of utterance interpretation: i.e. they reduce the effort required by the addressee for the process of utterance interpretation by restricting the range of hypotheses he has to check in order to arrive at an optimally relevant interpretation (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 21). In this sense, the discourse marker *in other words* contributes to optimal relevance of utterance interpretation by reducing the processing effort for the addressee to recognize the inferential relation between the original utterance and what is restated. Unlike discourse markers, some procedural expressions seem to be linked to capacities such as mind-reading, emotion reading, social cognition, and so on, rather than comprehension (Wilson 2011: 25-26). Fillers including *I mean* belong to this type of procedural expressions.

The purpose of this article is to differentiate the cognitive mechanism motivated by the use of *in other words* and *I mean/ you mean*. within a relevance-

3 Example (2) is taken from a movie *Days of Thunder* and *you mean* is added to it.

theoretic framework. The special focus of this article is on the relation between these two expressions and metarepresentation, a relevance-theoretic notion dealing with the interpretive use of a representation to represent another representation. The current relevance-theoretic account of discourse markers attempts to differentiate the subtle shade of meaning of similar discourse markers even though they belong to the same coherence or speech act category (Blakemore 2002: 170; 2004: 235).⁴ This suggestion is available in the procedural expressions such as *in other words* and *I mean* that serve similar discourse functions. Especially, there has been no clear definition of the meaning encoded by *I mean*, though their discourse functions have been frequently accounted for. On this issue, Blakemore's relevance-theoretic account of *in other words* as a reformulation marker will shed light on the difference in cognitive mechanisms involving the use of these two expressions.

2. Previous Studies

2.1. *I mean*

The meaning and discourse function of *I mean* have been accounted for in various frameworks. Crystal and Davy (1975: 97) define the meaning of *I mean* as the speaker's clarification of the meaning of the immediately preceding expression. This clarification may be made for a number of contextual reasons and take a number of forms. James (1983) deals with this expression within a set of discourse particles termed "compromisers" that have pragmatic, interpersonal and social-behavioral dimensions of meaning.

In addition to the multi-dimensional use, *I mean* has two distinctive uses which stem from the two meanings of the verb 'mean'. Schiffrin (1987: 304) explains the polysemy of 'mean' as follows.

I mean marks modifications of both propositional information and speaker

4 The necessity for closer examination of procedural constraints and cognitive effects is indicated in the distinctive analysis of similar discourse markers *but*, *however* and *nevertheless* (Blakemore 2000: 479-484; 2002: 115-128). The distinction between *because* and *after all* is also accounted for based on the conceptual-procedural distinction (Rouchota 1998: 34-35).

intention. This is due not only to the polysemous meaning of the predicate ‘mean’, but to the meta-linguistic and meta-communicative qualities of the expression which go beyond a focus on the semantic properties of the linguistic code to include a focus on the speaker’s use of and reaction to the code.

Schiffrin (1987: 304) claims that *I mean* indicates “a speaker’s upcoming modification of the ideas or intentions of a prior utterance”. In this dichotomy, the meta-linguistic use as a modifier of the speaker’s ideas corresponds to Erman’s (1987) micro-level use, while the meta-communicative use, indicating the speaker’s intentions or communicative act, corresponds to Erman’s macro-level use. Erman’s micro-level use introduces a clarification or mitigation of some part of a previous phrase at a proposition level and the macro-level use introduces a justification, modification and mitigation of a previous statement at a discourse level (pp. 118-119). Consider then example (3), the micro-level meta-linguistic modification, and example (4), the macro-level meta-communicative modification.

- (3) Is there a doctrine about that — **I mean** a doctrine about disfavouring American applicants should there not be one...
(Erman 1987: 109)
- (4) B: You like it there do you Monica?
A: Well I love it there in a way. **I mean** I don’t want to stay there forever. Obviously or else it’ll be terribly bad for me. **I mean** it’s been bad enough for me as it is. (Erman 1987: 96)

I mean in example (3) clarifies the referent of the demonstrative pronoun “that” by adding more specific information, while it mitigates the previous utterance in example (4). In addition to the dichotomy, it is pointed out that there is some parallelism in meaning between *I mean* and *in other words*. According to Schiffrin (1987: 303), the use of *I mean* as a repair of ideas is parallel to the meta-linguistic expression *in other words*. Compare Schiffrin’s examples (5) and (6).

- (5) But he still carries it on and becomes sickening — sickening when y’see it, see. **I mean** he’s sick, from that.
- (6)
 - a. When *you* keep getting hurt, you become a cripple.
 - b. and when you’re a cripple you’re prej...
 - c. **In other words**...they’re cripples because they’re so so religious is what — is the point I’m trying t’make.
 - d. **In other words** they’re sick. Religiously.

According to Schiffrin, *I mean* in (5) substitutes “sickening” with “he’s sick”, while *in other words* in (6c) substitutes “prejudice” with the idea that religious orthodoxy is what cripples people, and “cripples” is substituted with “sick” in (6d). Schiffrin therefore concludes that “the explicit phrase *in other words* and the marker *I mean* both preface substitutions in replacement repairs (p. 302).”

It is evident that *I mean* forms various discourse relations. The research on its discourse functions seems to have been following the notion of modification and its multifunctions have been classified under this overall notion. Using ‘adjustment’, a similar notion of modification, Fox Tree and Schrock (2002: 741-742) classify the multifunctions of *I mean* as interpersonal, turn management, repairing, monitoring and organizational. Consider the turn-management examples (7a-c).

- (7)
 - a.
 - A: they tend not to be so dramatic, do they,
 - B: I I think it is true that, a sort of
 - A: **I mean** you’re not going to get a sort of medal for uh, drafting a beautiful new bill or something like that

(Fox Tree and Schrock 2002: 741)
 - b. the interview was — it was alright **I mean** handled it like a competent undergraduate (Svartvik and Quirk 1980: 88)
 - c. if the response is enthusiastic, well then **I mean**...

(Svartvik and Quirk 1980: 393)

Fox Tree and Schrock claim that the turn- or utterance-initial use indicates that the speaker contributes an adjustment to the speaker’s prior utterance (7a), the

utterance-medial use (7b) indicates that the speaker adjusts what the speaker just said, and the utterance-final use (7c) indicates that the speaker means something else, but leaves the adjustment off record. In spite of the account for the relation between sentence positions and the types of adjustment, it seems vague what cognitive activity ‘adjustment’ indicates: i.e. how adjustment to the prior turn, adjusting what the speaker just said and correction differ, and how something else the speaker wants to convey off record is related to the prior discourse.

In contrast with Fox Tree and Schrock’s functional classifications based on negotiation strategies, the classifications of Brinton (2003, 2007) and Yamada (2011) are more purely based on discourse functions. Brinton classifies the appositional uses of *I mean* as repair, reformulation (meaning ‘in other words’), explicitness (similar in meaning to ‘namely’ or ‘that is’), exemplification (meaning ‘for instance’), cause (meaning ‘because’), speaker attitude (conveying that ‘I’m serious when I say’), interpersonal meaning (hedging).⁵ Yamada’s (2011: 54-60) classifications are ‘supplement’ (8a), ‘restatement’ (8b), ‘clarification’ (8c), ‘reasoning’ (8d), ‘concluding’ (8e), ‘emphasis’ (8f) and ‘faltering’ (8g).⁶

- (8) a. Tom: Would you like to go out for a bit to eat? **I mean**, do you fancy a curry, a Chinese, or an Italian?
 Jess: Oh, I love... Lasagne and canne-linguini and pasta.
 b. Then, you add the peaches — **I mean**, the apricot.
 c. I hope to teach in public schools in New York, **I mean** New York public school.
 d. I don’t want to bother them now. **I mean**, they are eating.

5 According to Brinton’s (2007: 58-59) semantic account for the development, *I mean* developed from the meta-linguistic function (such as repair, clarification or exemplification), the meta-communicative and subjective function (such as reformulation, emphasizing, evaluating or speaker attitude) to the meta-communicative and intersubjective function (such as explanation of cause or interpersonal meaning).

6 As a matter of fact, examples (8a-g) are mixed with the micro-level use and the macro-level use: *I mean* in (8b) and (8c) is micro-level, while the one in the others is macro-level.

- e. A: Jimmy is taller than Tommy.
B: I know. But he is only 4 feet tall — **I mean**, he is extremely short.
- f. You will come back tomorrow, won't you? **I mean**, promise me that!
- g. [Daniel, who is Morey's husband, gazed at her almost with awe and stumbled over his words]
You are...you are...**I mean**, the Reverend Mores is a very lucky man, Mrs Morey.

Summarizing his arguments briefly, the following invitation supplements the preceding invitation to go out for something to eat in (8a), “apricot” is a restatement or repair for “peaches” in (8b), “New York public school” is a clarification of one of the “public schools in New York” in (8c), the following clause serves as a reason for stating the preceding utterance in (8d), “extremely short” is a conclusion or summary of the “only 4 feet tall” in (8e), the following clause empathizes that the preceding utterance is a promise in (8f), and the following clause is the speaker's hesitation in saying what he wants to say in an unplanned discourse in (8g). As a matter of course, we cannot deny the possibility that *I mean* may form other discourse relations. From these observations, Yamada concludes that *I mean* encodes a procedural constraint of correcting or adjusting the content of the preceding utterance. But this conclusion still remains vague and insufficient because there are other procedural expressions that meet this definition and those expressions must be differentiated in another procedural way (or in more cognitive terms).

2.2. *In other words*

The discourse marker *in other words* has developed from the adverbial phrase that can become complex such as *in other concise words*. Blakemore (1996, 2002) thus claims that the discourse marker use of *in other words* contributes to the explicit side of communication as a reformulation marker. Consider Blakemore's example (9).

- (9) A: I'm afraid I will have to let you go.
 B: **In other words**, I'm fired. (Blakemore 2002: 183)

In (9), “fire” is a rephrased representation of “let go”. This reformulation contributes to the conceptual content of the preceding expression. The relevance of this reformulation marker lies in the way it instructs the addressee to recover a proposition of the form (10) as a higher-level explicature of the original utterance.

- (10) The speaker believes that P is a faithful representation of a thought Q.
 (Blakemore 1996: 340)

In other words encodes constituents of higher-level explicatures which communicate the speaker's belief that the reformulation P is relevant as a faithful representation or interpretation of a thought Q communicated by the original utterance (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 228-229; Blakemore 1997: 8; Blakemore 2002: 183). In (9), the propositional form “I'm fired” can be said to be relevant as an interpretation of the original utterance (9A). That is why the reformulated utterance as a representation of another utterance cannot be truthful but more or less faithful to the original. In this respect, Blakemore concludes that *in other words* encodes a conceptual constraint on constructing high-level explicatures.

In contrast with Blakemore's conceptual account, Murillo (2004) claims that this reformulation marker is both conceptual and procedural in that it restates explicatures and procedurally contributes to the recovery of higher-level explicatures of the host utterance (i.e. explicates implicatures), as well.⁷ Con-

7 Tanaka (1997: 372-375) makes a similar remark and his examination of the dialogic use can be recaptured in relevance-theoretic terms. In the interpretation of (iB),

(i) A: I shall be in Japan the last week of September.

B: **In other words**, you'll miss the department meeting.

speaker B's conclusion (i.e. speaker A will miss the department meeting) is inferentially derived from the basic explicature of utterance A and speaker B's “background information” (Tanaka's term) or an implicated premise regarding speaker B's assumption that speaker A would attend the department meeting.

sider Murillo's examples (11) and (12), in which *in other words* makes an implicated conclusion explicit.

- (11) Among the statistics released last week was the real stocker: One-third of British homes have three or more television sets. Television, **in other words**, is increasingly a solitary experience.
- (12) Nearly everyone in the study believed people who boasted or used positive statements were 'significantly more competent' than the humble speakers. **In other words**, stress your good points hard enough and people start to believe you: but put yourself down constantly and they won't think you are endearingly modest, they'll think you are as useless as you say you are!

Murillo does not merely deny the contribution of reformulation markers to the construction of higher-level explicatures in a conceptual manner but explicates that it also involves inferential processes of utterance interpretation in a procedural manner (p.2066). *In other words* introduces a conclusion and a consequence derived inferentially from the original utterance, respectively. In (11), the reformulated proposition "Television is increasingly a solitary experience" is certainly a higher-level explicature of the preceding utterance "One-third of British homes have three or more television sets", but such a conclusion is implicated in that the derivation of the conclusion is based on the inferential process involving the enrichment of implicated premises regarding an appropriate number of televisions within a single family and so on, in addition to the preceding utterance. Similarly, in (12), the higher-level explicature of the host utterance — a consequence derived from the original utterance (i.e. the preceding utterance) — is constructed through an inferential process that determines the representation of a thought as a consequence derived from the preceding utterance. Therefore, it seems to be an insufficient description of the utterance interpretation to merely say that a high-level explicature of the preceding utterance is a representation of a thought. Thus, *in other words* contributes to the explicit side of communication in terms of the recovery of explicatures or higher-level explicatures and the implicit side of communication in terms of making explicit

implicated or contextual assumptions in multiple ways, as well (p.2066).⁸

Most of the reformulations are more often likely a conclusion or consequence derived from the preceding utterance. But other discourse functions are derived. Example (13) indicates a reason for stating the preceding utterance and example (14) is a clarification of the preceding utterance.

- (13) The amazing thing is that oil companies don't have to pay for the oil they take from the North Sea. In every other country in the world, royalties have to be paid to the government. But not in Britain. **In other words**, governments here have chosen to tax the consumer instead of the oil companies. Shell spokesman Eric Nickson suggested there was no direct relationship between the price of crude oil and the company's huge profits. (WB: SUNNOW_0014)⁹
- (14) A 1992 survey showed that the sex ratio for newborn infants had reached 118.5 boys for every 100 girls; a normal ratio is 105.5 boys for 100 girls. **In other words**, more than 12 percent of all Chinese baby girls go missing every year (which makes 1.7 million, or 85 times the number of women at the UN conference), because they are hidden or adopted by relatives, most because they are prevented from entering the world in the first place, aborted once their sex is identified by the parents. (WB: OZNEWS_0044)

As example (13) indicates, the preceding utterance is restated as a reason why oil companies in Britain do not have to pay for the oil they take from the North Sea to the British government. In example (14), *in other words* clarifies the nature of the problem. These examples indicate that *in other words* performs vari-

8 Murillo's and Tanaka's (1997) observations respond to the recent theoretical development of the conceptual-procedural distinction. Procedural expressions function to activate "procedures whose main function is to help the hearer understand an utterance by finding the intended combination of context, explicit content and cognitive effects" (Wilson 2011: 12). There is no reason why a single lexical item should not encode both a concept and a procedure (Wilson 2012: 3).

9 WB (Wordbanks) is followed by the document ID of examples.

ous discourse functions as does *I mean*, and both expressions have some discourse functions in common. This discussion poses a new question of how *in other words* and *I mean* produce similar discourse functions — reformulation, clarification, cause-effect relations or the derivation of a conclusion, to say the least of it — and complicates the semantic and pragmatic distinction between these two expressions.

3. Reformulation and Metarepresentation

Section 2 has revealed that *I mean* and *in other words* are multifunctional and have some overlapping in their discourse functions: they have a micro-level (or phase-level) use that modifies a speaker's ideas as repairs or replacement repairs on the one hand, and a macro-level (or a discourse-level) use that modifies a speaker's intention or communicative act producing various discourse functions on the other. If we wish to describe the meaning of *in other words* and *I mean*, we need to investigate the cognitive mechanism in the use of these expressions, not the surface-level discourse functions including modification, adjustment, correction or clarification, all of which seem to be a coherence or speech act notion.

The starting point of the examination of *in other words* and *I mean* is that they are linguistic devices that reflect the speaker's restatement or reformulation of the original phrase or utterance. This implies that the use of both expressions involves the interpretive resemblance between two representations. The interpretive use of thoughts or utterances involves three distinct cognitive abilities with regard to what is represented (Wilson 2000: 414). They are called metapsychological, metacommunicative, and metalogical abilities, as briefly outlined in (15a-c).

- (15) a. When mental representations (e.g. thoughts) are interpreted, metapsychological abilities are involved.
- b. When public representations (e.g. utterances) are interpreted, metacommunicative abilities are involved.
- c. When abstract representations (e.g. sentences or propositions) are interpreted, metalogical abilities are involved.

The metapsychological abilities in (15a) and metacommunicative abilities in (15b) manage representations such as thoughts or utterances attributed to someone other than the speaker, or attributed to the speaker at some other time, whereas the metalogical abilities in (15c) manage only non-attributed representations characterized as sentences or propositions. Metarepresentation involves a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded inside it. The higher-order representation is generally an utterance or a thought. Three main types of lower-order representations are public representations (e.g. utterances), mental representations (e.g. thoughts) and abstract representations (e.g. sentences or propositions). Accordingly, theoretically speaking, six types of metarepresentations are conceivable, as is indicated in (16a-f).

- (16) a. public representation of public representation
- b. public representation of mental representation
- c. public representation of abstract representation
- d. mental representation of public representation
- e. mental representation of mental representation
- f. mental representation of abstract representation

Among (16a-f), (16a-c) are regarded as linguistic metarepresentation, while (16d-f) are non-linguistic metarepresentation. The subtype of the metarepresentational use of utterances (such as (16a)) has the interpretive use based on resemblance in content and the metalinguistic use based on resemblance in form (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 224-231; Noh 2000: 74-75). Reformulation is the typical example of metarepresentations based on the interpretive use, and the interpretive use of reformulation markers including *in other words* belongs to a public representation of a public representation (as in (16a)) in the sense that some utterance is restated or reformulated by another utterance. In this use, the original utterance and the reformulated one resemble each other, and the reformulated utterance shares some of its logical and contextual implications with the original utterance (Blakemore 1996: 338).

Interpretative resemblance is also involved in the restatement by *I mean*. As Schourup (1985: 147) investigates, *I mean* indicates that what is said (what

the speaker has said) and what is meant (what the speaker has in mind to express) are not well matched (substantially nonequivalent), so has the effect of producing a repair or correction to avoid misunderstanding. But the question is where the utterance as a repair or correction comes from. I would claim that *I mean* verbalizes a thought (i.e. what the speaker has in mind to express) of the previous utterance. In this respect, metarepresentation regarding the use of *I mean* involves a public representation of a mental representation (as in (16b)) and the interpretive resemblance is formed between the thought (of the previous utterance) and the reformulation. Reformulations are involved in the use of *in other words* and *I mean*, but the difference is that the former expression makes the reformulated utterance relevant as a representation of the previous utterance which it resembles, while the latter makes the reformulated utterance relevant as a representation or a thought of the previous utterance which it resembles.

Metarepresentation (a representation of another representation) regarding the use of *I mean* and *in other words* has a mirror image relation in encoding and decoding processes of human verbal communication. In the use of the former expression, the reformulated utterance is a thought encoded by the original utterance in an encoding process; in the use of the latter expression, the reformulated utterance is an interpretation of the original utterance in a decoding process. In this respect, the restatement by *in other words* is addressee-oriented, whereas the restatement by *I mean* is speaker-oriented. *I mean* forms a wide range of relations between the original utterance and the reformulated one, and those relations are frequently less identifiable.¹⁰

The different relations between these two expressions and metarepresentation predict the interchangeability of the two expressions. In examples (8a-g) and (11-14) above, *in other words* seems to be replaced with *I mean*, but not vice versa. It is probably reliable to think that *in other words* in those examples is not replaced with *I mean*. This is because an interpretation of the original utterance can be a thought encoded by it, but a thought encoded by the original can never be an interpretation of the utterance. In examples (1) and (2), both expressions

10 Compared with *in other words*, *I mean* makes manifest various discourse functions and conveys even the speaker's attitude, such as emphasis, veracity, evaluation and sincerity, all of which *in other words* cannot restate (Brinton 2007: 50-52).

are acceptable because these examples are invented in such a way that *I mean/you mean* are added to the original utterance which includes *in other words*. The acceptability of both expressions stems from different cognitive motivations.

These differences of cognitive motivation account for why *in other words* does not employ a discourse function such as repair and why *I mean* does not require the original utterance to be restated. Examples (17-19) are the repair use of *I mean*.

- (17) A: Was he short and fat like me?
 B: He was tall and skinny.
 A: Yeah? Now, describe that man his clothes, describe his clothes.
 B: Black, **I mean** brown jacket. (BNC: FMA)¹¹
- (18) The friends clung to one another, absolutely petrified. No-one said a word. Bang, bang! Middle put his big brown eye to the hole in the wall and looked out. "It's the sheep ... **I mean** the wolves!" he gasped. (BNC: HH3)
- (19) He described General George Marshall, the revered Defence secretary, as "a man steeped in falsehood, always and invariably serving the policy of the Kremlin". He said Hiss had been a supporter of Stevenson whom he called "Alger ... **I mean**, Adlai Stevenson." (BNC: ASC)

In these examples, *I mean* cannot be replaced with *in other words* because genuine repair is not an interpretation of the original phrase or utterance.¹² Schifffrin (1987) and Erman (1987) divide the use of *I mean* as meta-linguistic (micro level) and meta-communicative (macro level), and they define the repair use as the typically meta-linguistic use. However, the repair use also belongs to the meta-communicative use in the sense that the replacement is based on the resemblance between language and thought. It is evident that the speaker in (17) and (18) does not use the terms "black" and "sheep" the wrong way. "Black"

11 The codes following BNC (British National Corpus) indicate the filenames of examples.

12 Schifffrin's term "replacement repair" (meta-linguistic substitution) in examples (5) and (6) is not the same as the genuine repair in examples (17-19).

and “sheep” are uttered not as a linguistically encoded concept but an ad-hoc concept, a concept that is pragmatically adjusted according to context (Carston 2002). In (17), the speaker does not use the word “black” for the brown jacket but communicates that he recognizes the man’s clothes have a dark or blackish color. In (18), on the other hand, the speaker looked through the hole of the wall and called the wolves “sheep”, but the speaker called so in the sense of the wolves in sheep’s clothing. In both examples, the restated words “brown” and “wolves” form a resemblance to the thought ‘dark or blackish’ or ‘the sheep in disguise of the wolves’. In (19), it is thought that the speaker uses the first name of Alger Hiss, an Adlai Stevenson’s supporter, to show their closeness. Even in this example, the restatement by *I mean* indicates a resemblance between the two persons. In these examples, the speaker neither attempts to deny the linguistically encoded concept of “black” and “sheep” nor identifies a person with a name of Alger Stevenson. Therefore, they are not the same as the following rewording.

- (20) Not black but brown jacket.
- (21) It’s not the sheep but the wolves.
- (22) ...whom he called not Alger Stevenson but Adlai Stevenson.

I mean occurs even in a case where the original utterance is not identified. This is also because this expression restates the speaker’s thought. Consider examples (23) and (24).

- (23) A: I don’t think smoking’s good for you at all and I’m not proud of the fact that I’ve smoked and I think if we can reduce it in girls especially in schoolchildren I think it’s a very positive thing.
 B: Mm. I agree. **I mean** even though I I have smoked I I also agree and I also think there’s nothing worse than sitting in a restaurant or being out somewhere and smoking.
 (WB: UKSPOKEN_0600)
- (24) A: Erm and I got an award from the college didn’t I for engineer

of the year type thing and got my photograph in the paper.
company name promotion their only female technician.

B: And what do people say to you **I mean** outside that world?
What's your what's your gran think?

A: Erm I don't know. (WB: UKSPOKEN_0248)

In (23) and (24), restatements do not stem from the previous utterance but the speaker's thought. The dialogic contexts may not guarantee the successful recognition of the speaker's thought. In (23), it is considered that speaker B uttered the previous utterance "I agree" with the meaning "even though I have smoked" (assuming that speaker A already recognized speaker B's smoking habit), but speaker B anticipates that such an additional meaning is not successfully recognized by speaker A. Example (24) restates "outside that world", which does not have the original utterance in previous discourse. This is presumably because speaker B uttered "people" referring to 'people outside the engineering world' but speaker B assumed that speaker A might not recognize such a thought.

You mean is an indicator that occurs in a dialogic context and confirms a thought encoded by another speaker's utterance. *In other words* can be used in the same context of confirmation. Consider then the difference of the functions of the two indicators.

- (25) A: Well I'll ring him up. See if he's in.
B: **You mean** you're not going to show off to John?
A: Oh yeah. (BNC: KCL)
- (26) A: Well that's what the life insurance is for, to pay the house off.
B: Oh! Put that against the value of the house.
A: Oh, great!
B: So
A: So **in other words** the money from your life insurance will pay the mortgage?
B: Yes. (BNC: KSV)

In these dialogic uses, *you mean* confirms a thought of speaker A's utterance

(underlined) in (25), while *in other words* in (26) confirms a representation or interpretation of speaker B's utterance (underlined). In both examples, the restatement has an interrogative form and follows the addressee's back-channeling "Oh, yeah" and "Yes", which indicate that the restatement is correct.

4. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to differentiate the cognitive mechanism motivated by the use of *in other words* and *I mean* — both of which serve as reformulation markers in discourse — within a relevance-theoretic framework. Reformulation is a verbal act based on the interpretive resemblance between the original and the reformulated. In the case of *in other words*, the reformulated utterance is used to represent the original utterance, and interpretive resemblance is formed between the original utterance and the interpretation of the utterance. Meanwhile, in the case of *I mean*, the reformulated utterance is used to represent the thought encoded by the original utterance, and interpretive resemblance is formed between the original utterance and the interpretation of the thought encoded by the utterance. This metarepresentational viewpoint consequently leads to the investigation of the distinctive procedural constraints encoded by both expressions and their cognitive efforts, and this is a topic I would like to pursue in more detail in future research.

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